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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
This thesis takes as its subject the foundation and rise to commercial power of the British 
Managing Agencies in Calcutta in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As 
private partnerships they initiated and controlled a substantial body of commercial, 
industrial and agricultural concerns, in transport, coal, jute, financial services and, 
importantly, in tea.
This topic has been largely ignored by other business historians, who have preferred to 
study the Managing Agencies’ eventual decline and extinction during the following half- 
century. However, it is equally instructive to examine the health and vigour that 
propelled young businesses towards the power and prosperity which blossomed before 
1914.
The thesis examines in some detail five Managing Agencies and the individual 
entrepreneurs who founded and ran them, necessarily selected according to the 
availability and usefulness of primary sources but providing a reasonably representative 
range of characteristics and business activities. In the course of this examination the 
thesis also examines the industries in which they were particularly engaged-jute, 
transport, tea, coal and indigo.
However the insistence of Indian nationalist historians on the privileged position of 
British business rather than the merits of its performance which has suggested the issues 
which the thesis particularly examines:
the degree of commercial skill possessed by British incomers;
the impact of imported British technical innovation, notably steam power and 
mechanised jute textile production;
the possibility that British commercial interests colluded to erect barriers to entry 
for Indian entrepreneurs;
the importance of access (possibly preferential) to British investment capital and 
bank finance;
the extent of preferential support from the imperial government; 
the absence of competitive Indian entrepreneurial activity before 1914.
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INTRODUCTION
The Managing Agency institution
This thesis takes as its subject the foundation and rise to commercial power of the 
British Managing Agencies in Calcutta in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. As private partnerships they initiated and controlled a substantial 
body of commercial, industrial and agricultural concerns, in transport, coal, jute, 
financial services and, importantly, in tea.
Maria Misra summarised the position: "By the late nineteenth century there were 
about sixty significant managing agency houses, of which a dozen had capital 
assets of between £100,000 and £2 million. Most British private direct investment 
in India in the colonial period was represented by the Managing Agencies, and 
by 1914 they controlled capital of over £200 million in India."1 If there were sixty 
such firms, each with an average of four partners, it is indeed remarkable that 
fewer than 250 mainly Scottish entrepreneurs were collectively responsible for 
generating such growth. This invites an exploration of the factors which 
contributed to their achievement: those personal qualities which made them 
entrepreneurs; the context of a rapidly developing commercial and technological 
environment; the apparent lack of indigenous competition.
This topic has been largely ignored by other business historians, who have 
preferred to study the Managing Agencies' eventual decline and extinction 
during the following half-century. Maria Misra is one such, and more 
substantially B. R. Tomlinson has returned to the subject of "decolonisation" 
several times.2 It is as though a forensic dissection to find the cause of death is 
seen as more instructive than an examination of the health and vigour that 
propelled young businesses towards the power and prosperity which blossomed 
before 1914.
1 Maria Misra, Business, Race and Politics in British India c. 1850-1960, Oxford, 1999, pp. 3- 
4.
2 B. R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj: the Economics of Decolonisation 1914- 
1947, London, 1979; 'Colonial Firms and the Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 
1914-1947', Modern Asian Studies 15, 3 (1981), pp. 455-86; 'British Business in India 1860- 
1970/ in R. P. T. Davenport-Hines and Geoffrey Jones [eds], British Business in Asia since 
1860, Cambridge, 1989; The Economy of Modern India: 1860-1970, Cambridge, 1993.
Although most of them were started in the mid-nineteenth century it was not 
until 1936 that the Managing Agency achieved a legal definition: "a person, firm 
or company entitled to the management of the whole affairs of a company by 
virtue of an agreement with the company and under the control and direction of 
the directors except to the extent, if any, otherwise provided for in the agreement 
and includes any person, firm or company occupying such position by whatever 
name called".3 What this meant in practice was that a Managing Agency 
effectively had total control of the managed company, with the shareholders 
exercising no more than nominal authority.
Mostly the firms started very modestly with two partners and perhaps an. 
assistant, as a conventional agency house (what would be called an 
im port/ export agency today). They traded opportunistically in a wide variety of 
goods. For example, Finlay's, a substantial Scottish concern and to that extent 
atypical, opened their Calcutta branch office relatively late, in 1870, and it 
exported raw cotton, imported cotton piece-goods, and to a lesser extent coal, 
iron and other metals. Shellac, hides, vegetable wax, buffalo horns, rice, yam, 
silk, jute and gunnies were shipped with varying success while salt, beer and 
wine were imported.4
To these functions the agencies soon came to add the promotion of new 
enterprise, forming companies, drumming up investments, investing some of 
their own money and, most lucratively, providing management services on very 
long contract. In north-east India they promoted tea estates, jute mills, coal 
mines, shipping lines, flour mills, paper mills, cement factories, engineering and 
construction concerns and even ice factories. In the twentieth century there were 
also Managing Agencies operating in western India, mainly in the cotton 
industry, but here the British were much less successful in gaining a substantial 
foothold, and after a few false starts they left the field to Indian business. The 
exception was Finlays', who managed three cotton mills in the West in the 
twentieth century.
3 In the Amending Act of 1936, amending the Companies Act of 1913, cited in 
Lokanathan, The Managing Agency System, p. 19.
4 [James Finlay & Co.] James Finlay & Company Limited: Manufacturers and East India 
Merchants 1750-1950, Glasgow, 1951, p. 90.
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R. S. Rungta provides a useful table of companies founded or existing in Calcutta
in the early days between 1817-1850:
Managing Agents
Bengal Bonded Warehouse 
Association
Calcutta Docking Company 
Steam Tug Association 
Union Steam Tug Association 
Eastern Steam Navigation Co 
Benares & Mirzapore Steam Co 
Calcutta Steam Terry Bridge Co
1838
1830 Rustomji Cowasji
1837 Carr, Tagore & Co.
1850 Apcar & Co
1848
1847
1839 Carr, Tagore & Co.
P & 0 Steam Navigation Co (reg in 1840
UK)
India General Steam Navigation Co 1844 Carr, Tagore & Co
18205 Carr, Tagore & CoBengal Coal Company 
Sylhet Coal Company 1847
1848 
1839
Bengal Indigo Company 
Assam Company (reg in UK) 
Bowreah Cotton Mills 
New Fortgloster Mills Co
1817/18
18486
Notably no British Managing Agencies were listed as operating then.
The pioneering enterprise of Dwarkanath Tagore and his British partners in Carr, 
Tagore, founded in 1834, set out a blueprint7 for Managing Agency practice in 
1836 when they promoted the formation of the joint stock Calcutta Steam Tug 
Association and assumed its management.8 This pattern, deliberately or not, was 
followed closely for as long as the system survived, including the opportunities 
for playing both ends against the middle where interdependent companies were 
under the same management. The history of the rise and fall of Tagore's 
remarkable business is brilliantly detailed by Blair B. Kling9, and its fall 
undoubtedly cast a long shadow over the decade following the failure of the
5 Rungta derived this date from E. J. C Stewarf s Facts and Documents relating to the Affairs 
of the Union Bank of Calcutta, Appendix E, Calcutta, 1848, but Kling (see footnote 10) 
states that Naraincory Proprietors, creditors of Gilmore and Company, "in 1843 .. .joined 
with Carr, Tagore and Company to form a joint-stock association, the Bengal Coal 
Company, which remained under the management of Carr, Tagore and Company."
6 R. S. Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations in India 1851-1900, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 
274/75.
7 Ibid., p. 225, suggests that the true prototype was the appointment of Mackintosh, 
Fulton & McClintock by the Union Society, an insurance business formed in Calcutta in 
1814, but this seems somewhat specialised and academic.
8 Blair B. Kling, "The Origin of the Managing Agency System in India', Journal of Asian 
Studies, 2 6 ,1, (1966), p. 37.
9 Blair B. Kling, Partner in Empire -  Dwarkanath Tagore and the Age of Enterprise in Eastern 
India, Berkeley, 1976.
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Union Bank in 1848 and of Carr, Tagore itself soon after. But the other businesses 
Carr, Tagore built, by promoting initial investment and by assiduous 
management, survived the catastrophe: The Steam Tug Association (1837), The 
Bengal Tea Association (1839 -  merged into the Assam Company), the Bengali 
Coal Company (1843) and the India General Steam Navigation Company (1844) 
all flourished, the last two well into the twentieth century.
The published statistics show that by 1956 companies under Managing Agency 
control accounted for 71.2% of the paid-up capital of all public companies in 
India excluding banking and insurance. Between them, the 17 leading managing 
agencies managed 359 companies with an aggregate paid-up capital of Rs 114 
crores or 25% of the total paid-up capital of all companies under the managing 
agency system; and 33% of the total paid-up capital of the jute, iron and steel, 
cement, paper, tea and coal industries.10
The contribution made by the Managing Agencies to the Indian economy is 
partly illustrated by the changes over time in the share of India's total exports of 
three important export commodities which they were active in promoting:
Jute*
%
Tea
%
Indigo
%
1860-1 1.1 0.5 5.7
1870-1 0.6 2.1 5.8
1880-1 1.5 4.2 4.8
1890-1 2.5 5.5 3.1
1900-1 7.3 9.0 2.0
1910-11 8.1 5.9 0.2
1920-1 22.1 5.1 -
1930-1 14.5 10.7 -
1935-6 14.5 12.3 -
^manufacturers
However, the selective emphasis of economic histories and, indeed, the selective 
availability of archival material discount the major economic activities in non­
export fields to which the Managing Agencies contributed. While shipping 
(Mackinnons) can certainly be categorised as export-orientated, railways and coal
10 Raj K. Nigam, Managing Agencies in India (First Round: Basic Facts), Department of 
Company Law Administration, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of 
India, cited by P. S . Lokanathan in The Managing Agency System: A  Review of its Working 
and Prospects of its Future, National Council of Applied Economic Research,
Delhi/Bombay, 1959, pp. 38-41.
11 Tomlinson, Economy of Modern India, p.52, citing R. K. Chaudhuri, 'Foreign Trade and 
Balance of Payments (1757-1947)', Cambridge Economic History of India, 2, table 10.11.
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mining (Birds' and GiUanders) were export-led only to the extent that they 
served shipping. In addition, at least two Managing Agencies not studied in 
detail in this thesis developed entirely domestic enterprises: Balmer Lawrie 
managed an engineering and construction company, a flour mill, a paper mill, a 
cement factory and an ice factory; Octavius Steel managed substantial concerns 
in electricity generation and distribution, starting with the first street lighting in 
Calcutta, as well as a limestone processing factory and a sugar mill.
The Managing Agencies also handled more modem and substantial import 
business than in the earlier days of the agency houses, when a miscellany of 
goods were often imported speculatively, with the trade in cotton piece-goods 
dominant. From the later nineteenth century the Managing Agencies held sole 
sales agencies for a variety of British (and sometimes European or American) 
specialist suppliers. The Lawrie archive, for example, details the sales agencies 
which Balmer Lawrie promoted at the Calcutta exhibition in 1883, and lists 
twenty-eight of them, of which eighteen were for machinery, three for steel and 
structures, three for mining and three for miscellaneous products (which would 
have included Laphroaig whisky).12 The list included steam engines, tea 
machinery, portable railway rolling stock, oil, steel, pipes and fencing.
A long time later, in 1934, Arthur Stuart, then hurra sahib of Balmer Lawrie in 
Calcutta, wrote and cabled London in strong terms supporting Tata Iron and 
Steel's demands for an increase in duty on steel imports, in spite of the fact that 
they held the sales agency for a British steel manufacturer as well as for Tata.13
It is, perhaps, ironic that official statistics about Managing Agencies were not 
compiled until 1954-55, well after Independence, during the run-up to the 1956 
Companies Act which effectively passed a death sentence on the Managing 
Agency system.
The accusation which prompted the legislation was ostensibly that unscrupulous 
Managing Agencies could manipulate the basis for calculation of their 
commission to their own advantage rather than that of the shareholders, an 
opportunity frequently protected by an unreasonably long-term management
12 Michael Manton (ed), Camellia - the Lawrie Inheritance, Wrotham, 2000, privately 
printed, p. 41.
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contract (thirty years in some cases).14 A nationalistic desire to curtail foreign 
commercial power was also, of course, a considerable motive, although in fact 
the principal abuses seemed to be by Indian agencies in western India rather than 
by British agencies in the north-east.
A history of business in ultimately terminal decline can be seen as a satisfactory 
proxy for the decline of Empire itself, but it is argued that the effects of the British 
Managing Agencies' early success were very largely beneficially incremental, and 
did not displace or suppress or deliberately exclude competitive indigenous 
activity.
The commercial environment
The sudden burst of commercial activity in Calcutta in the early 1860s was more 
likely a by-product of the promise of tea than a response to the political changes 
following the Mutiny. The East India Company's trading monopolies had long 
gone, but it is possible that there was a new sense of re-established security 
following the trauma of 1857, and a new sort of confidence:
To the English from 1859 to the early part of the twentieth century, the Mutiny 
was seen as a heroic myth embodying and expressing their central values which 
explained their rule in India to themselves -  sacrifice, duty, fortitude; above all it 
symbolized the ultimate triumph over those Indians who had threatened 
properly constituted authority and order.15
Another, more rational, spur to development will have been the Companies Act 
of 1857, which allowed limited liability to all companies bar banks and insurance 
companies, and set out some rudimentary regulations for their conduct. 
Investment in shares now carried more acceptable risks.
Nevertheless, the "tea mania" of 1862 was preceded by a wave of wildly 
speculative investment in virtually any business that cared to incorporate itself,
13 Ibid., p. 77.
14 The most common doubtful practice was to base commission on turnover rather than 
profit, which encouraged the agency to load expenditure with heavy charges for the 
procurement of supplies, for one example.
Bernard S. Cohn 'Representing Authority in Victorian India7 in The Creation of 
Tradition, Erie Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, edsv Cambridge, 1983, p. 179.
and this was almost certainly a response to the boom conditions deriving from 
the rise in cotton prices when the American Civil War erupted. There were many 
small-scale trading activities which offered the chance of profit to partnerships 
which were not particular about specialisation and which were not yet in more 
formal shape as managing agents.
In Calcutta the early establishment of British enterprises was a chaotic process, 
pursuing random and varied opportunities as they turned up, deploying "smart" 
instincts and light-footed structures. Quite often they failed: if history is written 
by the victors, the history of businesses is written by the survivors. Ernest Cable, 
who joined Bird's in 1880, went on to make it one of the most powerful 
companies in India, and became a peer in the process, illustrates the point in 
passing in his charmingly disjointed memoir:
I was brought out to Calcutta at the age of eleven, as the winters were giving me 
throat diseases, and completed my education, such as it was, at Mussoorie. On 
the death of my father I had to do something, and so I gave up studying to be a 
civil engineer and my mother made Morgan, of Ashbumers, give me a post at Rs 
100 a month, at the age of 17, in 1877; in (I think) 18801 joined Lyall Rennies 
(Ashburners having closed) and when the latter firm failed Bird's took me on at 
Rs 300 a month.16
Dead partnerships were buried in an unmarked grave, but the death of 
companies was registered. Rungta provides a sobering table showing that, out 
of 1,149 companies registered in India between 1851 and 1882, 646 were wound­
up, a brutal casualty rate which suggests that the survival of our entrepreneurs 
was not only a question of physical health. The total of wound-up companies 
includes 55 in tea, 8 jute mills, 3 in coal and 36 in navigation.17
"Men of ordinary ability and initiative"
In north-east India the scale of the British business success and of the dominance 
it achieved in the following fifty years invites enquiry into a number of issues. 
This thesis examines in particular how the commercial context of mid-nineteenth
16 M. S. Jacomb-Hood, A History of Bird & Co 1864-1929, Calcutta, 1929, pp. 19-20.
17 Rungta, Rise of Business Corporations, p. 284.
century Calcutta favoured the creation of new enterprise, and what may have 
been the specific triggers for new endeavours -  legislative change, technical 
developments and botanical discoveries among them. It also studies the reasons 
for the absence of effective indigenous competition, but questions the contentions 
that it was the result of British political hegemony, of barriers to entry set up by 
deliberately restrictive commercial collusion, of restricted access to British 
finance, or of simple racial antagonism.
More broadly it is necessary to attempt some explanation for the success of a 
small group of men, most of whom were of modest means and modest skills, 
who may well have made the voyage to Calcutta with high hopes but who will 
not have had any clear perspective of the shape of the future, for example in 
terms of a resolve to dominate a particular industry. A historian must take care 
not to attribute visionary prescience to any of the individuals, who in the 1860s 
would certainly not have recognised the possibility of the dominance they would 
achieve, nor have described the path ahead in the contemporary American 
frontier phrase "manifest destiny".
Most scholars ascribe the success of the British Managing Agencies to their ability 
to import commercial know-how into a fledgling economy. The American D. H. 
Buchanan, writing in 1934, says:
This period of industrial development and investment coincided with one in 
which business ability and capital were flowing from Europe, and from the 
British Isles in particular, out into various parts of the world -  the United States,
. Canada, Australia and South Africa, not to mention the West Indies, China and 
Malaya. India could hardly fail to be touched, for it possessed large amounts of 
raw material, ready markets and an abundant supply of untrained but cheap and 
tractable labour. As Indians themselves were unfamiliar with the conduct of 
modern business, entrepreneurs and capital had to be imported. With 
pioneering and colonising traditions, Englishmen and Scotsmen naturally came 
to fill the need.18
Buchanan's paternalistic tendencies, which permeate his book, are in evidence 
here. But he does not attempt to substantiate his claim that Indians were 
unfamiliar with the conduct of modem business, even after a long period of 
working with the East India Company; nor does he explain why capital had to be 
imported.
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S.K. Basu, writing in 1958, says:
History, geography and economics, as it has been well observed, have all 
combined to create and develop the Managing Agency system which is India's 
unique contribution in the field of industrial organisation...[Possibly a truism: it 
is difficult to think of an industrial organisation which is not the product of 
history, geography and economics.] .. .Its origin can indeed be traced to the 
social and economic conditions which prevailed in India at the time when the 
monopoly of trade was lost by the East India Company. In the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, India offered plenty of opportunities to enterprising business 
men. There were, however, important obstacles in the way of the exploitation of 
these business opportunities. First, there was a shortage of entrepreneurship; 
secondly there was a dearth of venture capital; and last but not least, there was a 
lack of technical and particularly managerial knowhow. The Managing Agency 
system was evolved to meet this challenge.19
Basu does not explain what he means by entrepreneurship nor why there should 
be a shortage, and repeats Buchanan's claim that there was a shortage of capital. 
It is certainly likely that there was a lack of technical expertise at a time of rapidly 
developing engineering techniques, but it is anachronistic to suggest that 
"managerial know-how" was an established skill at the time.
A. K. Bagchi, writing in 1972, says:
The initial advantages of the British businessmen in most fields of industry could 
not be doubted; they were, after all, in touch with the world's pioneer 
industrialising country.20
Bagchi had some more critical things to say about the British, but here is clearly 
supporting the idea of superior British knowledge as one key to their success.
Maria Misra, writing in 1999, said very much the same thing, although she 
perceptively adds to the list of the Managing Agencies' strengths "a reputation 
for reliability and creditworthiness":
The Managing Agency structure had been an ideal solution to the problems of 
Indian industrial development in the middle and late nineteenth century. At a 
time when there was a shortage of modem entrepreneurial skill, no organised 
capital market, and a high level of general uncertainty and risk, the managing 
agents provided venture capital, management skills, and a reputation for 
reliability and creditworthiness...
So both the agencies, who were able to mobilize the scarce resources of capital, 
entrepreneurship and management in late nineteenth century India, and the
18 D. H. Buchanan, The Development of Capitalistic Enterprise in India, New York, 1934, p. 
143.
19 S. K. Basu, The Managing Agency System in Prospect and Retrospect, Calcutta, 1958,
p. 1.
A. K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939, Cambridge, 1972, p. 186.
companies and investors who enjoyed the security of agency management, 
benefited from the system.21
Misra's research was principally focussed on Gillanders, Arbuthnot, who did 
indeed export managers with solid business experience and access to British 
capital finance, as did James Finlay & Co, examples which make these 
explanations plausible, but they were exceptional. Most of the individual 
arrivals did not have serious money of their own to invest, had few if any 
wealthy contacts, had only the most rudimentary management skills -  clerical 
and book-keeping for the most part -  and had yet to make any kind of 
reputation. At least four of those who would come to head important Managing 
Agencies (J. H. Williamson of Williamson Magor, the brothers Bird of Bird & Co., 
and C. H. Arbuthnot of Gillanders, Arbuthnot) were maritime captains, some 
deploying their specialist abilities skippering the new steam-driven shipping on 
the inland waterways, until the lure of commercial opportunity brought them 
ashore. Walter Duncan could boast only of a year's apprenticeship in a Glasgow 
firm of merchants and a year in the West Indies (where he was sent to close 
down a business), before he came to Calcutta at the age of 24 as a partner in a 
firm importing cotton piece goods from Glasgow. Alex Lawrie was 19 when he 
came out to Calcutta to join W. H. Smith, Barry, with only two years' clerical 
experience behind him. That they had the makings of talented entrepreneurs is 
evident from their subsequent careers, but they were not sophisticated 
commercial operators when they arrived.
Perhaps the scholar with the most realistic understanding was Lokanathan, who 
said in 1935:
The past was the golden age of the Indian industrial development. There was 
such a vast, unexplored field that the way was very smooth, and men of ordinary 
ability and initiative were able to pioneer in those years.22
In a more rhetorical passage Clive Dewey, writing in 1993 about the Indian Civil 
Service, described the impact of the Indian environment: "India provided the 
element of scale, of expansiveness, which was essential to the full development of 
the middle-class mind. It turned clerks into proconsuls, subalterns into
21 Misra, Business, Race and Politics, pp. 68-69.
22 Lokanathan, Industrial Organisation in India, London, 1935, cited in The Managing 
Agency System, Bombay, 1959, pp. 2-3.
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strategists, traders into merchant princes -  and day-dreamers into philosopher- 
kings.""23
The emigration option and its risks
As we have seen, the new arrivals in Calcutta were by no means aspirant 
mandarins. Their education will have been adequate, and in the case of the Scots 
more than that, but they typically left school at sixteen or seventeen. They were 
usually from middle-middle or lower-middle class families24 and would not have 
had the upper-middle class options of a Church of England living or the 
purchase of an Army commission readily available to them. The class structure 
was, of course, different in Scotland, where educational opportunity was not a 
restricted privilege and where merit was a more important determinant than 
family background, but even there the "mandarin route" was quite out of their 
families" reach -  Haileybury College, followed by two years at university 
(preferably Oxford) and two years at a crammer before taking the fiercely 
demanding ICS examination.. But they all needed jobs at a time when a 
reduction in child mortality had increased the supply of literate or numerate 
young men faster than jobs for them were being created at home, either in the 
family firm or elsewhere.
Going abroad to ""seek your fortune"", or for reasons of conscience, had been a 
familiar choice in Britain for the previous two hundred years (if sometimes made 
from desperation or even under duress). Ferguson writes that ""between the 
early 1600s and the 1950s, more than 20 million people left the British Isles to 
begin new lives across the seas"".25 India was no longer the preserve of those 
with good connections at the East India Company. R. K. Renford, quoting the 
1881 Census Report, says:
23Clive Dewey, Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service, London, 1993, 
p. ix.
The birth certificate in the Public Records Office of Stephen Balmer, a founding partner 
in Balmer Lawrie, shows his father's occupation as "labourer".
25 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, London, 2003, p. 53.
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During the decade 1871-81 some two and a quarter million emigrants had left the 
United Kingdom. For most of these men and women America and Canada were 
the promised land, but as the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made the voyage 
to India quicker and less rigorous and as news of the opportunities there filtered 
through, or the pull of family tradition made itself felt, significant numbers tried 
their luck in Asia. By 1881 the non-official UK-born population in India had 
grown to some 29,000, approximately double its numerical strength of twenty 
years previously.26
However, those who went earlier did not enjoy the benefits of the Suez Canal 
and had to face the hazards of the six-month voyage round the Cape, or the more 
expensive "overland route", across the Sinai peninsula in a camel train.
Although these were relatively commonplace voyages by the mid-nineteenth 
century, shipwreck was frequent enough to represent a real danger. Those who 
made the voyage had to learn to accept risk.
One archival source touches on the voyage in an earlier decade. The letters of 
James Stuart to bis mother begin with his description of his fast passage from 
Spithead in August 1840 round the Cape, arriving in Calcutta in January 1841 to 
take up a "position" at Carr, Tagore.27
In addition to the risks of the voyage to Calcutta, some faced onward voyages by 
inland waterways in "country boats" powered by human (and in particularly 
favourable places animal) muscle, and only occasionally by sail. Wrecks through 
tempest and flood and bad navigation were frequent, and even if the passenger 
could escape by wading ashore, he faced a hostile jungle. The voyage up to 
Assam through the Sunderbands and along the Brahmaputra river could take a 
further three months. Some of these experiences are mentioned in the Lawrie 
archive, and the subsequent growth of steam-powered inland shipping is 
explored by Percival Griffiths in A  History of the Joint Steamer Companies.28
The risks of fatal illness were high in Calcutta and up-country, with malaria, 
tuberculosis, dysentery, cholera, and occasionally bubonic or pneumonic plague 
taking a high toll. Many of the new arrivals (and their wives and children) died
26 R.K. Renford, The Unofficial British in India to 1920, Delhi, 1987, p. 36.
27 The originals of James Stuarf s letters are stated by Blair B. Kling to be in the archives 
of the Rabindra Bharati University in Calcutta, in "the Kshitindranath Tagore m / s 
collection". Typed transcripts (probably arranged by A.N. Stuart when he was in 
Calcutta) are in the possession of the Stuart family and copies are in the Camellia 
archive.
28 London, 1979.
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young, as the old British cemeteries in Park Street in Calcutta and in the mofussil 
record.29 On tea estates a remarkable number of deaths were caused by wild 
animals and snakes (even if the numbers grew as the tales were re-told): there are 
several memoirs by planters in the Lawrie library.
Ferguson tables a proxy indication of mortality risks, showing the death rate 
among British soldiers across the Empire between 1817 and 1838. Bengal is 
shown to be the highest-risk area in India, at one in fourteen, and one of the four 
highest-risk areas in the world.30
Did the traditional tales of wealth available for the taking, of shaking the 
inexhaustible pagoda tree, also warn of the dangers? They cannot have been 
entirely unreported, and it is likely that the young man who chose to face or, 
more likely, ignore them had some insouciant courage, even at a time when the 
risks of death from injury or disease in Britain were acknowledged but not dwelt 
on as an inescapable everyday reality (but nearly five times less dangerous than 
Bengal according to Ferguson's table).
Nevertheless, the British kept coming. Renford quotes these Indian census 
figures:
In 1861 there were...some 15,000 UK-bom non-officials in India (up 8.000 from 
1851 [the partial first Census])... Of the 1,300 British mercantile non-officials in 
India some 500 were in Calcutta...there were recorded in all British India only 
192 indigo planters, 122 tea planters, 96 coffee planters and a mere 53 land 
proprietors who were British bom.
Undoubtedly India was seen as a "land of opportunity" by those with courage 
and an adventurous spirit, those with the makings of entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurs who founded the Managing Agencies in India were mostly 
Scottish, a disproportionate preponderance which reflected the global profile of 
British emigrants and dated back to the particular profile of the East India 
Company's early recruits. Ferguson states th a t" The East India Company was at 
the very least half-Scottish."31
29 Two of Alex Lawrie's partners died within three years of setting up the first 
partnership in 1867.
0 Ferguson, Empire, p. 73.
31 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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Ferguson, himself a Scot, attributes the disproportion to a "greater readiness to 
try their luck abroad", but it seems more likely that economic pressure from an 
over-supply of well-educated young men was the underlying cause.
Indian participation in business
It must be accepted that India was to an extent a protected environment for 
British enterprise, being under British administration, unlike, for example, China 
and South America, but the truism that "trade follows the flag" did not, strictly 
speaking, apply to India, where the East India Company had established 
substantial trading interests well before using military force to protect and 
extend them. Nevertheless, the existence of Empire as a trading environment 
was by no means immaterial, a factor which this thesis explores
In north-east India in the late nineteenth century, after Tagore's failure, British 
business had little or no competition from indigenous enterprise, in contrast to 
the West, where Parsi and Gujarati interests were already gaining a dominant 
commercial position.
Chronologically, the first to examine this peculiarity was the German scholar 
Max Weber, who followed his seminal The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, first published in German in 1904/5, by extending his studies from 
Christianity to other world religions, including Hinduismus und Buddhismas32. 
However, English-speaking readers had to wait until 1930 for publication of a 
translation of The Protestant Ethic and until 1958 for a translation of The Religion of 
India,33 and it was not until 1967 that Morris D. Morris came to publish his 
important and radical critique -  "Values as an Obstacle to Growth in South Asia:
32 Published as one of three volumes of Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen, included in 
the critical edition of the collected works, 1916-1920, Tubingen, 1923, from which 
Weber's original work is generally quoted.
33 Edited and translated by H.H. Gerth and D, Martindale, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958.
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An Historical Survey"34.
Weber concluded that the effects of Hinduism on Indian economic progress were 
"essentially negative", deriving not from any specific religious institution or 
ritual, which "every one of the great religious systems in its way has placed, or 
has seemed to place, in the way of the modern economy. The core of the 
obstruction was rather embedded in the 'spirit7 of the whole system."35 
Weber invoked the rigidity of the caste system and its inability to respond to 
change, and he concluded that caste "sustains tradition no matter how often the 
all-powerful development of imported capitalism overrides it"36. Morris 
summarises the formal position by pointing out that "the hierarchy of castes 
favours those -  Brahman and Kshatrya -  whose functions are unconcerned with 
direct productive activity or accumulation of wealth."37 But Morris goes on to 
doubt the reality of caste obstacles to economic enterprise:
if.. .Hindu theology contained many strands, it is certainly possible that these 
could have been extracted and combined in a variety of ways to rationalise or 
stimulate a variety of economic behaviours ranging from the most passive and 
otherworldly to the most aggressive and profit-maximising.38
Gujarati and Marwari entrepreneurs were subject to the same Hindu ritual 
restrictions as their Bengali counterparts but seem to have had little difficulty in 
reconciling them with their own commercial behaviour. Pragmatism can be a 
powerful modifier of philosophical convictions, as is illustrated by the example 
of the European reinterpretation of Christian prohibitions on usury. In England, 
for example, "so far did legislation lag behind reality that as late as 1552 an Act of 
Parliament prohibited all taking of interest a s 7a vice most odious and detestable7. 
At length, in 1571, this Act was repealed and interest not exceeding ten per cent 
ceased to be criminal."39 Similar evasions are recorded in Judaic practice, which 
sanctioned lending at interest to non-Jews, although the Islamic Sharia 
prohibition is still more generally recognised by substituting equity subscription 
for loan capital.40
34 Journal of Economic History, 2 7 ,4 (1967), pp. 588-607.
35 Weber, Religion of India, pp. 111-12.
36 Ibid,, pp. 122-123.
37 Morris, 'Values as an Obstacle', p. 591.
38 Ibid., p. 595.
39 G.M. Trevelyan, English Social History, London, 1944, p. 120.
40 A useful summary is Wayne A.M. Visser and Alastair McIntosh, "A Short Review of 
the Historical Critique of Usury", in Accounting, Business & Financial History, 8,2, (1998), 
pp. 175 et seq.
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Morris also argues that since British business development tended to concentrate 
on export-oriented opportunities, requiring a good knowledge of foreign markets 
and good contacts within them, Indian business was at a disadvantage. He does 
not appear to consider the possibility that the Hindu doctrine of the polluting 
effect of travel abroad may, over many generations, have built a cultural 
reluctance to engage with foreign trade, and that although foreign trade 
flourished on the West coast, Parsi traders and Muslim sea captains were 
dominant.
Morris argues that Bengali entrepreneurs made rational choices in preferring 
what they saw as the most profitable opportunities -  rural marketing, workshop 
industry and agriculture -  to the newer and more risky fields of jute textile 
manufacture, the railways and plantations. This argument is doubtless partially 
true, but ignores the very important Bengali risk enterprises generated by 
Dwarkanath Tagore, as it does the continuing Bengali (and Bihari) involvement 
in small-scale coal mining and in indigo. And although he dismisses the often- 
stated argument that Bengali Brahmins were (perhaps like their British landed 
gentry counterparts) interested only in agriculture, government service and 
intellectual pursuits, the Calcutta location of the seat of British Government 
(whose officers shared the same predilections) can scarcely have failed to have an 
influence. There was an undoubted confluence between caste and social 
standing, and English (rather than Scottish) middle-class aversion from an 
occupation in trade as distinct from commerce was (and still is) remarkably 
similar to a caste restriction but without spiritual overtones.
Certainly Kling supports the argument that the lack of indigenous (specifically 
Bengali) participation in the m odem  economy in the late nineteenth century can 
in part be blamed on the parallel class rather than caste values seen in
the antibusiness attitudes inherent in the dominant culture of Bengal. This 
dominant culture reflected the values of the Bengal bhadralok...who composed 
the western-educated middle class. It included a preference for occupations 
requiring education, the ownership of land, and an idealisation of the casual, 
simple life of a country gentleman.41
41 Kling, Partner in Empire, p. 5.
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Kling traces the evolution of the bhadmlok back to the establishment of British rule 
in the eighteenth century, and suggests that its attitudes crossed caste differences 
and were shared by all those who "enjoyed the reflected prestige of the new 
rulers, were more or less wealthy, and were interested in European culture".42 
The British creation of zamindari property rights in 1793 eventually encouraged 
prestige land ownership, so that:
the zamindar became a small raja, the effective ruler of the villagers encompassed 
by his estate, and ownership of a zamindari became another measure of social 
status. Though he might still reside in Calcutta and perform his mercantile or 
administrative business, the zamindar acquired a country home where he could 
house his dependents and celebrate his holidays.. .The zamindar's sons were not 
raised in the bustle of city mercantile life, but were brought up as young gentry.43
The Permanent Settlement also had the eventual effect of redistributing many 
holdings, following the dispossession of landlords who defaulted on their tax 
payments..
An equally important factor, however, (and one ignored by Morris) was the 
severe discouragement to venture capital investment arising from the financial 
crisis of 1846 and the disastrous failure in 1847 of the Union Bank, a business 
built on the European model by Dwarkanath Tagore and his British partners.
The failure of the Union Bank may, according to Kling, have had a serious knock- 
on effect in destroying the confidence of Bengali investors in British-style joint 
stock companies and commerce in general. The Bank had been refused limited 
liability status (then conferred only by Act of Parliament) so that shareholders 
were "jointly and severally" liable for all of the company's debts. The liability of 
each shareholder was attributed by a "committee" according to assessed wealth 
rather than size of shareholding. Controversially two wealthy Bengali investors 
-  the brothers Ashutosh and Promothonath Day -  were assessed at Rs 300,000 
(£1,000,000+ at today's values) although they held only 13 shares between them, 
and the committee's judgement was not unreasonably suspected of racial bias. 
The havoc wrought by this catastrophe in the Calcutta business community 
(explored in more detail in Ch. 1.), and the discriminatory penalties on the two 
wealthy Bengali shareholders, effectively put a stop to "native" investment in 
joint stock companies, as a local newspaper noted at the time:
42 Kling, Partner in Empire, p. 6.
43 Ibid., p. 7.
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As to the natives, who it is so desirable to see becoming members of Joint Stock 
Companies, the Union Bank affair has given a death blow to their confidence in 
any such associations. We have heard severed highly-respectable natives declare 
that nothing would induce them to take shares in any of them, and that such was 
the general feeling among their countrymen...44
The first explicit official recognition of the relative weakness of indigenous 
enterprise, at least in eastern India, did not come until the publication in 1918 of 
the radical Report of the Indian Industrial Commission of 1916-1918. The report 
notes that the jute industry had failed to attract Bengali capital investment, but 
provides no sensible explanation beyond the sheer volume of British investment. 
It also notes that there was still significant Bengali participation in the coal 
industry:
The industry is at the present time by no means entirely in the hands of 
Europeans, although they are responsible for the working of most of the largest 
and best developed mines. The majority of Indian enterprises consist of small 
pits or inclines...The coal royalty owners are the local zamindars who under the 
Permanent Settlement are the owners of the mineral rights. They are at present a 
class of mere rent chargers who take little interest in the working of their 
property, although great waste occurs, especially in the mines managed by the 
smaller interests.5
The Report goes on specifically to examine "The Indian in Industries", and 
reflects then current Government of India policy by explaining that this is "in 
order to ascertain the lines along which this tendency may be further 
stimulated". The Report's analysis marks probably the first appearance of the 
discourse which has subsequently been widely accepted:
Indian capitalists generally have followed their ancestral tradition of rural trade, 
and have confined themselves to the finance of agriculture and of such industries 
as already existed.. .Traders took advantage of the changed position merely to 
extend the scale of their previous operations. Like the landlords, they lent money 
to the cultivators and found a profitable investment in landed property. In trade 
and money-lending and, to a less extent, financing village artisans, the trading 
classes found that large and certain gains were to be made; while modem 
industries required technical knowledge, and offered only doubtful, and in most 
cases, apparently smaller profits. The failure of the more intellectual classes to 
take advantage of the new prospects was especially marked in Bengal, where it 
contrasts with the success of European enterprise. Here and in most parts of 
India, these classes grasped eagerly at the prospect of Government, professional, 
and clerical employment...46
The Commission also turned its attention to the financing difficulties experienced
44 Bengal Hukaru., 28 August 1848, cited in Kling, Partner in Empire, p. 223.
45 Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-1918, New Delhi, 1918, pp. 18-19.
46 Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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middle-class industrialists, who are unable to offer the security of 
approved names, or of stocks which could be readily disposed if, Indians 
suffer in a special degree from this deficiency; for, among other reasons, 
they find it difficult to satisfy a bank, whose directorate and staff are 
entirely European, as to their financial position.. .Applicants for assistance 
are often unable to exhibit their financial position in a form intelligible to a 
banker.47
This complaint persisted in subsequent studies, often with a particular emphasis 
on the financing advantages enjoyed by British business. However, bank finance, 
particularly from British banking institutions, was (and still is) a source only of 
short-term borrowing to provide working capital, not of long term investment 
funding, and so was not an immediately relevant factor in the establishment of 
new enterprises. It was equity capital which was required, and here the 
familiarity of the British with the convenient (but still fragile) techniques of 
forming a limited liability company may well have given them an advantage 
over indigenous entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, the implication that British entrepreneurs in India could call on a 
host of potential British investors eager to deploy massive wealth is far from 
borne out by the evidence of the laborious recruitment of small investors from 
the UK families and friends of Lawrie promoters, or even by William 
Mackinnon's success in tapping his mercantile friends in Glasgow for relatively 
small sums. The "big money" seems to have been in Indian hands, with the 
possible exceptions of Gillanders, Arbuthnot and Finlays'.
This was evidenced by Dwarkanath Tagore's ability to marshal the funding 
locally for his enterprises, much of it from his personal and family resources; and 
even by the apparently discriminatory assessments on two of the Bengali 
shareholders in the collapsed Union Bank, which may well have derived from a 
pragmatic calculation by the Committee of the distribution of cash resources. 
European shareholders simply did not have the money to meet the claims.
Indian finance was also freely used by European business, often by advances on 
the hypothecated value of goods yet to be delivered, as well as extended credit
47 Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, p. 213.
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on purchases. Even the well-connected Gillanders, Arbuthnot firm used Indian 
money to finance their enforced move to new office premises in 1840.48
This was not, as might be assumed, a transitional situation while the imperial 
power strengthened its grasp on the economy -  Tomlinson shows that almost a 
century later in the 1930s:
The vital factor...was not an alliance with government; it was instead relations 
with the vast and potentially very powerful 'unorganised' sector of the Indian 
economy, especially the up-country merchants, bankers and credit suppliers who 
controlled so much of Indian economic activity...many industrial undertakings 
depended on rations of credit from their distributors in the form of advances on 
orders to keep going at all in the 1920s and 1930s. The sources of credit and 
capital that such distributors possessed were rooted deep in the indigenous 
economy.49
Nevertheless the dissonance between the long-established Indian credit finance 
system and traditional Western banking practice proved to be an insuperable 
obstacle to comfortable integration: in particular the trail of Indian debt 
guarantees back through an unidentified extended family, supported by 
traditionally axiomatic acceptance of liability rather than by written contract, was 
unacceptable as security to Western bankers. This fundamental cultural and 
procedural difficulty suggests that the reluctance of the banks to lend to Indians 
was not necessarily racially motivated. British trading companies, however, 
dealt with Indian bills -  hundis -  alongside their own, as was mentioned in 
passing by Mookerjee of Gillanders, Arbuthnot, describing the financial crisis of 
1846: "Drafts, Cheques and Hoondies were drawn against us..."50 Morris D. 
Morris makes a parenthetical reference to these factors in commenting on the 
difficulties in raising working capital encountered by both European and Indian 
enterprises:
.. .the inability to integrate the hundi into the m odem credit system despite many 
attempts, suggests that there were deeper and more complex difficulties than 
mere lack of will. One factor was the ambiguity of the rights and obligations 
which afflicted various instruments of property transfer and indebtedness...It is 
probable that foreign businessmen were operating in an environment where
48 S. G. Checkland, The Gladstones: A  Tamil]/ History, 1764-1851, p. 243.
49 B. R. Tomlinson, "Colonial Firms and the Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 
1914-1947", Modern Asian Studies, 15,3 (1981), p. 485, citing "especially" "Note of 
conversation with F. P. Pudamjee 31.7.35", Benthall Papers X, Centre of South Asian 
Studies, Cambridge.
50 Mohendra Nauth Mookerjee, Diary, Glynn/Gladstone MS. 2744, p.2.
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(despite superficial similarities) technical differences in the structure of property 
relations made risks different for them than for the native entrepreneur.51
This citation is extracted from a long review of A. K. Bagchi's important Private 
Investment in India, a seminal polemic from the Indian nationalist school of 
economic historians, which has its roots in the nineteenth century: the Azamgarh 
Proclamation at the time of the Indian Mutiny specifically includes among the 
many grievances the claim: "It is plain that the infidel and treacherous British 
government have monopolised the trade of all the fine and valuable 
merchandise, such as indigo, cloth.. .leaving only the trade of trifles to the 
people."52 In the twentieth century the nationalist discourse seeks to identify an 
Imperialist conspiracy53 which effectively and deliberately excluded Indian 
enterprise from participating in the modernisation of the economy.
A memorable statement of the nationalist position was made by the All-India 
Manufacturers7 Organisation in 1944, when there was much resentment of 
perceived discrimination in Government7s awards of wartime contracts.
Given their much larger world connection and experience, these concerns [non- 
Indian concerns in India] are able to compete on more than equal terms with the 
corresponding Indian concerns in the same field. They obtain all the fiscal 
advantages open to Indians: in addition, they have the silent sympathy from the 
mystic bond of racial affinity with the rulers of the land, which procures them 
invisible, but not the less effective, advantage in their competition with their 
indigenous rivals.54
Bagchi goes on to comment:
However, this social discrimination was complemented and supported by 
political, economic, administrative and financial arrangements which afforded 
European businessmen a substantial and systematic advantage over their Indian 
rivals in India.55
51 Morris D. Morris, "Private Industrial Development on the Indian Subcontinent 1900- 
1939: Some Methodological Considerations7, Modern Asian Studies, 8,4 (1974), footnote 
34, pp. 552-3.
52 Charles Ball, The Histoiy of the Indian Mutiny, London & New York, 1858-59, Vol. 2, pp. 
630-32.
53 In fairness it should also be acknowledged that Bagchi wrote: "One does not have to 
believe in either a "conspiracy7 theory of entrepreneurial dominance or a theory of 
absolute superiority of European businessmen in all fields of activity in order to be able 
to explain their extraordinary degree of control over the economy of eastern and 
northern India." Private Investment in India, p. 185.
54 M. Kidron, Foreign Investments in India, London, 1965, p. 67, citing The All-India 
Manufacturers7 Organisation, Indian and International Economic Policies, "Statement on the 
Agenda of the International Business Conference at Tye, New York, mid-November 
1944", p. 41, in turn d ted  by Bagchi, Private Investment in India, p. 166,.
55 Bagchi, Private Investment in India, p. 166.
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Later he repeats the argument:
Political, racial and social relationships between the rulers and the ruled did in 
fact play an important role in determining the relative performance of Indian and 
European business in India.. .56
Notably Bagchi offers little evidence of specific cases, and reverts several times to 
his principal discourse:
But the systematic maintenance of [the Europeans'] advantages definitely 
depended on erecting barriers to the entry of Indians into their preserves: the 
control of external trade would to a large extent have served as an effective 
barrier to entry because the stimulus to any development that occurred there was 
provided by the impact of expanding world trade. But to the control of external 
trade was added the almost exclusive monopoly of Government patronage and a 
remarkable degree of understanding among European traders and industrialists 
about the ineligibility of Indians as equal partners, particularly in those areas 
where British political and economic dominance had prevailed for a longer 
period of time...the most important feature of the relationship between European 
and Indian capital during the period under consideration, viz., their basic 
antagonism...the persistent advantages enjoyed by the Europeans not only 
because of their early start and acquaintance with external markets but also 
because of the racial alignment of government patronage and the financial and 
other services supporting and reinforcing European control over trade and 
industry...57
Morris' review is largely concerned with the historiography of 
South Asian economics studies, as well as with a technical commentary on some 
of Bagchi's conclusions (Bagchi was an economist rather than a historian). But 
while Morris does not directly challenge Bagchi's claims of racial discrimination 
he points out that: "Bagchi does not attempt to make a distinction between those 
situations in which Indians were treated differently because they were Indians 
and those which occurred because Indians were competitors to be defeated."58
This thesis examines the actual experience of a number of individual European 
companies and, inter alia, seeks evidence, if any, for Bagchi's repeated argument 
that they enjoyed a number of advantages denied to indigenous business.
56 Bagchi, Private Investment in India, p. 158.
57 Ibid., p. 186.
58 Morris, Private Industrial Development, p. 554.
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The scope of this thesis
This thesis examines in some detail five Managing Agencies and the individual 
entrepreneurs who.founded and ran them, necessarily selected according to the 
availability and usefulness of primary sources but providing a reasonably 
representative range of characteristics and business activities. In the course of 
this examination the thesis also examines the industries in which they were 
particularly engaged -  jute, transport, tea, coal and indigo.
The agencies studied in detail are:
Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co.. a well-found "colony" of the established 
Scottish Gladstone family business, the earliest agency to be formed. The 
chapter particularly explores the jute industry, in which they were major 
operators, and the long-lived influence of the Gladstone dynasty.
Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co.. built on much more modest financial 
foundations, largely by a pair of determined Scottish individuals with 
evangelical leanings but with no particular commercial training. The firm 
grew to be a major force in the shipping industry, which the thesis 
explores, and also had substantial interests in tea. The several family 
members employed scarcely constituted a dynasty, and the business was 
taken forward into the twentieth century by a non-family member.
Bird & Co. also a very modest initiative, by the Bird brothers -  an English 
clipper ship's captain, who may have been "beached" in Calcutta, and his 
maritime brother. Its early success was in labour contracting for railway 
construction. Later the young Ernest Cable, who was not part of the 
family, took charge, and expanded the business to include interests in coal 
as well as jute. He was succeeded by his son-in-law.
W illia m so n . Magor & Co. specialised in the management of tea estates and 
became one of the largest agencies in the sector, but was formed with no 
significant financial resource or specialist skill by another ship's captain 
together with a local acquaintance from the hotel trade. The chapter
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includes a thorough examination of the tea industry including its early 
history and issues of migrant labour and land distribution. The Magor 
family continues to run the company today.
Tames Finlay & Co. was another "colony" of a long-established business 
with a trajectory from the Industrial Revolution to the withdrawal from 
Empire. They used their relative wealth aggressively, gaining the agencies 
for 167 tea estates by offering generous advances, and had important 
interests in jute. They were also heavily committed to financing indigo 
concerns in Bihar, and suffered from the collapse of demand following the 
introduction of synthetic dyestuffs. This chapter includes an examination 
of the indigo industry, including its impact on the agricultural 
community. Finlays' produced three successive dynasties who ran the 
company until the 1980s.
An approach of this kind is encouraged by Tomlinson, who wrote:
It would be best for future research to concentrate more on the individual 
circumstances of particular firms and to try to answer questions about the 
institutional foundation of their enterprise and about their attempts to control or 
manipulate the larger producing and consuming economy of which they 
represented only a small part. It may be useful to look at firms as particular 
centres of economic power, although not always effective ones, rather than as 
agents of abstract economic forces.9
He goes on to point out that Bagchi did not take the individual firm as the basic 
unit of analysis, and seemed to have "virtually no interest in particular 
circumstances at all".
However, it is Bagchi's insistence on the privileged position of British business 
rather than the merits of its performance which has suggested the issues which 
this thesis particularly examines:
the degree of commercial skill possessed by British incomers;
the impact of imported British technical innovation, notably steam power 
and mechanised jute textile production;
59 Tomlinson, Colonial Firms, pp. 485-6.
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the possibility that British commercial interests colluded to erect barriers 
to entry for Indian entrepreneurs;
the importance of access (possibly preferential) to British investment - 
capital and bank finance;
the extent of preferential support from the imperial government; 
the absence of competitive Indian entrepreneurial activity before 1914.
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Chapter 1
GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT & CO
a privileged and well-funded Gladstone dynasty, with major interests in jute 
but a wide field of operation.
Introduction
The firms of Gillanders Arbuthnot and Finlay, Muir were distinct from the 
majority of the Managing Agencies. Each of them was funded by a well- 
established and solidly financed Scottish firm, in contrast to the modest 
independent ventures started up by optimistic individuals of slender means and 
few, if any, commercial or technical skills.
The archive material for both firms describes an apparently abundant availability 
of investment capital, if sometimes restricted during lean periods and always 
rigorously defended against extravagance.. This seems to support the claim that 
at least these particular British firms had an advantage over Indian concerns, 
particularly given the difference in attitude to risk between British and Indian 
financiers.
However, these advantages did not provide them with an effective competitive 
edge in the context of the Indian marketplace -  their commercial skills, at least 
while they were only concerned with consignment and shipping business, were 
more complementary than superior to their Indian counterparts. What they 
brought with them was familiarity with the British market for Indian produce, 
shipping capacity and capital to support their creditworthiness.
Gillanders Arbuthnot became in many respects a conventional Managing
Agency, with a range of interests largely parallel to those of others. However,
the specialised nature of the archive material -  private letters between the
partners -  emphasises financial issues almost to the exclusion of practical
commercial activity. The correspondence reads as though it came from the files
29
of a merchant bank, and much of the narrative is concerned with quasi-banking 
investment matters. The deployment of sometimes massive investment funds, 
for example in the forestry, indigo and mining industries, cannot have been a 
normal part of the Calcutta Managing Agency's day-to-day operational 
responsibilities, even if they included the grudging management of relatively 
modest credit facilities in the tea industry.
The archive correspondence also provides a rare glimpse of the personal 
frustrations and anxieties of the senior partners, as well as of their often racist 
attitudes.
The Gladstone family and the foundation of the firm
Gillanders Arbuthnot claimed to be the oldest merchant house in Calcutta, 
having been founded in 1819, not long before a number of others began to trade 
there, following the partial curtailment of the East India Company's monopolies 
in 1813 and the introduction of their new system of licensing ships for the East 
India trade. Gillanders was one of the few firms to survive the financial havoc of 
1847, eventually extending the business from that of an "agency house" -  buying 
and selling on commission, and increasingly on their own account -  to that of a 
Managing Agency, with a tea garden agency in 1866. But they were not the first 
to do this, and their development was slower than that of other firms of more 
recent foundation.
Their unique position of seniority is of more than anecdotal interest, because it 
derived from solid financial backing from a prosperous and well-established 
Liverpool source, unlike those who arrived later with little more than personal 
savings to their name at the outset.1 Liverpool also provided business
1 The James Finlay Managing Agency was the only similar example of a firm with such a 
long history and with well-established financial strength in the UK -  in that case the 
Glasgow firm of that name founded in 1750, with extensive interests in cotton 
manufacturing and trading. Finlays participated in a trading partnership in Bombay 
from 1816 to 1828, but thereafter only "corresponded" with a firm there until 1862, when 
a branch office was opened in the wake of the American Civil War and the ensuing crisis 
in the supply of raw cotton.
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experience, and those sent out to Calcutta were first trained there in business 
skills.
Behind the Gillanders Arbuthnot name lay the dominant interests of the 
Gladstone family. John Gladstone and.his brothers were corn merchants who 
came to Liverpool from Leith in the late eighteenth century (dropping a final "s" 
from their surname), and developed a substantial mercantile business, 
principally with the West Indies, initially importing tobacco and spices but 
joining the rush for sugar, eventually owning plantations (and slaves). They also 
took part in the East India trade, and following the liberalisation of 1813 they 
owned six ships licensed by the East India Company.
According to S. G. Checkland's The Gladstones: A  Family History, however, they 
did not find the East India trade easy, and were concerned by the risks -  "by the 
early 1820s India's markets were glutted with British goods" .2 In 1818 this 
negative prospect led John Gladstone to send a junior partner, George Grant, to 
India to assess the possibilities, but illness prevented him from doing useful 
work, and he was invalided back to Liverpool, to be replaced by F. M. Gillanders, 
who gave his name to the firm. He was a Gaelic-speaking Scot from Ross-shire, 
and a cousin of John Gladstone's wife. He had been trained in the Liverpool 
office, and first went out to Calcutta as a supercargo on one of the Gladstone 
ships.
It does not seem that the Gladstone brothers were initially partners in the 
Calcutta firm, but it is virtually certain that they financed it. Gladstone & Co 
(John and Robert) was the British centre of the trading operation, and in 1824 
Gillanders was joined in the Calcutta office by Thomas Ogilvy, a Gladstone 
family friend from Scotland, and the name of the firm became Ogilvy, Gillanders 
& Co. David Gladstone, the youngest brother, became the first Gladstone partner 
in the Calcutta firm in 1826, but was not required to work in Calcutta. 
Subsequently, in 1833, David Gladstone retired, Ogilvy returned to England, to 
operate there under the style of Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co., and C. H. Arbuthnot 
joined the firm in Calcutta. Arbuthnot had been an East India Company naval
2 S. G. Checkland, The Gladstones: A  Family History, 1764-1851,1971, p. 120.
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captain, was also the owner of the ship Royal William, and had worked in Madras 
on Gladstone & Co. business. He remained a partner until he retired in 1855.
The firm was then re-named Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co., the name which 
remained unchanged through all the subsequent changes in the partnerships, 
and perhaps implying a change in the perceived character of such firms, away 
from the purely personal identity of the partners and towards a quasi- corporate 
entity (although they were not in any sense incorporated). The name of 
Mackinnon, Mackenzie was never changed after the death of Robert Mackenzie, 
the senior partner, in 1853. Balmer Lawrie, as another example, never changed 
its name after one its founding partners, Stephen Balmer, died only a year after it 
was formed in 1867, and the name survives as a corporate entity to this day.
John Gladstone became a significantly powerful public figure in Liverpool, active 
in Tory politics both locally and nationally, becoming an MP, finishing up with a 
baronetcy before returning to his grandiose gothic castle in Fasque, between 
Aberdeen and Dundee, to see out his days in retirement. He died in 1851. He 
kept in close touch with another Scottish businessman with strong political 
connections, Kirkman Finlay, whose firm, James Finlay & Co, would some time 
later (the Calcutta branch was not opened until 1870, as Finlay, Muir & Co.) 
become an important player in the Calcutta Managing Agency world. In the 
meantime it was presumably no coincidence that Gladstone, Lyall were James 
Finlay's agents in Calcutta.
The rift between the Gladstone brothers
The history of the Gladstone family's businesses in Calcutta is complicated by the 
legacy of a quarrel between John Gladstone and his brother Robert, arising from 
a difference over the proper reaction to false rumours in Liverpool about the 
firm's finances, and apparently never healed. It was principally Roberf s 
descendants who owned and managed Gillanders. But in 1840 John founded a 
second, competing, partnership in Calcutta, Gladstone, Hay, Wyllie & Co.,
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perhaps, as Checkland surmises,3 to secure the financial future of his own 
descendants, particularly his son Robertson and his children, but perhaps also to 
gain more direct control over the handling of his trading business. John 
Gladstone supplied most of the capital for the new firm, which in disputed 
circumstances displaced Gillanders from their office accommodation. Otherwise 
there is no record of any damage caused to the Gillanders firm, and the two 
businesses seem to have operated independently of each other without friction, 
being referred to as "our neighbours".4
The peculiar duality of the relationship was highlighted when Henry Neville 
Gladstone (eventually to become Senior Partner of the whole firm), John 
Gladstone's grandson, joined Gladstone, Wyllie as an assistant in the mid-1870s, 
a natural family orientation. However, according to his increasingly ill-tempered 
and much senior cousin Robert (junior), writing in 1899:
[Henry] left them because they would not make him a partner. While his uncle 
Robertson Gladstone was alive, and a partner in the firm, he could make terms 
for HNG's advancement, but on his death James Wyllie became the chief man in 
the firm, and for reasons but known to himself he declined to promise HNG 
promotion, and then I was asked to take him into this office [i.e. Gillanders].5
Henry Gladstone joined Gillanders, Arbuthnot in Calcutta in 1876, and was made 
a partner in 1881.
Gladstone, Wyllie's activities in the early days were shipping and consignment 
trading, identical to Gillanders, Arbuthnot6 and indeed Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
and all the agency houses before the beginning of the managing agency business. 
Early correspondence gives detailed UK market reports on a wide range of 
commodities:7
saltpetre raw jute hemp
linseed rapeseed cutch sticklac & lac dye
shellac safflower castor oil
cotton munjeet
3 Checkland, The Gladstones, p. 341.
4 In 1909 the London businesses of Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co., Gladstone, Wyllie & Co. 
and Gladstone & Co. were amalgamated.
5 Robert Gladstone to William Gladstone, 15th June 1899, Glynn-Gladstone MS 2590.
6 More interestingly, Gillanders Arbuthnot had the import agency for Bass beer in 1830, 
for Ruinart champagne in 1839 and for Cockburn & Campbell whisky in 1848.
7 Copy outletter book 2 September 1853 -  23 February 1856. Gladstone & Co., Liverpool, 
to Gladstone, Wyllie & Co., Calcutta. Glynn/Gladstone MS. 2474.
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Surprisingly the reports do not include indigo, although it is unlikely that they 
did not handle this staple of the East India trade.
When Samuel Steuart Gladstone, an old Etonian nephew of Robert Gladstone, 
was a Gillanders partner in Calcutta, in 1862, the shipping and consignment 
business was evidently still the dominant activity, alongside banking. In May of 
that year he wrote a long and gossipy memorandum describing the techniques 
and pitfalls. He evidently had a poor opinion of sea captains: "The bulk of our 
skippers are from the lower walks of life [elsewhere in the memorandum he 
mocks their accents], indifferently educated and miserably paid, say £12 to £16 
[say £700 at current values] a month.. .At such a pittance it can scarcely be 
wondered at, however much it may be regretted, if the skipper swindles his 
owner.. ."8 He goes on to describe the common practice of skippers arranging a 
hidden 4% commission on chandlers' bills for ships' supplies. Captains 
Arbuthnot, Bird, Scott and Williamson, all significantly successful entrepreneurs 
in India, were thus dismissed.
"The Gladstone Experiment"
Gladstone, Wyllie is credited by Checkland with starting what was later known 
as the "coolie trade", the recruitment and shipping of indentured Indian 
labourers to the West Indies and elsewhere, following the abolition of slavery in 
the colonies in 1833. But it was on 4 January 1836 that John Gladstone wrote at 
length to Gillanders Arbuthnot, inviting them to arrange for the shipping of 
labourers to his sugar plantations. He starts by writing: "I observe by a letter 
which he [his son] received a few days ago from Mr. Arbuthnot, that he was 
sending a considerable number of a certain class of Bengalees, to be employed as 
labourers, to the M auritius"9, so the activity was already established before 
Gladstone, Wyllie was formed in 1840. He goes on to say: "You will probably be
8 Glynn/Gladstone MS. 1765
9 Cited in Parliamentary Papers, LII No. 180,1837-38. MF41.413-414.
34
aware that we are very particularly situated with our Negro apprentices in the 
West Indies, and that it is a matter of doubt and uncertainty how far they may be 
induced to continue their services on the plantations after their apprenticeship 
expires in 1840".10 He proposes that a "moderate number of Bengalees", 
defined later as 100, should be sent in one of his vessels to British Guiana, where 
he owned two sugar plantations -  Vreed-en-Hoop and Vried-en-Stein -  in West 
Demerara, which had been ceded to Britain by the Dutch at the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815.
It is to be remembered that John Gladstone had not himself ever travelled to 
India, and had no first-hand knowledge of the country or its people. (There is 
equally no suggestion that he had ever travelled to the Caribbean.) Gillanders 
Arbuthnot replied with an authoritative and encouraging summary of the 
possibilities, recommending the recruitment of "tribals" in Chota Nagpur, on 
account of their hardiness. This region was also to be the favoured source of tea 
garden labour for Assam some twenty years later.
The practice of indenture outraged the abolitionists, who saw in it the 
substitution of one form of slavery by another, thinly disguised by 5- or 7-year 
indentures. They published a 36 page pamphlet detailing abuses, both in 
recruitment methods, alleging kidnapping, and in brutal working conditions for 
Indian labour, following John Scoble's tour of the plantations in Mauritius and 
British Guiana, including John Gladstone's. Their aim was to dissuade Lord John 
Russell and his cabinet from lifting the current ban on exporting Indian labourers 
to Mauritius.
Although Russell met with a delegation of the abolitionists, he confirmed that the 
government would proceed with its intention of reopening the exportation of 
Indian laborers. With a few exceptions, the exportation of indentured Indian 
labor to various British colonies lasted until January 1,1920, when the last 
indentured Indians in Fiji were released from their contracts.11
It seems that John Gladstone's scheme was a pioneering venture as far as the 
Caribbean was concerned, and is today referred to in Guyana as "The Gladstone 
Experiment", with John Gladstone himself described as "the initiator of East
10 Ibid. It should be noted that the description "negro apprentice" is presumably a 
euphemism for a freed slave. The Gladstone family7s wealth was, in part at least, 
originally founded on slave ownership.
11 P. Allen Reichert, introductory comment on Internet reproduction of pamphlet, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1996.
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Indian immigration".12 According to this report, the first emigrants arrived in 
Guyana in 1838.
The financial crisis of 1847
In 1847, a disastrous financial crisis spread from England to India. The financial 
position in Calcutta had already been weakened by the decline in indigo prices 
since 1840, leading to increased borrowing by producers, and a vicious spiral of 
increased production to service the debt, a glutted market, further falls in prices 
and further borrowing.
From the official reports issued by the [Union Bank] directors it appeared that the 
bank was gradually divesting itself of the indigo factories it had assumed on 
mortgage and reducing its loans to agency houses for indigo cultivation.. .But in 
fact the bank continued to increase its support for indigo cultivation.. .Almost 
every rupee loaned by the bank found its way to an indigo plantation.13
By the autumn of 1846 Britain was in a full-scale commercial crisis. The 1845 
rush for fixed, long-term investment in railways had mopped up working 
capital, and when the Irish potato crop failed in 1846 large wheat imports were 
needed. Then the price of American cotton soared following a crop deficiency. 
Money was tight, interest rates were high, and the Bank of England's reserves 
were worryingly low. Despite this, however, British speculators bought 
imported grain forward at high prices, but in July 1847 there was a bumper 
domestic wheat crop, prices fell and in August nineteen com importers went 
bankrupt. Their links to other mercantile houses meant that bills were widely 
dishonoured and disaster spread.
In September two of the largest East India houses in London, Cockerell & Co. 
and Lyall Brothers, were among the thirty seven firms that went out of business. 
Both were closely connected with Calcutta houses deeply in debt to the Union 
Bank. By November the failures spread to Calcutta, where Kling writes that
12 Tota C. Mangar, article in Stabroek News, 8 May 2003.
13 Blair B. Kling, Partner in Empire -  Dwarkanath Tagore and The Age of Enterprise in Eastern 
India, Berkeley, 1976, p. 215.
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sixteen agency houses suspended operation. According to Mohendra Nauth 
Mookerjee, who may have been an eye-witness, all the agency houses in Calcutta 
failed except Gillanders Arbuthnot, Gladstone Wyllie, Jardine Skinner, and 
Colvin Cowie. The Delhi Gazette then published a false report that Gillanders had 
suspended payments.
Innumerable Drafts, Cheques and Hoondies were drawn against us and 
demands for money knew no bounds and crowds of people collected at the gate 
to receive money. Mr. Mackinlay opened three cash offices in three different 
parts of the office and paid one and all in full in three consecutive days from 10 
a.m. to 9 p.m. This satisfied the public minds and restored full confidence 
amongst the people of Calcutta and on the fourth day nearly all the monies or 
more paid by us were re-deposited.14
The Union Bank was not one of the survivors: they finally went to the wall in the 
Spring of 1848, leaving a trail of financial destruction and bitter recrimination. 
The commercial community in Calcutta was wholly demoralised.
The Gladstone dynasty
Gillanders Arbuthnot was very conscious of its dynastic heritage. On 10 
February 1909 the foundation stone of their new office building in Calcutta was 
laid. Under it, together with some memorabilia, was this record:
The Mercantile House of Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co. was founded in the year 
1819 by F. M. Gillanders, who was sent out for this purpose by John Gladstone, 
the Head of the Liverpool firm of John and Robert Gladstone...
The present partners of the firm are
Henry Neville Gladstone, son of the Rt. Hon. William Ewart Gladstone and 
grandson of Sir John Gladstone, the founder of the House.
John Francis Ogilvy, the son of Thomas Ogilvy, who was associated as a partner 
with F. M. Gillanders from 1824 to 1833.
14 Mohendra Nauth Mookerjee, Diary, printed document dated 1 April 1900,
Glynn / Gladstone MS. 2744, p.2. Mookerjee was Head Babu at Gillanders, and evidently 
a loyal and devoted employee as well as an intelligent commentator. The Head Babu 
held a key position in a European firm, and would be a trusted confidant and occasional 
adviser to the Partners. Mackinlay was then Senior Partner in Calcutta, a Scottish lawyer 
who went to Calcutta in 1843 to work with Murray Gladstone and George Gillanders, 
and was made a partner in 1846 after the tatter's death.
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William Buckley Gladstone, son of Murray Gladstone, who joined the Firm in
Calcutta in 1842.
Arthur Steuart Gladstone and John Steuart Gladstone, nephews of Samuel
Steuart Gladstone and sons of Robert Gladstone.15
Notwithstanding the occasional appearance of outsiders like Daniel Mackinlay 
and Charles Moore, dominant representation by Robert Gladstone's branch of 
the family in Gillanders Arbuthnot was maintained and extended after F. M. 
Gillanders retired in 1840, and his. son George joined the partnership, only to die 
of cholera in 1846. In the same year Robert Gladstone's son, Adam, joined, and 
in 1847 so did his younger son Murray. In due course Murray's son William and 
his nephews Robert (junior) and Samuel Steuart were to become partners, as 
were Robert (junior's) sons Arthur and John. Thomas Ogilvy's son John had 
joined the partnership in 1859 and was still active (in London) in 1910.
This dynastic exclusiveness was by no means uncommon in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century business, when furthering the financial interests of family 
members went hand-in-hand with the reassurance that family members could be 
trusted in faraway locations. This was not a peculiarly British practice, and in 
India the Marwari community were very deliberate in choosing family members 
for positions of responsibility. In the case of Gillanders Arbuthnot, Albert 
Gladstone eventually became senior London partner in 1945, and Thomas 
Gladstone followed him. A young James Gladstone was still carrying on the 
tradition as a branch manager (in Chittagong) in the 1950s before abandoning the 
sub-continent, and at a more senior level his cousin Stephen Gladstone was a 
Director (of what by then was a limited company) when, in 1988, he sold his 
large shareholding to G. D. Kothari, who had been involved with the firm since 
1967. Stephen remained a non-resident director for at least a decade, but he was 
the last Gladstone to be interested in the firm.
They displayed an easy-going but strong shared family culture which perhaps 
appeared arrogant to outsiders. Certainly Maria Misra16 saw in its later
15 Prefatory citation in J. S. Gladstone, History of Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co and Ogilvy, 
Gillanders & Co. 1910, Glynn/ Gladstone MS. 2749.
16 Maria Misra, Business, Race, and Politics in British India, c. 1850-1950, Oxford, 1999, e.g., 
p. 49.
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manifestation a hidebound nineteenth century attitude to twentieth century 
business demands and a cult of the amateur which, by extension, she adduced as 
reasons for the decline and extinction of the Managing Agencies in the post­
colonial period. Nevertheless, the Gladstone family gained enough distinction to 
suggest that inherited talent and ability were at least as important to success as 
nepotism and privilege. As well as the justly famous and distinguished Prime 
Minister, two of his three sons were ennobled: one, Herbert, to a Viscountcy for 
his service in Government -  he was Home Secretary and then the first Governor 
General of South Africa -  and another, Henry, to a Barony for his business 
achievements at Gillanders. (His third son took Holy Orders.) One of Robert 
Gladstone's grandsons, Samuel Steuart, was appointed Governor of the Bank of 
England after forty years as a Gillanders partner.
By the mid-1850s and 60s, when the major development of the Managing Agency 
business took place, the Gillanders Arbuthnot firm was part of a mature 
partnership which had already been in existence for thirty or forty years, and its 
Calcutta management was in the hands of partners who were third generation 
Gladstones (or their connections), well-educated, sophisticated, reasonably 
wealthy, upper-middle-class "gentlemen", destined to marry into the minor 
aristocracy. They were patrician grandees, and a distinct contrast to the more 
plebeian Birds and Mackinnons, and to their many competitors of similarly 
undistinguished origins. They were also better trained in business skills, had 
access to accumulated financial resources in Britain and were well-connected in 
all the right circles, starting with a new Viceroy as a putative banking client in 
1880, when Samuel Steuart Gladstone wrote to his cousin Henry: "I suppose 
there will be a new Viceroy for India [Lord Ripon] who will I hope keep his 
account with GA&Co."17, and in 1899 "Billy" (W. B.) Gladstone wrote to Henry: 
"Curzon [another new Viceroy] to us privately was extremely civil and nice, and 
there is no doubt he wishes to secure the good opinion of the Calcutta mercantile 
community. He encourages us to talk to him, which is the exact opposite of what 
his predecessor did."18
17 Samuel Steuart Gladstone to Henry Neville Gladstone, 19 April 1880,
Glynn / Gladstone MS. 893.
18 W. B. Gladstone to Henry Neville Gladstone, 2 May 1899, Glynn/ Gladstone MS.2590.
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Investments in forestry became a major company interest, although the archive 
contains only glancing references.19 Burmese forests were particularly important, 
and this consideration was doubtless the underlying reason for Samuel Steuart7s 
comments in a letter to his cousin Henry Gladstone (one of the Prime Minister's 
sons) in Junel879, criticising the Zulu War, which was then still in progress after 
the early military reverses at Isandhlwana and Rorke's Drift in January. He 
suggested that it was achieving no more than "the acquisition of mealie fields" 
and that it would be "far better [to] adventure our blood and treasure in the 
annexation of Upper Burmah, and the establishment of free trade beyond the 
limits of Mandalay and at the same time feel the satisfaction of bearing the torch 
of civilisation throughout the dominions of the misguided [?Therban]."20
A very rare reference in 1880 to W.E. Gladstone as Prime Minister records that he 
was using his influence in Government to promote what became the Third 
Burmese War in 1885.21 Although it might be absurd to suggest that Samuel 
Steuart Gladstone's views influenced his uncle's decision to go to war, it is 
interesting that historians have acknowledged only political and strategic 
motives and have ignored the commercial benefits.
In any case, it seems that the Prime Minister himself was not above seizing good 
personal investment opportunities generated by his Government7s policies: he 
was a major investor in the Ottoman loans negotiated in Egypt, and "by 1882 
these bonds accounted for more than a third of his entire portfolio."22 They were 
a very lucrative investment for him, and it has to be acknowledged that he and 
the Gillanders firm, along with many other firms, was a beneficiary of imperial 
aggression.
Dynastic solidarity did not, however, prevent significant family disagreements. 
For several years the London partners, and particularly Robert Gladstone, 
adamantly refused to countenance having Henry Gladstone or Charles Moore 
leave Calcutta and join the London partnership, although Samuel Steuart 
Gladstone and John Ogilvy seemed more sympathetic. The issue reached the
19 The timber department is shown as the largest single contributor to Gillanders7 gross 
profit in 1924-25 in Misra, Business, Race and Politics, Table 8, p. 225.
Samuel Steuart Gladstone to Henry Neville Gladstone, 27 June 1879, Glynn/Gladstone 
MS. 893.
21 Glynn / Gladstone MS. 893.
22 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, London, 2005, p. 286.
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point where Henry Gladstone submitted his formal notice of retirement from the 
Calcutta partnership, and a cabal of the younger partners combined to put 
pressure on the old men -  "Billy" and Arthur Gladstone, and originally Charles 
Moore, who left the partnership in any case in 1898, equally disenchanted with 
living in Calcutta. He had written to Henry as long ago as 1886 to say: "Like you 
I hate Calcutta and always have" and four months later: "I feel appalled at the 
idea of two more years in that loathsome Calcutta which I hate."23 Now, in 1899, 
"Billy" wrote to Arthur: "If HNG decides to retire I should be disposed to beg of 
him to take me with him, for however much capital your father [Robert] and 
S[teuart].G. might leave in the business I consider it would be certain to run 
down hill.. .[we must] take a definite stand to stop the present policy of drift."24
The archive contains so many letters concerning the argument over such a long 
period that it seems certain that the partners' energies were substantially 
diverted from business issues, which implies a lack of judgement by the London 
partners as. well as a strangely antagonistic attitude towards their Calcutta 
colleagues -  a manifestation which was also to be found in other Managing 
Agencies.
Financiers to the indigo industry
The ability to deploy substantial financial resources shaped the nature of the 
business to a considerable extent. For example, in 1844 they put a toe into the 
precarious indigo industry by lending to Barlow Bros. & Co., who were in the 
indigo seed business. Thereafter they lent to the Block of Rangepore indigo 
concern, with the object of gaining an insight into the indigo trade, and J. S. 
Gladstone's History refers to "the Bettiah Raj sterling loan for £475,000"25, which 
was probably made in the 1880s, when the equivalent amount at today's values
23 Charles Moore to Henry Neville Gladstone, 6 June and 7 October 1886,
Glynn/Gladstone MS. 2589.
24 W. B. Gladstone to Arthur Steuart Gladstone, 24 May 1899, Glynn/Gladstone MS.
2590.
25 Gladstone, History, pp. 79-80 and p. 147.
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would be £2.5 million. The loan will have been a major extension of Gillanders7 
indigo interests. Bettiah was a small princely state in NW Bihar, and the 
maharajah was the leading zamindar in the Champaran district, owning 1630 
villages (covering half the district area), the majority leased to indigo planters. 
Bettiah had a reputation for "particularly oppressive management", and in 1868 
had been the scene of significant raiyati agitation, albeit short-lived.26
Gillanders eventually became more widely involved as agents for indigo 
plantations and factories. Some forty-three indigo factories are listed for which 
they were at some time agents, making large hypothecation advances and 
handling sales and shipping in Calcutta. But there were frequent frauds and 
failures, which forced them reluctantly into the position of landlords.
In 1892 Samuel Steuart Gladstone, then Senior Partner in London, wrote to 
Henry Gladstone in Calcutta, illustrating continuing anxieties:
There is no doubt about the bad indigo crop -  prices m ust improve. Jardine's are 
said to have refused Rs. 70 advance for the J&RW mark. Some of our factories I 
fear will be up to the hilt at the close of the season and we shall have to consider 
the advisability of stopping supplies. We did not see sufficient margin in 
Pathebarry to meet A. Hill's wishes. Seerada also requires advances in excess of 
the security, so that is no go.27
In 1898 Henry Gladstone, who was at the time in London, wrote to "Billy" 
Gladstone in Calcutta, continuing the negative assessment, but still without 
reference to the looming nemesis of synthetic dyestuffs :
Indigo news is as unsatisfactory as it could possibly be and so far from adding to 
our interest by new purchases my great anxiety is to reduce our advances in this 
line. My opinion is that we have done no good for the last 20 years where the 
account barely balances with interest either with tea or indigo and as we can 
employ all available capital on this side in remunerative financial business I 
would far rather see this department closed than we should continue to lose
nomoney.
It is plain that the problem was defined as one of capital finance rather than 
operational competency.
26 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian Politics, 
New Delhi, 1999, p. 204.
27 Samuel Steuart Gladstone to Henry Neville Gladstone, 27 September 1892, ibid.
28 Henry Neville Gladstone to W. B. Gladstone, 14 October 1898, Glynn/ Gladstone MS. 
2590.
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They remained active in indigo until the German invention and marketing of a 
synthetic indigo dyestuff in 1897 saw the virtual extinction of trade in the natural 
product over the next twenty years.29
Investment banking in other areas
Although J. S. Gladstone credits Henry Gladstone with recognising "that the old 
agency and consignment business could no longer be relied upon as Gillanders, 
Arbuthnot & Co/s mainstay" and changing the firm's policy towards "devoting 
more attention to the development of local industries" -  notably jute mills -  for 
the most part he and the firm seem to behave more like investment bankers than 
entrepreneurs, and the letters in the archive seldom, except in the case of jute, 
refer to operational matters, only to issues of capital finance.
One of Henry Gladstone's most successful achievements had been to devise a 
scheme to protect the firm from the repeated devaluations of the Indian rupee by 
transferring rupee balances into sterling. Writing to Robert Gladstone, arguing
29 See Gladstone, H istory, pp. 92-3. For a fuller account of the indigo industry see 
Chapter 5.
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for retaining Henry in the partnership, "Billy" Gladstone said: "HNG was 
responsible for the "Sterling Securities" a /c  which must have saved the firm 
lakhs of rupees in losses in Exchange, which.. .fell from ls.9d. to Is. .05d. 
subsequently." However, the letter goes on to praise Henry for: "Jute mills, 
disappointing to shareholders but extremely lucrative to the firm; Sumatra Oil 
Co.; Erebus and other loans and financial connections; tea companies etc; for 
which HNG seems to have been mainly responsible and but for which, had we 
stuck in our old grooves, we should now be in a sorry plight."30 This seems to 
support J.S. Gladstone's contention, and is perhaps its source.
Perhaps the preoccupation with finance was a manifestation of lofty superiority, 
with the mundane business of operations -  perilously dose to being "trade" 
rather than commerce -  not worthy of discourse between partners. Perhaps it 
was the affectation of the leisured amateur, who would not wish to be seen to be 
exerting any effort. Even the traditional visitation of tea gardens by Calcutta 
partners in the cold weather -  occasions for respectful hospitality and tiger 
shooting -  are not mentioned, if they ever took place. These omissions are 
disappointing, for while the archive presents an unusually candid and often 
indiscreet picture of the partners' opinions and relations with each other, it does 
not illuminate the development of the business.
Banking business on a significant scale was evidently important.
From 1842, when George Gillanders was appointed to the Board, a Gillanders 
partner was always a director of the Bank of Bengal,. Occasionally the Gillanders 
partner served as President. A. K. Bagchi states that the bank was founded in 
1806, was the biggest joint stock bank in Bengal, enjoyed state patronage and was 
managed exclusively by Europeans, "Its Board of Directors generally included 
partners of the biggest managing agency houses in Calcutta."31 It may well be 
that Gillanders or the London partnership were shareholders. Certainly it is 
consistent with this financial preoccupation that Samuel Steuart Gladstone was, 
as we have seen, appointed Governor of the Bank of England.
In referring to the absence of coal mining from the firm's range of interests, J. S. 
Gladstone says: "It was probably owing to the intimate relations with the Bengal
30 W. B. Gladstone to Robert Gladstone, 4 June 1899, ibid.
31 A. K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939, Cambridge, 1972., p. 264.
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Coal Co. and its affiliated companies that the firm did not avail of the 
opportunities which occurred of taking a more direct interest in coal mining..." 
Here again, it must be presumed that Gillanders were major investors, in what 
was the largest coal mining concern, its origins dating back to the time of 
Dwarkanath Tagore.
Gillanders were, however, interested in  mining other minerals, notably copper, 
but although Charles Moore, a Calcutta partner, wrote to Henry Gladstone:
".. .Sir F. Edwards (a shareholder alas!) [was] asking my sister when his copper 
profits were coming in. Ugh."32, the venture proved very successful indeed. The 
Indian Copper Company was the sole producer in India, a monopoly position 
which was ultimately to be penalised by nationalisation in 1971-2. By then 
Indian Copper was bigger than the whole of the rest of the Gillanders Group put 
together. There were also unsuccessful prospecting ventures in diamonds, tin 
and gold.
In 1862 Gillanders Arbuthnot were appointed Financial Agents for the Indian 
Branch Railway, again implying a quasi-banking role in the importation of 
rolling stock. They were appointed agents for the Darjeeling Steam Tramway 
(which became the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway) in 1880-81; floated the 
Southern Punjab Railway in London in 1895; the Hardwar Dehra Railway in 
Calcutta in 1897; and "participated in the financing" of the De lhi-Sa haranpur 
Railway in 1905. All these were, of course, substantial capital projects, and the 
firm's strength in financial matters must have helped to secure these 
appointments. They were also involved in the Rangoon Tramway company. 
Perhaps also deriving from the firm7 s financial strength and expertise was their 
long connection with the insurance business, starting in 1858 and eventually 
comprising 14 agendes.
Less unusually, Gillanders Arbuthnot followed the conventional Managing 
Agency course of promoting and managing tea estates. In 1866, relatively late in 
the day but wisely delaying until the speculative bubble of "tea mania" had burst 
the previous year, they took up the agendes for Golaghat and Teelwaree, 
following them with the larger estate of Singlo in 1873. When the Indian Tea 
Assodation was formed in 1881, Gillanders was one of nine firms represented on
32 Charles Moore to Henry Neville Gladstone, undated, Glynn/Gladstone MS. 2590.
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the first Committee — by J. H. Edwards. J. S. Gladstone's History lists 25 tea 
gardens for which the firm "have acted as agents" in 1909,33 but this is not 
reflected in the Investor's India Yearbook for 1911, which shows only one rupee 
company under Gillanders management, or in the 1914 listing of sterling tea 
companies, where none is shown.34 In any case it seems that they were not 
continuously successful.
In 1885, undergoing a barrage of criticism from London, Charles Moore, Senior 
Partner in Calcutta, wrote to Henry Gladstone:
He [Robert Gladstone] talks of increase in liabilities in tea and slack management 
in lending rupees as if we kept adding to our agencies. We have added nothing -  
and the whole point lies in our having been unable to get rid of anything, either 
by sale or by transfer to other agents -  absolutely unable, and the fact before us 
was, are we to continue outlay till we can get rid of them -  or face the only 
alternative, sacrifice debt, security, everything, and allow primitive jungle to 
replace the failure of civilised cultivation.. .He keeps on saying -  "Surely now, 
you must see what an undesirable security is tea property, and so on, as if I had 
been perpetually maintaining the opposite when I have never said a syllable of 
the kind, but have bewailed and bewailed the impossibility of sale.35
The criticism continued, and in 1887 Robert Gladstone was threatening to debit 
the Calcutta partners' personal accounts with Sale Room losses, accusing them, 
and particularly Charles Moore, of idleness and inattention. This was partly 
because Moore, like Henry Gladstone an old Etonian, led a famously hectic social 
life in Calcutta, much involved with horse racing, owning racehorses and getting 
into debt over them, and was on the Committee of the Golightly and Turf Clubs 
In reporting to Henry Gladstone on the latter, he demonstrated some of his less 
likeable attitudes:
Awful ructions at the Turf Club now happily tided over. Some of the Armenian 
brigade, hating Bill Beresford as he always beats them racing, tried to make him 
out a puller of a horse, in which the stewards had a long six days enquiry 
palpable innocence convincingly proved. This put Armenia in the wrong box 
and the black blood came out -  but it was not as at first appeared "a huge black 
ox on a plain" only "a small black fly on the pane" and I hope all henceforth will 
be peace.36
Such unapologetic racial discrimination was, of course, quite normal at the time, 
and it is worth noting that, whatever the private prejudices against them,
33 Gladstone, History, p. 94.
34 Cited by Bagchi, Private Investment, pp. 177,179.
35 Charles Moore to Henry Neville Gladstone, 20 August 1885, Glynn/Gladstone MS. 
2589.
36 Ibid.
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Armenians were not excluded from the exclusive Turf Club or the racing 
fraternity.37
There is no evidence that Charles Moore's racial prejudices extended to Indians, 
but in earlier decades there was certainly a harmonious and respectful 
relationship at Gillanders with banians and Indian staff, fostered by long 
association in the bazaar. Mohendra Nauth Mookerjee writes of the time when 
he used the formal "I am your servant" phrase to Daniel Mackinlay, the Senior 
Partner, and was corrected: "Babu, you are not my servant -  you are an Assistant 
at Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co., as I am."38 When a European Assistant called a 
(deaf) writer "stupid", he was roundly reprimanded, and told that the babus 
were "the sons of gentlemen, not coolies".39
Mookerjee also notes the wealth of some of the banians -  "they amassed large 
fortunes". Kally Dass Seal, who resigned as "Cash Keeper" in 1877, "is the 
richest man in Bir Bazaar, half of which belongs to him, yielding a monthly 
income of 5 / 6,000 Rs.jsay £25,000 at current values]." 40 Ram Lai Angurwallah, 
"our old piece goods broker, died leaving estate worth about 6 lakhs [nearly £3 
million at current values]...Ram Lai was not only one of the most skilled of 
Marwari brokers but he was also their chief."41
When Gillanders, Arbuthnot had to move out of their Calcutta premises to make 
way for Gladstone, Wyllie in 1840, the new office was partly financed by a loan 
from a banian who owned the property, although presumably the partners could 
have raised a loan in Liverpool.
37 The Armenians had been a small but influential presence in Bengal since before the 
British arrived, and when they did, in 1698, they appointed an Armenian merchant, 
Khoja Israel Sarhad, as their emissary to the Mughal Court of Azem-Ush-Shan, where he 
successfully negotiated the seminal "Grand Firman" conferring governing rights in three 
villages on the British. By the later nineteenth century there were a number of very 
wealthy Armenians in Calcutta, and between 1855 and 1893 there were more than 
twenty-five Armenian advocates at the Calcutta High Court; Gregory Charles Paul 
became Advocate General of Bengal and was knighted. It seems that in Calcutta 
Armenians were unofficially classified as "grey", alongside lews, Greeks and 
Portuguese, and tended to live between the "black" and "white" towns.
38 Mookerjee, Diary, p. 4.
39 Ibid.
40Mookerjee, Diary, p. 4.
41 Ibid., p. 37.
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We have already noted Henry Gladstone's disillusionment with the tea business, 
and in January 1899 he followed this gloomy assessment by writing: . .all the
profit the firm is making is being earned here [i.e. London].. .1 am feeling very 
uneasy as to our Indian business for it seems to me that apart from 
Exchange.. .we have hardly earned interest on capital."
An anonymous and undated memorandum, probably written in 1919, notes that: 
"the fortunes of the House were lowest about the middle of the Seventies, and 
the native staff was considerably reduced. The total European staff, did not 
exceed 6 or 8 including partners,"42 Staff reductions, and anxieties about the 
security of advances to tea and indigo estates, were the subject of a letter from 
Samuel Steuart Gladstone to Henry on 2 February 1885.43
Robert Gladstone was not impressed, nevertheless, with Henry's activities in 
company promotion:
We all admit [HNG's] cleverness and ability and we are no doubt much indebted 
to him for the profits which we have made in London by speculation in shares -  
or "company promotions" if you prefer that euphemism... this kind of business 
hardly falls within the limits of our Articles...operations on the Stock Exchange 
do not always end in profit, any more than gambling at Monte Carlo does.44
1899 seems to have been a pessimistic year for the London partnership, whose 
preoccupations seem to have been investments remote from Calcutta, It had new 
oil interests in Baku (in what is now Azerbaijan -  they would presumably have 
been expropriated after 1917), as well as Sumatra. But in a letter to John Ogilvy 
Robert Gladstone said:
As for the business, don't fret about it. It is all right; but we should begin taking 
in sail as soon as possible. We have been extremely fortunate with our Russian 
companies, but such business is not all "beer and skittles" and we should never 
forget the warning put before us by the failure of even the great house of Baring 
by locking up more capital than they could afford.45
John Ogilvy also received gloomy financial news from Samuel Steuart Gladstone: 
"You will have heard that the [flotation of the] Anglo-Galician Oil Co. has been
42 Mohendra Nauth Mookerjee refers at some length to the considerate way in which this 
staff reduction was managed.
43 Samuel Steuart Gladstone to Henry Neville Gladstone, 2 February 1885,
Glynn/Gladstone MS. 893.
44 Robert Gladstone to W.B. Gladstone, 15 June 1899, Glynn/Gladstone MS. 2590.
45 Robert Gladstone to John Ogilvy, 12 May 1899, ibid.
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badly received -  only about 5% applied for -  it is fortunate that we passed on the 
£20,000 that we took to oblige Charles Arbuthnot."46
The management of jute mills
According to J. S. Gladstone, Gillanders Arbuthnot7s first entry into jute mill 
management was the Balliaghata mill in 1877, writing that the agency ceased in 
1881. Wallace gives a more informed account of this discouraging start:
A short-lived experiment started in 1875 was the Bengal Pressing and 
Manufacturing Co. -  now the Balliaghatta. The company took over the old 
Brunton Pressing Co/s property at Sealdah, which was the second of the 
hydraulic jute presses, the Nay smiths being the first, but the style of the Brunton 
press did not prove a success. It was intended to combine jute baling and 
spinning but the idea was abandoned and the buildings were re-arranged to 
accommodate machinery for 130 looms by a new company under the present 
name. It never did any good and was ultimately taken over by the Barnagore 
Jute Company as their branch mill.47
The Barnagore agents were the pioneering George Henderson & Co., who had 
originally persuaded the cash-rich Borneo Company, for whom they were agents, 
to invest in a jute mill in 1859 and to introduce the first power looms. The 
company was floated as a limited liability company in 1872, as the Barnagore Jute 
Manufacturing Company.
J. S. Gladstone credits Henry Gladstone, who joined the partnership in 1881, with 
the promotion of the Hooghly Jute Mills Co. in 1883, when the Upper Mill was 
erected. He says the Lower Mill was built in 1893 but Wallace gives 1897 as the 
date. Wallace also tables Gondolpara as a Gillanders company, erected in 1895: 
this is what the History refers to as "a French mill on French territory at 
Chandemagor", intended to supply the French market on preferential tariff 
terms, but the French Government refused to recognise the product of the mill as 
of French origin, so no advantage was gained.
Gillanders7 Calcutta mills were not large -  the two Hooghly mills had 455 and 
650 looms respectively, and Gondolpara had only 330. Compared to Birds, for 
example, whose seven mills totalled 3,897 looms in 1909, they were relatively
46 Samuel Steuart Gladstone to John Francis Ogilvy, 11 May 1899, ibid.
47 D. R. Wallace, The Romance of Jute: A  Short History of the Calcutta Jute Mills Industry, 
1885-1909, Calcutta, 1909, p. 33.
minor players.48 However, jute was sufficiently important to the firm to be the 
subject of a number of references in partners' letters, almost the only operational 
activity to rate such attention.
The timing of Gillanders' entry into the jute mill business was not happy. After 
the opening of the first four mills hi the 1850s and 60s, with varying success, 
there was a rush to build: fourteen new mills were erected in the four years from 
1873 to 1877, with over 11,000 looms between them. The effect of this rapid 
expansion was massive over-production, and some informal arrangements were 
. made between neighbouring mills to reduce production by working a shorter 
single-shift 10 hour day instead of a double shift 13 to 14 hour day 49 In 1884 such 
arrangements were formalised within the Indian Jute Manufacturers'
Association, a classic cartel, which continued to try to control cyclical imbalances 
between supply and demand well into the twentieth century.50
It not surprising that there were difficulties very soon after the Upper Hooghly 
Mill was opened in 1883. In June 1884 Samuel Steuart Gladstone wrote to Henry:
Your views about the Mill, which had to choose one of the two evils: either of 
working to a loss or standing idle to a loss, and supposing the loss to be equal the 
choice of working to a loss was I think a wise choice for it keeps the staff and 
establishment together ready to take advantage of any improvement in the 
demand for gunnies.51
In his Diary, Mookerjee records the fall of a clerk in the office who
was a calculating prodigy -  made a lakh of Rs. hitherto unknown in the line of 
Keranidom (writership) by fees etc., but more by private speculations. He 
conceived the idea of at once becoming a millionaire and bought all the Jute Mill 
Shares as he could, but in 1855 the stock of jute being overwhelming in Dundee, 
all shares came down and he was bankrupt.52
It is unlikely that Henry Gladstone or Charles Moore will have felt at home in 
the isolated world of the jute-wallahs up the Hooghly. Monica Clough, a shrewd 
20th century observer, wrote: "St Andrew's Kirk.. .was still well attended by 
Scots Presbyterians, who ran country dancing evenings, supported Scots 
orphanages and held Caledonian Society Balls of great splendour on St Andrew's
48 See Wallace, Romance of Jute, pp. 56-57.
49 Ibid., p. 65.
50 Ironically, Gillanders was one of the very few firms to bypass the IJMA restrictions in 
the 1920s.
51 Samuel Steuart Gladstone to Henry Neville Gladstone, 6 June 1884, Glynn / Gladstone 
MS. 893.
52 Mookerjee, Diaiy, p. 25.
50
Night.. .This was great fun because of the reels danced with skill and enthusiasm, 
but was considered by the real snobs as a bit down-market because of the . 
prevalence of jute-wallahs and walli...By definition jute-wallahs were narrower 
in their interests than any other of the British community, as they never left their 
claustrophobic compounds up the river, except to visit other compounds and 
their Scots inhabitants."53 If this was true in the mid-20th century the jute-wallahs 
will have been even more sharply differentiated in the late 19th century, when 
many mills still had European artisans, almost exdusively Scottish imports from 
Dundee, as well as Scottish managers not many rungs above them on the social 
ladder.
Gordon Stewart points out the instructive contrast between the status of jute- 
wallahs and that of tea-planters. He cites a state banquet with 103 guests held in 
1938 which included tea-planters, ICS men and army and police officers, but no 
jute mill owners.
The tea planters had an advantage because their money was made on country 
estates in the hills round Darjeeling and Assam, They could be viewed in more 
gentlemanly fashion than the men who made money from factories with power­
houses and smokestacks in the crowded urban setting of Calcutta.. .The jute- 
wallahs could only be sure of invitations when the governor's guest list swelled 
to above 1,000 or so. There was an odour of roughness to the world of jute that 
made upward mobility problematic in the ferociously graded expatriate and 
imperial hierarchies.54
Henry Gladstone and Charles Moore will doubtless have been towards the top of 
the Governor's guest list, even if they were only box-wallahs.
There is an instructive contrast in the attitudes of David Yule, the nephew of 
Andrew Yule, who in 1863 with his brother George founded the Calcutta firm 
which bears his name and which became the largest of all the managing agencies. 
The Yules, like the Gladstones, were originally from Scotland, but had moved to 
Manchester. David Yule was bom  in Edinburgh and was educated at the Royal 
High School. He came out to Calcutta at the age of seventeen in 1875, and took 
over as Senior Partner in 1891, buying out his uncle George's partnership. One 
of the firm's interests was a cotton mill on the Hooghly, and David Yule lived in 
a house in the mill compound from the time he arrived until 1900, when he
53 Cited in Stephanie Jones, Merchants of the Raj, Basingstoke, 1992, p. 217-8.
54 Gordon T. Stewart, Jute and Empire: The Calcutta Jute-wallahs and the Landscapes of 
Empire, Manchester, 1998, pp. 222-23
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moved to Calcutta with his new wife. He took no home leave for the first 21 
years -  a marked contrast to those who "hated Calcutta". He then bought out his 
late uncle Andrew's partnership, becoming the sole owner of the business in 
Calcutta and in London.
Under his leadership the business grew rapidly, and by 1902 it managed four jute 
mills, one inland navigation company, one cotton mill, fifteen tea companies, 
four coal companies, two flour mills, one oil mill, a small railway company, a jute 
press house and a zamindari company. It went on growing, and although David 
Yule eschewed public life, he could not escape identification entirely. When 
George V toured India in 1911-12, after his accession, he asked to meet the 
leading businessman in Calcutta, and David Yule was named by the Lieutenant 
Governor, but with the comment that he had never met him. When the meeting 
took place the king asked to visit a jute mill, so he was invited to the Belvedere 
Mill, one of those managed by Yules. The royal party arrived by yacht, and 
when David Yule was accompanying the king along the ramp to the landing 
stage, he noticed another man following close behind. It is said that he asked the 
king if that was perhaps his private detective, to be told that it was the Viceroy, 
to whom the king then introduced him. David Yule was accordingly invited to 
the Government House banquet and ball, where the king unexpectedly conferred 
a knighthood on him.55
To the Gladstones it would have been inconceivable that they should not be 
personally known to the Viceroy, as we have seen.
Because he had no male heir, in 1919 David Yule arranged for the business to be 
purchased by the investment bankers J.P. Morgan, a solution which might well 
have suited the Gillanders partners, given their predilections. David Yule died in 
1928, leaving a personal fortune of £20 million -  more than £500 million at 
current values.
55 This anecdote appears in the anonymous company history, Andrew Yule and Co Ltd 
1863-1963, Edinburgh, 1963, and is repeated in Sujoy Gupta, Yule Musings, Calcutta, 
1997.
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Indian participation in the jute industry
Although hand-produced jute textile manufacture already existed in Bengal, it 
was the introduction by the British of power spinning which laid the foundations 
for the modem industry. This straightforward technology transfer from Dundee, 
by what Wallace called "a singular course of accidents", was eventually to rob its 
Scottish originators of much of their worldwide market, not having the economic 
power or political influence to protect themselves from Indian (albeit British- 
owned) competition as the Lancashire cotton industry had done.
Dundee spinners had experience of spinning flax and hemp, relatively coarse 
fibres with a longer staple and more flexibility than jute. Unsuccessful attempts 
at machine-spinning jute had been made since 1790, but in 1838 fresh trials on a 
parcel of 40 tons of raw jute imported by a ship's captain showed that soaking 
the fibre in whale oil (readily available in Dundee) softened it enough to make 
machine spinning possible. With the outbreak of the Crimean War, which cut off 
the supply of hemp from Russia, the Dundee jute industry flourished even more 
rapidly.
Wallace's "accident" was the attempt by George Adand, who had arrived in 
Calcutta from Ceylon in 1853, to develop Bengal-grown rhea as a textile fibre. 
When he took samples of rhea to show to spinning machinery manufacturers in 
Dundee in 1854, he was advised to forget the possibility of turning it into a 
competitive textile. Instead the head of the firm, John Kerr of the Douglas 
Foundry, advised him to buy the components of a jute spinning factory and erect 
it in Bengal near the source of supply. This he did, then went back to Dundee 
and recruited a few mill mechanics and overseers, and the first machine-spun 
jute yams were produced in 1855. It was not until 1859 that power weaving 
looms started to replace hand looms.
A.K. Bagchi, in a familiar complaint, wrote: "What seems so mysterious, in view 
of the relative simplicity of processes involved in jute manufacture and the 
recognised monopoly India had in raw jute production, is the almost complete 
absence of Indian enterprise on the manufacturing side." He suggests that the 
main reason was that the export trade of Bengal had almost entirely passed out 
of Indian hands, since there were no Bengali-owned ships. He goes on to adduce
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the European domination of inland transport, of the port, and of the trading 
chain of raw jute from the peasant through to the ship, linked by a network of 
ties -  "a common interest, a common language, and above all, a common social 
distance from the Indians among whom they lived". Citing the occasional 
restrictions on non-European entry to jute trade associations, he suggests that 
"perhaps the Indian merchants knew better than to try to break into this nexus".56
In fact there was, from the start of the development of the mechanised jute textile 
industry, vigorous and profitable Indian mercantile and manufacturing activity 
in baling, warehousing and dealing in raw jute, as has been shown by Omkar 
Goswami, who cites the membership of the Calcutta Baled Jute Association, 
which had 133 members in 1903-4, of which 70 were Indians, several of whom 
were to enter the exclusively European manufacturing sector in the 1920s.57 
Thomas Timberg calculated that by 1900 over half the jute balers were 
M arwaris58 Goswami goes on to say: "The Marwari move from up-country jute 
trade and dadans to speculation and futures markets, to industry, and then to the 
gunny trade and burlap exports, to eventually straddle all the sub-sectors of the 
jute economy, belies the potency of entry barriers".
There is, however, a difference between equity investment, speculative or not, in 
a successfully established business and, on the other hand, putting up risk capital 
to start a new enterprise. Timberg shows that Marwaris could be enthusiastic 
speculators but that they sought to avoid large risks with uncertain returns. As 
Bagchi points out, a new jute mill was expensive -  a minimum investment of 
more than Rs. 2 million in 1910-12 [say £7.5 million at current values] -  as was a 
cotton mill, for which Indian finance could be found in Western India, but with 
safer prospects. Nevertheless, in 1922, encouraged by the speculative profits of 
the war years, Ghanshyamdas Birla and Sarupchand Hukumchand each took the 
plunge with new mills at Budge Budge and Halishahar respectively.
Bagchi's contention that "the market for jute manufactures had to be sought out, 
and this search could be made only by businessmen who had an intimate contact
56 Bagchi, Private Investment, pp. 263-66.
57 Omkar Goswami, Industry, Trade and Peasant Society: The Jute Economy of Eastern India 
1900-1947, Delhi, 1991, p. 85.
58 Thomas Timberg, The Marwaris: from Tradei's to Investors, Delhi, 1978. Cited by Stewart,
p. 26.
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with the export trade" has to he accepted. There was a very modest export trade 
in country-made jute gunnies and gunny cloth in 1850-51, well before the 
establishment of the large jute mills:
To United Kingdom
Pieces
69,636
To France -
To Hamburg 2,180
To North America 2,290,427
To Coast of Coromandel 1,955,150
To Malabar 2,054,075
To Penang and Singapore 1,043,600
To Ceylon 357,290
To New South Wales 32,125
To Trieste -
To Java 242,550
To Pegu 672,950
To Mauritius 213,980
To Cape of Good Hope 82,750
To Guam 15,000
To Arabian and Persian Gulfs 4,000
9,035,713
Value Rs. 2,159,788 [say £10m at current values]59
The scale of growth in exports of manufactures which was to come, however, 
completely dwarfed these figures, and not all of it can have been achieved by 
Indian bazaar merchants:
Gunny bags (no. of bags) Gunny cloth (yards)
1879-80 55,908,731 5,213,000
1889-90 97,415,895 37,144,007
1899-1900 168,323,849 307,021,359
1909-10 364,368,835 940,101,340
1914 368,759,260 1,061,151,537®
This argument is corroborated by the fact that in 1883 Charles Moore, the 
Gillanders Senior Partner in Calcutta, went on an extended sales tour to America, 
New Zealand and Australia, reporting back to his fellow old-Etonians, his 
Calcutta colleague Henry Gladstone and his London Senior Samuel Steuart 
Gladstone on his experiences. While he certainly provided hard market 
information on prices, on the threat of local manufacture in Californian jails, and 
the reliability of the "German Jew" who was their correspondent in San Francisco 
and New York, his letters are informal to the point of superficiality, including a 
description of a tourist visit to the Yosemite Valley, risque jokes and a long
59 Wallace, Romance of Jute, p. 10, citing Dr. Forbes Royle, Fibrous Plants of India, 1855, in 
turn citing "a Calcutta merchant named Henley".
60 Indian Jute Manufacturers' Association, Report of the Committee, 1917, Calcutta, 1918, 
p. 117, cited in Stewart, Jute and Empire, p. 82.
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description of his social successes with the Melbourne horse racing fraternity, to 
which he hastened to ascribe commercial value. Nevertheless, there is little 
doubt that he laid a satisfactory foundation for future trading, using his social 
standing and "old country" background to advantage, in a way which would not 
be within the reach of an Indian competitor for another forty years or more.
With the dramatic growth of the Dundee industry the demand for raw jute 
escalated steeply. This European-led demand, which significantly pre-dated the 
development of production in India, was met by the Bengali ryots, who 
responded by increasing the acreage under jute at the expense of paddy, a 
controversial process which made adequate food production vulnerable to 
climatic variations, particularly as the amounts grown increased exponentially 
over the next century. There is a large literature on this topic, which lies outside 
the scope of this thesis, but two points are relevant.
The first is that the ryots formed the most numerous group of Indian participants 
in the new jute industry, and were among the first, alongside the traders. The 
second is that they did so as independent agriculturalists, not as labourers on a 
European plantation, and did so voluntarily. The disastrous "immiserization" of 
the ryots in the 1930s and the famine in the 1940s tend to overshadow the relative 
prosperity of earlier days. Jute was the only cash crop: "At the beginning of the 
twentieth century the ryots regarded jute as a wonderful crop as they could 
afford all the luxuries of rural life.. .after selling their jute they covered their roofs 
with tin, dug ponds, and spent money on fireworks and feasts to greet their new 
daughters-in-law."61 Goswami concludes that:
. ..until the late 1920s most peasants not only earned a real surplus from jute 
cultivation, b u t .. .the gains were greater than what might have been under 
subsistence farming. Further, the jute cultivators of east and north Bengal were 
as responsive to relative prices and profits as peasants elsewhere...this helps 
restore to the peasants the rationality that was appropriated by generations of 
economic historians.62
61 Tajil-Islam Hashmi, "The Communalisation of the Class Struggle: East Bengal 
Peasantry 1923-1929", Indian Economic & Social History Review, No. 25 (1988), pp. 171-204.
62 Goswami, Industry, Trade and Peasant Society, p. 239.
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Chapter 2
MACKINNON, MACKENZIE & CO
From relatively humble beginnings, a few individuals built a new business 
which grew to include an important shipping line
Introduction
"Mackinnon's was possibly one of the most prestigious houses in Calcutta and 
was, in fact, sometimes seen as the successor to the East India Company... 
Mackinnon's regularly provided presidents for the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce and my father, for example, was also a member of the Viceroy's 
Legislative Council...''1
Mackinnon Mackenzie were the Managing Agents for the British India Steam 
Navigation Company (BI), for a time the largest shipping company in the world. 
The size and importance of the BI relationship dominated the firm and its 
reputation, overshadowing its other, more conventional Managing Agency 
interests in tea, jute and coal, and its identity was also blurred by the common 
family ownership of Macneill & Co, whose offices were in the same Calcutta 
building and to which eventually all the non-shipping interests were transferred. 
It was the only Managing Agency with a major shipping interest, and as such it 
was regarded by the other large firms which were its peers as something of a 
special case, although much respected, not least for its wealth.
"Box wallahs" tended to be disdained by the mandarins of the ICS throughout 
the period from 1858 until the end of the Raj. Robert K. Renford's study The Non- 
Official British in India to 1920 (Delhi, 1987) describes a number of examples, and 
Sir Bartle Frere's biographer wrote (of the 1860's): "At Calcutta, more than at 
Bombay, and than elsewhere in India, the Civil servants had hitherto been 
socially a class apart, having little intercourse with non-official Europeans.. ."2 
However, Mackinnon Mackenzie was, from early on, exceptionally close to
1 Ruthven Monteath, cited in Stephanie Jones, Merchants of the Raj, Basingstoke, 1992, 
pp.15-16.
John Martineau, The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, London, 1895, Vol. 1, 
p. 296.
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Government, which, as we shall see, regarded the shipping line as a strategic 
imperial asset which it was desirable to support.
Like many Managing Agencies, Mackinnon Mackenzie began as a modest 
im port/export agency -  an "agency house" -  and its survival from its early 
beginnings in the 1840s was a rarity. Most Managing Agencies were set up at 
least a.decade later during the boom following the Indian Mutiny and the 
changes in Government policies after the East India Company lost its position. 
The trading house was transformed in 1856 with the inception of the Calcutta- 
Rangoon shipping line, and while it continued its trading activities for several 
years, it was as shipowners and shipping line managers that the business grew 
and prospered.
The contrast with Bird & Co, who also provided important services to the state, is 
instructive. None of the principals of either company were privileged in any 
way, and their initial success derived exclusively from determination and 
industrious effort. However, William Mackinnon developed negotiating skills 
which enabled him to become an "establishment" figure, and to pass that 
authority to his successor, James Mackay. The BI shipping line was already a 
major business, operating all the way from Rangoon to the Persian Gulf by the 
time Birds' started in 1864. While Ernest Cable of Birds' also earned an earldom, 
the business he ran was more workaday in character, and their Government or 
quasi-govemmental contacts were at a more junior level than Mackinnon's until 
the 1920s and 30s, when Sir Edward Benthall, from a very different social and 
educational background, was head of the company.
William Mackinnon and the foundation of Mackinnon Mackenzie
William Mackinnon was born in 1823 in Campbeltown, a fishing and distilling 
town on the east coast of the Kintyre peninsula in the Firth of Clyde, the 
youngest child of his parents. Only four siblings survived infancy and 
childhood -  one brother, Peter (b.1818) and three sisters, Elizabeth (b.1810),
58
Catherine (b.1814) and Flora (b.1816). An article by the headmaster of Keil 
School, which is in the Guildhall archive3, states that William attended an 
elementary school in Campbeltown before entering the burgh school, where, 
according to J. Forbes Munro, "the Rector and two or three assistants taught a 
curriculum that included English, arithmetic, book-keeping, geography, 
mathematics, navigation, Latin, Greek and French".4 Another account has him 
the son of devout parents, a bright boy who "came to the notice" of the principal. 
of the nearby academy, who gave him private lessons. Although it is uncertain 
how much of this ambitious educational programme will have made a 
permanent mark on a 13-year-old, the renowned quality of Scottish education 
must go some way towards explaining Scottish business success in India and 
elsewhere.
Munro also emphasises the maritime character of Campbeltown:
Fast revenue cutters were based in Campbeltown and conducted anti-smuggling 
patrols over the entire western seaboard of Scotland, from the Isle of Man to the 
Outer Hebrides. They provided steady employment for seamen from the burgh, 
including William's uncle and cousins. Peter Mackinnon, Duncan's [his father's] 
brother, joined the customs service and by 1796 worked his way up to mate of the 
Prince of Wales. His two sons, including James, who rose to tire rank of second 
mate of the Wellington cutter in 1844, followed him in tu rn .5
The importance of seafaring to the town and particularly to the family will have 
given William, the eventual shipowner, a deep-seated understanding of the 
maritime environment, even if he was not himself a seaman.
His uncle James Mackinnon had three sons -  Peter (b.1832). John (b.1841) and 
Duncan (b.1844) -  whom William called 'nephews' but were in fact cousins, and 
each was to play an important r61e in the family firms.
William's elder brother Peter was 'away to sea' by 1836, when their father died, 
and William probably left school (at 13) to be apprenticed to a grocer, later 
opening his own shop. Munro cites the census of 1841 as showing him as a 
grocer living with his widowed mother and unmarried sister Flora. His other
3 Sheriff J Macmaster Campbell, 'Sir William Mackinnon, Bart/, The Campbeltown Courier. 
20 and 27 January 1934.
4 J. Forbes Munro, Maritime Enterprise and Empire: Sir William Mackinnon and his Business 
Network, 1823-1893 (Woodbridge, 2003), p-18.
5 Ibid.
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two sisters were meanwhile expanding the family circle by marriage, Catherine 
to a mariner called Archibald Gray, Elizabeth to Alexander MacNeill, a ship's 
carpenter with a master's ticket. The sons of each sister, William's actual 
nephews, would also come to play an important part in his businesses.
William's grocery business failed, perhaps as a result of serious illness, but 
Munro was unable to find any corroboration of the stories told of his subsequent 
work in Glasgow between 1841 and 1846, which include working in a silk 
warehouse, and then for a Portuguese East India merchant, where, according to 
Jones, he quickly became a partner. He has, however, traced the family origin of 
the initiative which took William to India.
Sometime during the 1840s, William's elder brother Peter went into partnership 
with Jamie Hall's father, and Peter took himself off to Liverpool to represent the 
firm of Hall & Mackinnon in that port. However, Peter and William Hall also 
had their eyes on India, where an acquaintance named Robert Mackenzie, a 
former bank clerk in Campbeltown, had a small general trading enterprise in 
Bengal. William Mackinnon and James Macalister Hall, it seems, were sent out to 
join Robert Mackenzie in India with a view to the development of a trade 
between Calcutta, Liverpool and the Clyde.6
William went to India in 1847 or before, but there is no corroboration of Jones'7 
story that he was running a sugar factory near Calcutta when he met Robert 
Mackenzie, who had an im port/ export business in Ghazipur, dealing principally 
in piece-goods, travelling frequently to Calcutta. An alternative version8 
suggests that Mackenzie came to Calcutta in 1836 and set up an oil goods 
import /  export business and was engaged in the coasting trade in the Bay of 
Bengal as well as being an agent for the India General Steam Navigation 
Company (for which Ghazipur would be a more plausible location than 
Calcutta). Another secondary source9 says that Mackinnon "rose to a prominent 
position in one of India's leading trading houses, Smith, Mackenzie and Co." In 
spite of these uncertainties, however, it seems that the two men set up the 
Mackinnon Mackenzie partnership in (December10) 1847, combining general
6 Munro, Maritime Enterprise, p. 21.
7 Jones, Merchants of the Raj.
8 De Fonseka website concerning the history of P&O in Ceylon,
http: / / www.defonseka.com/hist_mack01.htm. This version is largely repeated in Peter 
C. Kohler, Sea Safari, P. M. Heaton Publishing, Abergavenny, 1995. Extracts on website 
www.merchantnavyofhcers.com / bistart.html.
9 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the 
Nineteenth Century, New York and Oxford,1981.
10 Kohler, Sea Safari, n.p
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trading with chartering ships between UK ports and Calcutta (via the Cape), 
carrying as cargo some goods on their own account and some from other 
merchants, for whom they acted as sales and purchasing agents on commission.
Consignments from the UK seem mainly to have consisted of cotton piece-goods; 
return cargoes could be oil seeds, rice, jute, indigo, saltpetre, sugar, dates and 
silk. Like all "agency houses" they were part of the bazaar economy, 
representing a valuable export market which they understood and from which 
they could gain (if painfully slowly) information about demand, but apart from 
that specialised knowledge, a necessity for any exporter, they had at this stage no 
technical or financial superiority. As importers, however, they enjoyed the 
advantage of representing British manufacturers of machine-made cotton textiles, 
the dominant force in world textile markets and still protected from Indian 
competition by the prohibition on exports of British textile machinery. Just like 
the Indian merchants with whom they did business, they had to assess credit 
risks, demonstrate their own creditworthiness, and manipulate money transfers 
to maintain liquidity. If Mackenzie was indeed working in Ghazipur, he would 
have been one of only a handful of Europeans there, by no means all of whom 
would have been British.
At this time the capital of the firm was:
Mackenzie Rs. 26,594 
Mackinnon Rs. 19.498
Rs. 46,092 or £201,482 at current values, which shows 
that the firm was fairly solidly funded, and that Mackinnon had already 
managed to get his stake together, either from Glasgow or in Calcutta.
Profits in the next two years were:
1850 Rs. 16,171 or £74,720 at current values
1851 Rs. 68,605 or £326,381 at current values 
so the new partnership was doing well.11
In 1849 James Macalister Hall, also from Campbeltown, joined the partnership. 
Munro states that Hall, who was two months his junior, was William's closest 
school friend, and certainly friendship lay at the heart of the long, close business
11 E.J.Pakes Private File, not referenced. Guildhall Ms. 27831.
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partnership between them. Munro speculates that they may even have been 
distant relatives.
Jamie Hall went to Ghazipur to look after the business there and to establish the 
firm of Mackenzie Hall & Co.
Of the two concerns.. .Mackinnon Mackenzie was soon the more successful, and 
by 1853 it had relocated to Calcutta. This occurred largely through William 
Mackinnon7s efforts to shift it out of local India commerce into the import-export 
trades -  for which purpose he drew upon his Glasgow friends [cotton 
merchants], Connal and Gunnis...His 'nephew7 Peter, eldest son of James and 
Margaret, went out to India to be an assistant in 1850. Neil Macmichael, a former 
school friend, went to Ghazipur to relieve Jamie Hall.12
The discovery of gold in Australia in 1851 sparked an economic boom there and 
attracted the interest of exporters and investors in Calcutta, which was at a 
reasonably accessible distance. Mackinnon Mackenzie extended their trading 
and chartering business accordingly (although it was never to prove satisfactory). 
A report of sales13 sent from Sydney to Calcutta by Robert Mackenzie in 1853 lists 
randomly miscellaneous items, geared no doubt to the imagined needs of 
"diggers", but perhaps not untypical of the opportunistic nature of their trading. 
As well as staples like sugar, rice and maize, it ranges from English leghorn hats 
(bought in Singapore) to coffee, black pepper and gutta percha jugs and basins.
Before this report can have reached Calcutta, Mackenzie, on his way back, was 
drowned in the wreck of the Aurora on 15th May 1853.
William and Jamie then took over the partnership, and Jamie wound up his 
interest in the Ghazipur concern. He wanted to rename the Calcutta firm 
Mackinnon Hall & Co, but was dissuaded by William on the grounds that the 
name should be kept in reserve until the partners opened a London base (which 
they never did). Peter Mackinnon was admitted as a junior partner in 1854, 
while Jamie's younger brother, Peter Hall, became a junior partner in 1861. His 
salary is noted as Rs.500/- in the first year, Rs. 1,000 in the second and Rs. 1,500/- 
in the third. (Rs. 500/- was just over £2,000 at current values, so it was far from 
generous but very typical.) James Hall, Peter Mackinnon and Peter Hall, in a 
rotation to permit home leave, managed the Calcutta firm throughout the 1850s 
and 1860s.
12 Munro, Maritime Enterprise.
13 Guildhall Ms. 27814.
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When Mackinnon had bought out Mackenzie's share in the partnership he 
returned to Scotland, leaving James Hall to run the firm in Calcutta. In that same 
year he set up Wm. Mackinnon & Co.14 in Glasgow as a base for promoting cargo 
shipments, purchasing goods on the firm7 s own account and taking care of sales 
of return cargoes. It was also a base for negotiating charters and, very shortly, for 
investing in the firm's own ships.
It is possible only to speculate on the extent to which Mackenzie's death was a 
factor in Mackinnon's decision, but it can scarcely have been a coincidence.
William Mackinnon, the individual
Mackinnon's commitment to evangelical Calvinist Christianity was evident in his 
public career, which embraced support for missionary work in Africa and for the 
Free Church of Scotland.
Munro emphasises Mackinnon Mackenzie's close connections with the Free 
Church of Scotland in Calcutta -  which Alexander Duff had led away from the 
Scots Kirk. William Mackinnon had left the established church at the time of the 
great Disruption of 1843. It was through the Free Church that William met 
William Haworth, a coffee planter, and David Begg, then an indigo planter. 
Mackinnon Mackenzie as a firm was the church's treasurer.
A strong family piety suffused the ethic of the firms, and strengthened the bonds 
of trust based on kinship that enabled business to be transacted over the very 
long distances between Calcutta, Glasgow and Liverpool. It was a set of beliefs 
which, alongside strict Sabbatarianism and an aversion to alcohol, inculcated a 
work ethic mat sustained long hours of labour and a willingness to suffer the 
discomfort of regular travel in the interest of family and firm.15
William's commitment was evident in some of his earlier letters, which from time 
to time invoked God before signing off -  "deserving for you all every needed
14 see Headrick, The Tools of Empire, p. 76.
15 Munro, Maritime Enterprise, p. 33
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blessing & seeking that we may learn and apply profitably the lessons taught us 
by passing events";16 "seeking Grace for you and favours from the Lord".17
He wrote to Haworth, who managed or owned a coffee plantation in which 
Mackinnon had an interest, about an evangelical project: ".. .if you see we can 
afford it from the produce of the plantation I would now be glad to see you try to 
carry out our old plan of a Christian school for the workpeople and their children 
and also a small dispensary."18
He wrote to James Hall: "Bye the bye I will be well pleased if you do not credit 
me with any portion of commission on opium - 1 have great doubts about it 
altho' I would be sorry to say another person was doing wrong in acting 
differently."19
When news of the Mutiny reached him, Mackinnon wrote to James Hall about 
"the fearful crisis thro' which India is passing", demonstrating his conviction that 
the revolt was a challenge to Christianity by heathen forces rather than any kind 
of political manifestation. His was not, of course, an exceptional opinion at the 
time, and could reflect Alexander D uff s view that Christianity was a logical 
concomitant of Westernisation, although it lacks the philosophical and 
theological subtlety of Duff's influential proselytising. It also reflects the anger 
felt by the British in India and in Britain at what they saw as betrayal, an anger 
which profoundly altered British attitudes to Indians as a whole.
... May the Almighty in his goodness preserve all of you thro' it, and cause you to 
realize more and more that He is the Sovereign disposer of all events, and that 
He is a sure defence to all who put their trust in Him.. .What awful proof of the 
fearful depravity of man when left to himself or to the influence of fallen 
spirits.. .It appears like the fearful judgements of the Almighty against our nation 
-  and against India -  agst ourselves perhaps for our neglect as a nation to give 
Him the honor due to His name, and the denial of Him in our Indian 
Government, and agst Hindoo and Mahometans for their refusal to accept the 
message of mercy. Looking back it appears as if this is a fearful warning, our 
duty and our responsibility are not yet ended, however, I hope. The empire will 
yet be Britain's but woe betide her if she does not rule it as a Christian nation 
should. Henceforward our rulers should recognise no caste, and all efforts for 
the improvement of the natives should have an openly avowed Christian bias 
and basis. Every office of trust should be in the hands of Europeans.. .no man
16 W.M. to James Hall, 26 November 1857, File 57, SOAS (pages not numbered).
17 W.M. to Peter Mackinnon, 26 April 1862, File 58, p. 142, SOAS.
18 27 December 1858, File 58, p. 52, SOAS.
19 W.M. to James Hall, 23 December 1858, File 58, p. 48, SOAS.
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should be elligible [sic] for any office under Government (unless a menial one) 
who is not a Christian!20
Mackinnon himself did not incline to "accept the message of mercy" for the 
mutineers. To his nephew Peter Mackinnon he wrote:
I have great hope that our supremacy will have been restored and justice -  stem 
justice -  inflicted on the inhuman fiends who have steeped their hands 
treacherously in the [illegible] blood of our countrymen. The most intense anxiety 
is felt in all minds here and die nation would do everything and make any 
sacrifice to avenge the past...21
But he did not want vengeance to interfere with business:
I observe you have joined the Volunteer Corps. ..I am rather surprised and 
disappointed at the military fervour which seemed to have taken possession of 
you...and to wish for a commission in the Indian Army and to give up business 
entirely...22
...we have heavy responsibilities, and altho' I can enter fully into your feelings of 
detestation and desire for vengeance on the inhuman [illegible] who have spilt the 
blood of the innocent like water, yet I trust you have stuck to the duties imposed
23on you--.
But the military activity had also provided a silver lining:
The choice of the Cape by Government is an excellent thing for the Co. I observe 
she left Colombo on 4th June with 353 soldiers on board, a much larger number 
than you expected.24
This was the first of many wartime Government requisitions/charters of BI ships 
over the next 50 years. There is a list of 17 British military campaigns up to 190125 
for which BI ships were requisitioned, and there were to be many more such 
requisitions, and many ships lost, during the two World Wars in the 20th 
century after the merger with P&O. The military obligations of Royal Mail 
carriers could be onerous.
Sunday Observance was obligatory. He once wrote to James Hall "I was very 
sorry, however, that circumstances should have rendered it necessary to write to 
me on a Sunday. It is, as you say, a rare thing, and I hope it may be a long time 
before you are again necessitated to do so."26 The contract which was eventually
20 W.M. to James Hall, 4 September 1857, File 59, p. 356, SOAS.
21 W.M. to Peter Mackinnon, 17 September 1857, Guildhall Ms. 27806.
22 7 August 1857, ibid.
2317 September 1857, ibid.
24 25 July 1857, File 59, p. 321, SOAS.
25 Undated promotional leaflet, p. 3, Guildhall Ms. 27831.
26 8 May 1857, File 59, p. 264, SOAS.
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negotiated for the shipping service from Calcutta to the Persian Gulf provided 
specifically that ships should not be required to sail on Sundays.
It appears that this rigour was shared by saloon passengers:
The Austrian traveller Baron Von Hubner, who made a long voyage in the 
Durunda in 1885, recorded in near despair the awfulness of a shipboard Sunday - 
no whist, no bezique, even smoking was unpopular. 'Young M. caught with a 
novel in his hand: a lady looks at him fixedly, utters the word "Sunday", takes 
away the novel and slips into his hand a hymnbook instead'.27
Mackinnon was plainly an archetype exemplar for Max Weber's contention that 
Christian Protestantism, and particularly Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism, 
generated the "Spirit of Capitalism" in Northern Europe and North America 
which was to establish global economic dominance. Weber stressed the pivotal 
importance of the profit motive -  "this sober bourgeois capitalism, with its 
rational organisation of free labour"28 -  but he ignored the factors of creative 
initiatives and risk-taking which all successful business ventures require, as well 
as the motivation of the less rational rewards of self-satisfaction and competitive 
achievement. Calvinism elevated thrift, frugality and hard work to the status of 
virtue, if not quite salvation, in Scotland and elsewhere, but these moral 
imperatives were certainly recognised by quite different religious traditions, 
notably, as far as the immediate context of this work is concerned, in the Parsi 
and Marwari communities.
In the case of William Mackinnon one can safely ascribe his thrift, frugality and 
relentless industry to his Calvinist upbringing, but his success was as much the 
result of his imaginative vision, his keen perception of opportunities, his 
boldness in taking risks, his intense competitiveness and his skill in developing 
and manipulating personal contacts, none of which are normally regarded as 
peculiarly Protestant qualities.
At a more personal level, the unchanging regularity of his careful handwriting 
seems to indicate a driven, slightly obsessive person, and he shows a grim, 
unsympathetic formality which does not bend even when writing to his old 
friend James Hall about his mother's final illness, using what today seem like
27 cited by Kohler, Sea Safari.
28 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Trans. Talcott Parsons, 
London, 1992. [First published in Germanyl904/5.j
sanctimonious cliches but were doubtless a comforting refuge to such a devout 
man. He could be as unforgiving of business antagonists in financial trouble as 
he was of the Indian mutineers, although in less dramatic language.
On the other hand he was unswervingly loyal to his family clan (including the 
Hall family), from which almost the entire management of the firm was 
recruited. This exclusivity, which mirrors Marwari. practice very closely, may 
well have had similar foundations -  primarily the placement in distant posts of 
individuals whose loyalty, integrity and acceptance of patriarchal authority were 
axiomatic and reliable, although doubtless it was also to intended to keep within 
the family the financial benefits of partnership. Nevertheless, the unfortunate 
Peter Mackinnon received several letters of swingeing criticism, one of which 
pushed him to the edge of resigning. It blamed him for his inability to find 
buyers for a large consignment of cotton piece-goods, lying in stock for months 
on Gunnis/ account, being forced eventually to dispose of it at a loss, thus putting 
at risk the lucrative agency contract with Gunnis. It was followed by a didactic 
letter which ihuminates the realities of commercial operation in the bazaar, and 
the value attached to trading operations even while the shipping interests were 
being built up.
I have often urged on you the importance of making yourself thoroughly 
acquainted with piece-goods...Let Paul consult you at all times and on all points 
when any big bargain is being made -  don't leave him singly to cope with the 
'cute Native buyers. I cannot help thinking he allowed himself.. .to be talked 
over too much by some sharp bazaar people and by our own broker. The broker 
needs, as you know, to be thoroughly watched and all he does well lifted, and 
you will require all your wits about you to avoid being done now and then by 
him and the other sharp witted men who are always going about. Write Gunnis 
carefully and often and do your best in your correspondence to show him your 
interest in his affairs and that you are thorough in all that is doing for him ...
Thoroughness was a very evident characteristic of the firm's management: Most 
of Mackinnon's weekly or fortnightly letters to Calcutta consisted predominantly 
of several pages of market reports, detailing the prevailing demand and prices 
for the commodities which Calcutta might ship, and likewise detailing the 
consignments of piece-goods which were being prepared for outward shipping. 
This obsessive, "hands-on" insistence contrasts sharply with the business style of 
the Gillanders partners.
In the same letter William Mackinnon went on to encourage his nephew to 
cultivate useful contacts:
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we must keep up our position with our friends, with the good folks in Calcutta 
too you should to a certain extent aim at a good position. As you represent large 
interests as well as our own, lay yourself out occasionally to see people to 
compare notes with whom you feel it would he an advantage to you. Cultivate 
personally as far as you can good relations with men in official situations...29
Even if he was a hard taskmaster, he was well able to gain the trust and respect 
of his business contacts -  and even their affection, at least in the case of David 
Begg30 and Bartle Frere31. He was also more than willing to use his influence and 
resources to do favours in India for the family and friends of those who were 
important to him in business -  a commonplace and overt practice at the time, 
even if the excesses of 18th century "preferment" had been tamed.32
The Calcutta & Burmah Steam Navigation Company
"Lower Burma", in which Rangoon was situated, was annexed by the British in 
1852 after the second Burmese War and came under East India Company 
administration. In addition to the extension of governmental responsibility, the 
newly pacified and liberalised Burmese trading opportunities created 
commercial interest in Calcutta, and the need for more reliable communications 
was an obvious concomitant to both. In 1855, according to Kohler, the Bengal 
Government invited tenders for a regular mail steamship route between Calcutta 
and Rangoon.
By this time Mackinnon's was moving from merely renting cargo space and 
chartering ships into part-ownership of ships (a normal maritime arrangement 
for spreading risk). According to J. Forbes Munro:
29 W.M. to Peter Mackinnon, 9 January 1861, Guildhall Ms. 27804.
30 Begg, a doctor, had been a successful indigo planter, and a founding partner of Begg, 
Dunlop, a substantial Calcutta Managing Agency. Although not listed as a Calcutta & 
Burmah shareholder in Mackinnon7 s original letter to Peter Mackinnon of September 
1856, he certainly became one later. The Macneill & Co.(Duncan Macneill, another 
nephew) Managing Agency looked after many of his Indian interests. Mackinnon and 
his wife would stay with him near London from time to time. He must have been much 
older than Mackinnon; he died in 1868.
31 see below.
32 see for example W.M/s letter to Peter Mackinnon, 5 February 1856, File 56, SOAS.
68
At first they purchased cheap, Canadian-built wooden sailing ships, but from 
1860 they began the development of a small fleet of Clyde-built iron sailing ships. 
Mackinnon, Frew & Co, Liverpool, in which William's brother Peter was 
principal partner, managed this fleet until it was abandoned in the 1880s.33
The principal issue for those tendering for the new service was securing a 
subsidy from Government for carrying mail. The operators of the steamships of 
the time, powered by "simple" engines (i.e. not the much more efficient 
"compound" engines introduced some years later), had to carry so much coal 
that space for cargo, and indeed passengers, was limited, and freight was often 
insufficient to cover operating costs. A mail subsidy would make all the 
difference.
In fact the principle of mail subsidies had been established for some time, even 
before the coming of steam, and the British Government paid hefty subsidies to 
P&O and others (not without complaint in Parliament)34 in order to secure the 
strategic benefit of loyal and reliable overseas communications, as well as the 
availability of ships as troop transports in an emergency.35 The same 
considerations would influence the Indian Government, which had more 
immediate strategic defence anxieties, even before 1857. Directly parallel was the 
Government7 s policy for encouraging private investment in Indian railways by 
guaranteeing a 5% return.
In one of the earlier letters in the archive William Mackinnon wrote at length to 
his nephew Peter about the crucial step being taken "to get up a company for 
Screw Steamers to Rangoon", and the overriding need to negotiate a subsidy.
He lists the original subscribers of the £20,000 capital (£900,000 at current values), 
who included I. Halliday, G.P. Gunnis (a Manchester cotton manufacturer and 
designer, and a major agency customer); George Duncan; and James Hall and 
William Mackinnon through Mackinnon Mackenzie. A further £7,500 was 
reserved for investors in India:
33 Munro, Scottish Overseas Enterprise, p. 77,
34 "By the 1860s the British Government was spending over £1 million [say £45 m] a year 
on mail contracts to steamship companies." Headrick, Tools of Empire, p. 170.
35 Freda Harcourt, "The P&O Company: Flagships of Imperialism', in Sarah Palmer and 
Glyndwr Williams (eds), Charted and Uncharted Waters: Proceedings of a Conference on the 
Study of Maritime History, London, 1982, pp. 6-28.
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We do not wish to have any shareholder holding less than £500 worth of stock. 
Try and get a few in Calcutta to take this or a larger amount. Ramgopal will I 
daresay, and perhaps a few more — Some of the other rich natives engaged in the 
trade -  that old fellow was used to buy the book muslins and others -  it will be 
important to get for shareholders people who can give cargo and with this view 
we might perhaps allow parties to hold £250 stock — not less...
It is interesting that at this time Mackinnon was quite ready to welcome Indian 
investors, particularly those with cargo to ship, although it is possible that his 
attitude may have changed following the Mutiny a year later.
On the issue of the subsidy it becomes clear that there was serious competition 
from another British firm -  Livingstone, Withers & Co. -  and Mackinnon 
instructed his nephew urgently to get in touch with the Government in Calcutta, 
initiating
... official correspondence which I wish you to open with the Govt thro' the 
proper channel immediately on receipt of this letter. Let every other matter stand 
for a day and apply yourself to this...
Address the Government or Marine Board... and intimate your now being ready 
as Agents for the "Calcutta & Burmah Steam Navigation Co." to run a steamer 
once a fortnight between Calcutta and Burmah and to carry the mails.
The offer to provide a scheduled service was based on the principal advantage 
conferred by auxiliary steam power - reliable regularity rather than speed, being 
no longer at the mercy of the wind. From the point of view of merchant shipping 
management it was a very significant shift in emphasis away from opportunistic 
"tramp" operation, which allowed a ship to wait until she was loaded and ready 
before sailing, and to some extent to allow demand to dictate the ports for which 
she was bound. The selection of ports for scheduled services was dictated by 
three principal factors: where a mail subsidy was paid, Government would 
specify ports which it knew to be important centres for administrative and 
military activity, generating mail volume and requiring passenger services for 
Government servants; the levels of commercial activity generating inward and 
outward cargo -  which would usually coincide with Government criteria; and 
the distance between coaling points.
Although these management considerations were new to Mackinnon Mackenzie 
in 1856, knowledge of the route to Rangoon from Calcutta would have been 
familiar in Calcutta. It was nevertheless a bold and innovative step by William
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Mackinnon and his fellow shareholders, and the correspondence goes into some 
detail about shore facilities in Rangoon.
But the underpinning of a mail subsidy was a necessary concomitant.
If no agreement can be come to, by hook or crook get them to keep free from any 
engagement to contract with any other company as Livingston Withers & Co. 
have made and will make great efforts to forestall us. We will, I trust, have our 
boats out first this I believe will be a great point, and we are going to do our 
utmost to be first in the field. Use your discretion and judgement as to what 
steps should be taken to secure our object with the Government and exert 
yourself in every quarter to bring influence to bear on it; lose not an hour, but set 
vigourously [sic] to work and we may yet get the field to ourselves. Livingston's 
are determined to do the same and it will be a hard fight. I just trust that by 
greater promptitude and zeal you will succeed in securing what we have in 
m ind.. .The thing must be done, must be done well and must be done promptly. 
We will buy two steamers and build a third -  these two we will dispatch with all 
speed... 36
In spite of all the exhortations and advice, however, Peter Mackinnon did not 
succeed. His uncle wrote:
We were all very sorry to find there appeared so little probability of your 
obtaining the subsidy for us. I wrote you two mails ago that we had been asked 
by Livingston Withers & Co. to come to an understanding with them. They 
would buy our boats but we would not sell...Since receipt of your letter, 
however, we have again opened up correspondence and have submitted a 
proposed.. .This morning I have a few lines from Withers in which he says "the 
terms, you offer are now under consideration..." So after all things may come 
into our hands yet... .37:
Eventually the deal was done, and Mackinnon Mackenzie as Managing Agents 
had the mail contract, and were responsible for all aspects of managing the 
Calcutta & Burmah Steamship Company, including crew, harbour facilities and 
bunkering. Two ships had been bought -  the Cape of Good Hope and the Baltic, the 
former a new 500 ton steamship built for the London-South Africa service of the 
now defunct General Screw Co. -  and the two ships maintained a fortnightly run 
between Calcutta, Akyab, Rangoon and Moulmein. The new ship was ordered, 
in the face of opposition from the cautious shareholder George Duncan, but was 
ill-fated. She never went into service.
What an unfortunate thing the wreck of the Calcutta is -  she was only 16 hours 
from Liverpool when in fog they ran her on Arklin Bank. The cargo, crew and 
passengers are all saved but the ship is not likely to be got off. She is much
36 25 September 1856, Guildhall Ms. 27804; File 59, p. 134, SOAS.
37 9 January 1857, Guildhall Ms. 27804; File 59, p. 162, SOAS.
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strained, I doubt. She is well insured which is so far satisfactory - £17,500 
[£800,000 at current values] -  bu t her loss will be a great inconvenience to us.38
but only two weeks later the indomitable Mackinnon could write: "to supply the 
loss of the Calcutta we have bought a new steamer nearly ready for launching at 
Hartlepool."
This was not the first stroke of ill-fortune -  the previous year the Cape of Good 
Hope had been rammed (accidentally) and sunk in the Hooghly "by P&O's aptly 
named Nemesis. "sg
It appears that the dissension on the Calcutta & Burmah board reached a crisis in 
the autumn of 1859. Mackinnon failed to get the obstructive George Duncan off 
the board and resigned himself. He was anxious for the company to move to 
Glasgow, and if that happened he would rejoin the board, as requested by David 
Begg, Halliday and others.40 It seems that he did indeed float another steamship 
company to underpin his ambitions to extend his operations to Madras, and that 
this was called the Bay of Bengal Company. However, by early the following 
year he seemed confident of getting agreement at the next Annual General 
Meeting to move the company to Glasgow, and was hoping again for Duncan's 
resignation. He planned to merge the two companies 41
By June 1860 they were working on a tender for a Calcutta-Madras mail service. 
Mackinnon wrote to James Hall from Geneva, where he was on holiday42:
Meantime go on with the arrangements for a line between Madras and Burmah, 
if the Calcutta & Burmah Co. w on't take it up we'll easily arrange it ourselves.
Mackinnon was now showing his skill in making useful contacts and exploiting 
them -  "networking" in today's terms. The Calcutta & Burmah company was 
based in London, and no doubt he could find opportunities to broaden and 
develop his acquaintance there. It seems to have been a remarkable talent, not 
necessarily to be expected in someone brought up quietly and piously in a small 
town in a remote part of Scotland.
3815 May 1860, Guildhall Ms. 27804..
39 Kohler, Sea Safari, n.p.
40 W.M. to James Hall, 27 September 1859, File 58, p. 91, SOAS.
41 W.M. to James Hall, 25 Februaiy 1859, ibid., p. 101.
42 8 June 1857, File 57. n.p., SOAS.
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I think the home Government might be disposed to help in such a case in 
consideration of the home mails being carried. I can have very good access to 
Wilson at the Board of Trade and will endeavour to find out whether any 
assistance from him might be expected. If you get a promise from Bendon [a 
Bengal Government official?] of a decent subsidy, you had best make the 
arrangement in our own name, as I can easily get up an independent company. 
Gunnis will go the length of his tether with us in it, and he will get Mr Sahnond 
of the Q ty [of Glasgow] Bank to co-operate with him.
.. .1 don't think Duncan can offer any more opposition to a new and suitable 
steamer being built. If he does we must first call a general meeting and carry the 
measure against him ... We must I think double our interest in the Burmah Co 
otherwise we may lose much of our influence in it and as it is so promising an 
undertaking I don't think we can go far wrong. Gunnis double [sic] his interest 
and has bought Law's 10 shares. Begg doubles his also -  you have long 'ere this 
heard that the resolution doubling the capital has been confirmed. If the Madras 
extension is agreed on it will have to be doubled again or made say £150,000 [£6.5 
million].
The following month he wrote reiterating the argument against Duncan, and 
saying that he, Begg, Gunnis and Halliday would take up all remaining shares 
and pay for them. "I have arranged an open credit of £20,000 [£860,000] for the 
purpose."43 He wrote to Halliday to say that if necessary he would personally 
buy out Duncan and his friends.44
Eventually Duncan and other London directors were squeezed out and 
Mackinnon moved the Company to Glasgow in 1860. For all the boardroom 
problems., Mackinnon evidently had enormous skill in identifying and 
convincing potential investors to build the company's capital base, a skill which 
paralleled his political networking. He was putting together significant finance, 
without using the stock exchange, all of it from private individuals except for 
lines of credit from the City of Glasgow Bank, where Gunnis evidently had the 
initial influence, and where Mackinnon followed in his footsteps, eventually 
becoming a director there.
Another major source of finance (possibly unrealised) was John Pender, another 
Manchester merchant, whose wealth and prospects Mackinnon enumerated45, 
and who at one point proposed a merger of Mackinnon's with his London firm of 
Gibb. However, this seems not to have come to anything, and in 1864 John 
Pender turned his attention to the new opportunities provided by submarine 
cables, eventually creating the vast monopoly of the Eastern and Associated
43 21 July 1857, File 59, pp. 3024, SOAS.
44 21 July 1857, File 59, pp. 305-6, SOAS.
45 24 February 1858, File 57. n.p., SOAS.
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Company controlled by him and his family. "Of the approximately 190,000 miles 
of submarine cables in the world in 1900, 72% were British owned, mostly by 
Eastern and Associated."46
As the shipping line grew exponentially and technological developments 
gathered pace, the need for more and more capital grew in parallel, and it could 
not have succeeded without Mackinnon, who did not have (or doubtless wish 
for) the professional financial advice at his elbow which his modem counterpart 
would take for granted. Mackinnon's skill was self-taught and his industry 
prodigious. In the early days it seems he kept the Glasgow books himself, and 
the out-turn of "partners' private letters" ran to thousands of words a week.
Meanwhile he was driving on with the "extension of steam communication" 
from the basic Calcutta-Rangoon line.
Begg had Bendon a fellow passenger to the Sandheads. The Madras contract not 
likely to be settled immediately, but he thinks they would be inclined to give us a 
subsidy for a line to Singapore from Burmah altho' it is not very important for 
Government purposes. Bendon thinks our contract is small (subsidy I mean). 
Begg is of the opinion that a little gentle pressure might settle the thing.. .try it. I 
would like that better than the Madras line as I am quite sure it would pay better 
& would be easily handled! We would get it up among 4 or 5 {fund a separate 
company].47
I hope you have succeeded in completing arrangements for the Andamans48 and 
Straits but you must avoid the pains and penalties if possible in your contract, 
and get grants of lands for coal depots and wharves if you can at all the stations. 
See what you can do also about a contract and subsidy along the coast to Madras 
and Ceylon. I am certain there is an ample field and if we don't someone else 
will take it up soon. I am going on with the formation of a company which once 
formed may take up in addition the Madras and Burmah line if you secure a 
good subsidy and a contract on favourable terms.. We must make a bold push to 
get the whole steam trade of the Bay of Bengal with our own hands whether by 
means of one or more companies!49
However, the subsidies and contracts seem to have been slow in coming. On 21st 
May 1861 he wrote to Peter Mackinnon: "Try again to get a subsidy for the 
Madras line and offer to continue further down the coast or with proper 
encouragement to Bombay." He also wrote: "See about the subsidy again down
46 Headrick, The Tools of Empire, pp. 161-2.
47 31 March 1858, File 57, n.p., SOAS.
48 The Andaman Islands were only sparsely inhabited, but were the location for a 
Government penal colony. There was therefore an official need for the regular carriage 
of mail and supplies, even though the volume may have been low.
49 31 July 1858, File 58, p. 6, SOAS.
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along the coast from Burmah to the Straits & Singapore -  now that the Bengal 
Marine50 is abolished Government may be inclined to entertain proposals for 
such lines for their own convenience. I f  s worth a trial as if we don't offer 
someone else will. With our six steamers we shall be able to undertake a good 
deal, and we can easily build another../'
What must be only a draft of the Madras contract is in the SO AS archive.51 It is in 
the form of an indenture between the Secretary of State for India and the four 
partners, now including Peter Hall, who was James Hall's brother, "merchants 
and co-partners trading under the style or firm of Mackinnon Mackenzie and 
Company". The service was to begin on 12th May 1861 and be monthly 
thereafter, calling at Masulipatam, Cocanada, Vizagapatam and Bimlipatam.
The Government had the right to require passages for its own personnel up to a 
maximum of:
5 commissioned officers or other public servants entitled to cabin passages,
3 warrant officers,
125 men,
and 30 tons of stores.
The mail contract was worth Rs. 4,500 [£18,225 at current values] each round 
voyage, with a minimum guaranteed revenue of Rs. 7,500 [£30,375] underwritten 
by Government.
Even before the Madras contract was signed, Mackinnon was writing: "The 
earnings this half year are magnificent and if it concludes as well as it has been 
going on, there should be a net amount on Voyage a /  c of £25,000 [£1,125,000] or 
thereabouts -  enough to pay all our debts."52
Mackinnon Mackenzie was well-rewarded by the steamship company for its 
Managing Agency services. In September 1861 Mackinnon wrote: "We are trying 
to arrange a fresh commission contract with the company to embrace all the
50 The Bengal Marine, like its counterpart on the West Coast, the Bombay Marine, was a 
small fleet owned and operated by the Government, which had originally had a 
primarily military function in protecting British merchant shipping, but had also 
undertaken the carriage of mails, passengers and cargo. The Government decided to 
abandon direct participation in this activity.
51 Box 97, File 14, SOAS.
52 21 May 1861, Guildhall Ms. 27804.
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agencies on both sides of the bay" and a few days later: "I have closed the 
Agency contract at 13 1/2% on gross earnings & 5% on net profits as a minimum, 
1 1/2% additional on gross when the company gets 15%, 1% more on gross when 
the company gets 19%. Under this arrangement we take all the Agencies 
including Akyab for 3 years from 1st January next.. .We must see to get one 
Postal contract for all the lines."
A m ajor p u sh  fo r expansion
By the autumn of 1861 Mackinnon's sights were set on even more ambitious 
subsidised extensions for the line. He had in mind a service all the way round 
the coast from Calcutta to Bombay, and then on to Karachi and the Persian Gulf. 
He decided to come to India himself, and engaged in some vigorous lobbying 
before he left.
I got an introduction to Lord Elgin and had a very pleasant interview with him 
alone for about half-an-hour on Monday last. He leaves for India in December 
and he may have the arranging of our steamer contracts. He will make a good 
Governor General and he is a Scotchman of very great and very varied 
experience... I spoke of our steamers and he made various enquiries about them 
and the traffic existing. I think h e ll take some interest in them. We must try to 
get the contracts all in one and for 5 or 7 years.53
He had arrived in Bombay to continue lobbying when he wrote on 16th 
November:
This morning I saw Mr Reeves, the senior member of Council, regarding steam 
communication. My scheme he had put into Mr Frere's hands, approving 
himself very highly of it and desirous that the Government should take it up. He 
said he thought I should if could spare the time go up to Mahableshwar and see 
the Governor ... From all I can see and hear, there is a very large trade done all 
along the coast and so long as to induce competition, but the steamers are so 
miserable and the Moulmein so superior that we would carry all the trade.
The Kurrachee trade is still more important and if decent subsidies were given I 
think we would find the whole very profitable...the profitable extension of our 
steam lines is as important to us as any part of our business...54
531 October 1861, Guildhall Ms. 27804. 
54 ibid.
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This straightforward expression of his new commercial priorities marks the 
turning point in Mackinnon Mackenzie's transformation from a general trading 
and chartering "agency house" to a major shipping Managing Agency.
.. .The Governor.. .will not be here before 1st December bu t...he concurs with Mr 
Reeves and Mr Frere in regard to the desirability of the Lines proposed and 
would be prepared to recommend any reasonable proposal to the Secretary of 
State for India and the Government of India...
the traffic is very large and being rapidly developed by a very inferior class of 
steamer, The Bombay Steam [Navigation Company]55 have, I believe, only 3 
steamers.. .The concern has a very bad name and their 500/- shares are worth 
about 200/ -. Government is disgusted with them and would gladly arrange with 
a respectable company...56
I saw Mr Reeves and Mr Frere this morning and find them very desirous to 
arrange with us for the lines to Kurrachee and Bushire. Mr Reeves is accordingly 
friendly and recommends me to see Sir Bartle Frere to whom I have an 
introduction from his brother here...57
MacKinnon then went to Calcutta, and before long had indeed met Sir Bartle 
Frere, a member of the Supreme Council and shortly to become Governor of 
Bombay. His biographer records the meeting, perhaps not knowing that 
Mackinnon had an introduction from Frere's brother in Bombay.
.. .once a week Frere had a public breakfast to which any person who wished to 
see him on any business could come...the non-official Europeans...found Frere 
always ready to give them a courteous and attentive hearing. It was thus that he 
met Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Mackinnon, who became for the rest of his life 
one of his warmest friends.. .it was not till early in 1862, shortly before Frere left 
Calcutta, that a friend took him to one of Frere's semi-public breakfasts.. .Frere, 
with a quick eye for a man of mettle, gave him and his proposal a cordial 
reception. "You are the man I have been looking for for years," he said to him; 
and he took him to Lord Canning, who gave favourable attention to his scheme. 
But the consent of the Bombay Government was also necessary, and this 
Mackinnon was unable to obtain until Frere went to Bombay as Governor in 
April 1863. [The writer is mistaken. It was in April 1862] There he was the first 
person with whom Frere had an interview after being sworn in, and the result 
was that the subsidy was soon after granted.58
The political context is more knowledgeably described by Munro. Frere was 
arguing for the Bombay Marine to be wound up as well as the already 
discontinued Bengal Marine, and for the private sector to provide all the Indian 
government's maritime transport needs, thus being encouraged to develop a
55 see below.
56 20 November 1861, Guildhall Ms. 27804.
57 29 November 1861, ibid.
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mercantile marine in Indian waters.
'We have in the coasting trade of India itself, he commented, 'the means of 
creating a local steam marine, which in time of need might render most valuable 
service to the State; but we have hitherto done little as a Government to assist in 
developing this branch of our resources/ He suggested an immediate enquiry 
into how 'local coasting steamers' might be prom oted ' by making use of diem as 
far as possible in the transport of troops and stores and for post-office 
purposes',59
Munro goes on to point out:
Consequently, when William outlined his plans for a series of inter-connecting 
steamship services around India and its spheres of maritime influence, from 
Singapore at the end of the Straits of Malacca to Basra at the head of the Persian 
Gulf, Frere is said to have exclaimed that he was the man he had been looking for 
for years,. .Frere threw the full weight of his influence behind William's 
proposals.. .William and the Calcutta and Burmah Co, in short, were pushing at a 
door being opened by the Government of India's decision to privatise its 
maritime transport facilities.
In April 1862 Mackinnon was in Bombay on his way back home, and Bartle Frere 
had just arrived there. It was a crucially fortunate coincidence. Mackinnon 
reported to Captain Reddie, presumably a senior member of the Secretariat in 
Calcutta, giving chapter and verse on the way the negotiations had stalled but 
had been triumphantly concluded:
On my arrival here I found that the papers on the proposed lines of steamers, 
which you had sent on to the Government of Bombay had been passed about 
from hand to hand in the various departments which were required to report on 
them, without being submitted to either of the members of the Executive Council 
-  no ... reply had been sent to Calcutta -  except -  and that only quite recently -  a 
disapproval of the line round the Coast to Bombay...
The arrival of His Excellency Sir Bartle Frere has set everything in motion. I met 
him as Sir George Clerk was leaving and he immediately gave me an 
appointment for the next morning. At that interview I informed him of the 
delay.. .No time appears to have been lost for on calling on the Honble J.W. 
Inverarty this morning I found that at length the officiating Chief Secy had sent 
his report dated only yesterday the 25th April! That report is on the whole 
favourable to the proposals, and it will probably be sent to you on Monday.
Mackinnon then complains at some length that the Bombay Government should 
only just have advertised for tenders, long after a recommendation had 
effectively been made by Calcutta. He also noted:
58 John Martineau, The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, London, 1895, Vol. 1, pp. 
296-8.
59 Munro, Maritime Enterprise, p. 46, citing Minute by Sir H.B.E. Frere, 6 January 1869, 
Confidential Print No. 72, Abstracts, IOLR L/P&S/19.
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It is very singular too that the advertisement is issued very much to correspond 
with the proposal made by the Bombay Stm Co for the Persian Gulf line which 
came before you from Bombay while you were arranging the various lines with 
me and which you put aside.
I had a long interview with Sir Bartle this evening the results of which I 
telegraphed to my nephew and requested him to inform you. Sir Bartle will 
probably telegraph to you direct on Monday. His Government approve & will 
bear their share of the Coast line Calcutta to Bombay, the steamers to call at ports 
convenient to this Govt. Col. Marriott's disapproval therefore will be set aside.
He approves also, as you know, of the Persian Gulf line... It would be quite 
satisfactory to him and I believe to his Council if the Govt of India thought fit to 
accept my tender without reference to the advertisement...
Acting on your suggestion as to the strengthening of boats built for this line -  one 
is in progress of about 800 tons strengthened for guns in swivels fore and aft!60
Frere had a far-reaching and ambitious agenda, however, sharing the view of 
many in Government that the Persian Gulf was of vital strategic importance to 
British India as the gateway to a putative overland route to the Mediterranean, 
through Arabia and avoiding the unreliability of Francophile Egypt. Eastwards, 
India's north-west frontier would be more accessible, the more so now that 
Karachi harbour had been built and the private sector rail-river route into the 
Punjab was nearly complete -  a major achievement of Frere's period as 
Commissioner for Sind between 1851 and 1859
Now, as governor of Bombay, he had responsibility for the conduct of India's 
foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, and had the authority to use William 
Mackinnon's steamships as agents of British power in the Gulf.
Mackinnon may have triumphed in the negotiations, and still be aiming to scuttle 
the chances of the competition from the Bombay Steam Navigation Co., but he 
evidently took it seriously enough to take pre-emptive action, a tactic which was 
to be repeated in the 1920s by an even more aggressive management targeting 
the Scindia Line. In spite of having previously reported so scathingly on their 
ships, he now (on his way home) wrote to Peter Mackinnon:
With regard to the offer I authorized W. Nichol & Co. [their agents in Bombay] to 
make for the block of the Bombay Stm. Co., I think if it is accepted we will have 
got our money's worth and cheaply rid of a [decided?] opposition. Their ship 
Tilly is a nice vessel, steams well & carries a good cargo. Her boilers with care 
will work for 3 more years. The Scindian also is a good ship... (If we don't get
60 26 April 1862, File 58, p. 138, SOAS.
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Bombay Steam you will have to charter until our own new steamers arrive in 
January.)61
The offer was turned down.
However, the Bombay Steam Navigation Company had, confusingly, more than 
one incarnation. According to Thomas Venn62, the Bombay Steam Navigation 
Company operating in 1862 had no connection with the company of that name 
which later operated coastal shipping services at least until the Second World 
War. The first company of this name was launched in 1845, operating between 
Bombay, Surat and Gogo.
This company had a comparatively short existence; yet built up a reputation for 
punctuality and efficiency, and its downfall is partly attributable to the liberal 
lines upon which it was run. The conveniences and, for those days, comfort 
which were provided was beyond the requirements of the times, or the ability of 
the poorer classes to pay for. And in 1863, amid expressions of universal regret, 
it was wound u p ...
Was it a coincidence that this was simultaneous with their failure to secure the 
government mail contract? However, Munro records that in 1863 J.A. Shepherd 
managed the 're-constituted7 Bombay Coast & River Steam Navigation 
Company, plying the Malabar coast in competition with BI, until 1867, when it 
went bankrupt in the fall-out from the failure of the Bank of Bombay. According 
to Venn:
In 1869 Shepherd secured a monopoly of ferry services across Bombay harbour as 
Shepherd & Co, and named its agents The Bombay Steam Navigation Company. 
Hajee Hassum Joosub, a small bookseller, was an investor for 50% of the cost of 
the first ship -  Rs. 40,000.
A. K. Bagchi states, in a footnote, that
The Bombay Steam Navigation Company Limited was registered in 1906; its 
managing agents were Killick, Nixon & Company, but there was an Indian 
majority on its board in 1913...The company was formed in 1906 to purchase as a 
going concern, owing to the indifferent health if the owner and vendor, Hajee 
Ismail Hassum, the navigation business known as Shepherds Steamers. See IIYB, 
2914, pp.400-2.63
611 May 1862, ibid., p. 148.
62 Thomas Walters Venn, The Bombay Steam Navigation Company, J.A. Shepherd and A.W. 
Crawford with Digressions. T.W.V.Devennen.1931. Unpublished typescript. IndiaOffi.ee 
Library Private Papers, MSS Eur D831.
63 A. K Bagchi, Private Investment in India, 1900-1939, Cambridge 1972, p. 263, footnote 7.
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The company survived independently at least into the late 1930s. An undated 
BI promotional leaflet states: "For nearly 30 years before the outbreak of the 
Great War in 1914 the BI, with the Asiatic Steam Navigation Company and the 
Bombay Steam Navigation Company -  the latter an Indian company operating 
on the West coast of India -  ordinarily carried between them 90% of the coastal 
shipping trade of India and Burma."64
Meanwhile, it is not known whether the decision of the Bombay Government to 
favour a British over an Indian firm was regarded as controversial, nor whether it 
was thought necessary to justify it. Munro was unable to trace a minute or a 
memorandum in the India Office Library papers.
Mackinnon7 s triumphantly successful negotiations meant that the shipping line 
was operating on an entirely new scale, although the Mackinnon Mackenzie 
agency were not to participate directly in the west coast line management until 
1878, prior to which it was in the hands of other agents in Bombay, Karachi,
Aden and Bushire. In 1862, following the award of the contract, the Calcutta & 
Burmah's name was changed to British Indian Steam Navigation Company and 
within a year BI was operating the following services:
Calcutta-Aky ab-Rango on-Moulmein (fortnightly) 
Calcutta-Rangoon-Moulmein-Penang-Malacca-Singapore (monthly) 
Rangoon-Port Blair-Andamans (monthly)
Bombay-Karachi (fortnightly)
Karachi-Persian Gulf ports (eight times yearly)
Calcutta-Bombay via coast ports (monthly)...
BI achieved a reputation for the regularity and safety of its service at a time when 
the Indian coast, Bay of Bengal and Persian Gulf were among the poorest charted 
waters in the world and each beset with its own peculiar and geographic 
condition. Thus Mackinnon7 s entrepreneurial ambitions were realised by good 
seamanship and well-found ships that truly went where no others had plied 
before. Many an eastern port was surveyed, buoyed and lighted by BI enterprise 
and at BTs expense.65
The Calcutta-Bombay contract, which was awarded in 1862, had to be financed 
by a special Government of India account, since neither the Post Office nor any
64 Guildhall Ms. 27831.
65 Kohler, Sea Safari, n.p.
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other department of government was willing to pay for it from their own 
budgets. This illustrates the extent of support at senior government levels, most 
particularly from Frere.
Munro summarised the political situation thus:
BI's coastal lines complemented and supported the overland transport revolution 
being carried out by the railways, and together the two harnessed the power of 
the steam engine to the service of the Indian government and the Indian 
economy.. .The notion that steamship lines and railway lines were not only tools 
of economic development, extending and deepening markets and bringing 
profits to those who funded and managed them, but also tools for the attainment 
of broader political and administrative objectives was something that William 
learned from Anglo-Indian governing circles. However, in securing the support 
of Sir Henry Bartle Frere, who was one of the chief proponents of the application 
of steam power to the exercise of state authority in foreign relations, William also 
transformed himself and his steamship company into active "agents of empire". 
He drew the conclusion that governments were willing to pay well for access to 
the new tools of empire.66
Mackinnon took a close interest in the design and performance of the ships and 
in the running of the line. In 1859 he wrote to James Hall of "new fast 
machinery" which he had seen under test -  which "will create a revolution in 
steam navigation... with a vessel like that we could soon nm  down the 
threatened opposition."67 This may well have been an early "compound" steam 
engine, which BI were among the first to install. As for managing the line, 
Calvinistic principles of frugality were visible:
I am afraid they are going to begin too expensively. I think it is quite absurd 
dressing up the officers so finely, and you should rather set your faces against it. 
They will be getting "too much of the gentleman" to do their work properly and 
they will also require higher pay. We should start economically and all our 
officers should be plain hardworking fellows, otherwise I fear we will ruin the 
prosperity of the company...As the fullest powers are delegated to you as Agents 
depend on it the firm will be blamed, if extravagance in  any department is 
permitted, or if your officers are above their work. It is most absurd to attempt 
emulating the P&O company in any way whatever, and the officers, for their 
own sakes as well as for the company" s, should avoid it.68
A few years later he wrote sternly reminding Peter Mackinnon that "private 
trading and letting of cabins is strictly prohibited to all commanders and officers 
without exception -  and as far as in you lies see that no work is carried on on 
Sundays -  as starting on that day from any point on the line."69
66 Munro, Maritime Enterprise, p. 52.
67 24 May 1859, File 58, pp. 76-77, SOAS.
68 W.M. to Peter Mackinnon, 9 May 1859, File 59, p. 274, SOAS.
69 W.M. to Peter Mackinnon, 24 January 1861, Guildhall Ms. 27804.
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Headrick summarised the shipping line's growth:
Mackinnon extended his lines in all directions: to the Persian Gulf, to Singapore 
and Malacca, to the Dutch East Indies, to England, Australia and China. By 1869 
his fleet numbered fifty vessels, among them the most modern steamers 
available. While the P&O concentrated on the long-distance passenger and mail 
business, the British India became the most important cargo line in the Eastern 
seas. As Portuguese captains had discovered four centuries earlier, there was as 
much profit carrying freight between the Eastern ports as to and from Europe. 
Thus by 1893 the British India Line had 110 ships covering twice as many miles 
as the Peninsula & Oriental routes.70
Kohler concludes with a romantic but provocative paragraph:
There were pirates to fend off in the Gulf, inter-racial or other religious fights 
among deck passengers, as well as the burr a sahibs in the Saloon to cater for. The 
little steamers of BI came to play an important role in the lives of scores of small 
coastal communities and to both native and European, they were the sinew and 
symbol of the British Empire.
If Kohler's imperial enthusiasm is naive, the point he makes is nonetheless valid. 
BI was the product and the beneficiary of Empire, and of the economic activity 
which Empire generated over a wide geographical area, but BI was also its 
servant, carrying trade cargoes, mail and passengers. Although, as we shall 
shortly see, it came to be demonised by Indian nationalists, it was gratefully 
regarded by most of its European users, and by very many Indian traders and 
passengers as well.
"The destruction of Indian shipping"
The dominance of Indian waters by British-built ships and British-owned 
shipping lines, and by BI and P&O in particular, was a central complaint of the 
Indian nationalists, and came to be dted  as yet more evidence of the malignant 
policies of the Raj -  "The cruel and calculated destruction of Indian shipping and 
shipbuilding -  as of many other industries -  forms a sordid chapter of the 200- 
year-old British connection with India"71. Gandhi himself expressed his outrage
70 Headrick, Tools of Empire, p. 173.
71 N.G. Jog, Saga ofScindia: Struggle for the revival of Indian shipping and shipbuilding (1919- 
1969), Bombay, 1969, p. 9.
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in 1928: "The tragic history of the national village industry of cotton manufacture 
in India is also the history of the ruin of Indian shipping. The rise of Lancashire 
on the ruin of the chief industry of India almost required the destruction of 
Indian shipping."72 Although the logic of ascribing to the Lancashire cotton 
industry an intention to destroy Indian shipping is not clear, there is no doubt 
that British policies and commercial practice were, to say the least, extremely 
unhelpful to indigenous Indian maritime interests.
The conflation of the separate issues of shipbuilding and mercantile shipping 
operations adds to the stridency of complaint but does not illuminate causes.
The restrictive British legislation of the early nineteenth century certainly 
damaged the Bombay shipbuilding industry, and obstructed the operation of 
Indian-owned ships, but it does not seem that it can have affected the coasting 
trade on either side of the sub-continent. As far as construction was concerned, 
there was severe competition in the early nineteenth century from North 
America, where there was an abundance of cheap timber, and although Indian 
teak was superior for long life, its price was uncompetitive in the short term, as 
was that of English oak.
It may be disingenuous for nationalist writers to attempt to dismiss the impact on 
worldwide shipbuilding of the introduction of steam power and then of metal 
hulls. The heart of marine steam technology was in Scotland, where natural 
resources and the existence of relatively sophisticated land-based steam 
applications in the textile industry could be easily married to a thriving wooden 
shipbuilding tradition. Ships using steam power as an auxiliary to sails were 
already in use in the 1830s but were so inefficient that "their services were called 
for only where speed mattered more than cost: transporting the mails or carrying 
wealthy passengers across the Atlantic...By the 1850s steam-powered freighters 
were used in the Mediterranean and across the Atlantic, but only for expensive 
cargoes like cotton or perishables like fruit.. .Over thirty years elapsed from the 
launching of the first iron steamer, the Aaron Manby, in 1821 until the British Post
72 cited by Jog, ibid., p. 8.
84
Office and Lloyds of London accepted iron ships as equal to wood in the mid- 
1850s,"73
Iron hulls demanded economically close access to smelting and forging, and to 
the iron and coal supplies that required. The Clyde was well-favoured, as were 
the Tyne and Tees.
In her meticulously researched book on Bombay shipping, Anne Bulley records 
that
in spite of the generations of talented craftsmen that had been employed in 
building ships, the much admired teak sailing ships, India could not compete in 
the building of iron hulls. Industrialisation had continued apace in England, raw 
materials there were cheaper while Indian shipbuilders had no easy access to the 
materials of construction which had to be sent from England.74
Even Satpal Sangwan, whose article argues against technological determinism in 
relation to the decline of Indian shipbuilding, writes:
With the coming of steam, came also the replacement of wood by much stronger, 
light and spacious ships built of iron. In the process, the competitive advantage 
which Indian dockyards had enjoyed now passed to their British counterparts. 
The [East India] Company could ill-afford to build ships in India with iron 
imported from England. In this context, Daniel Headrick's daim, 'what 
destroyed Indian shipbuilding was British iron', is not entirely wrong.75
The impact on shipyards in the south and west of England was disastrous, 
certainly as disastrous as the impact on Bombay. Indeed the impact was global. 
Headrick summarises the effect:
The shift to iron ships rescued Britain's dominance. From one quarter of the 
world's tonnage in 1840, Britain's share rose to 42.7% in 1850 and remained 
between forty and fifty percent until World War One. Between 1890 and 1914, 
half the world's sea borne trade was carried in British-owned vessels, and Britain 
built two thirds of the world's new ships.76
There would have been any number of shipbuilders round the world who would 
have had little sympathy with India7 s claim to have been singled out for
73 Daniel R.Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of 
Imperialism 1850-1940, New York, 1995, p. 24.
74 Anne Bulley, The Bombay Country Ships 1790-1833, Richmond, Surrey, 2000. p. 247, 
citing Frank Broeze, 'Maritime India in the time of the Raj', Modern Asian Studies,18,
1984.
75 Satpal Sangwan, 'The Sinking Ships: Colonial Policy and the Decline of Indian 
Shipping 1735-1835', in Roy Madeod and Deepak Kumar (Eds.),Technology and the Raj: 
Western Technology and Technical Transfers to India 1700-1947, New Delhi, 1995, p. 144.
76 Headrick, The Tools of Empire, p. 175.
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destructive treatment. The shipbuilding business is merciless, as is the shipping 
business, which must find the money to build or re-equip its ships to compete as 
technical inventiveness creates inexorable overnight obsolescence -  from the 
compound steam engine to iron hull to steel to turbines to oil power to container 
ships, which themselves can carry the cargo of fifteen conventional ships. 
However, these uncomfortable facts do not necessarily explain why Indian 
shipping -  the operation of Indian-owned ships -  declined so dramatically.
Anne Bulley states that "By 1853 'there was almost no country service left', 
almost all the old Bombay vessels having been burnt, wrecked or sold in 
England. Between 1841 and,1851 seven ships had been burnt in Calcutta and 
eight in Bombay by Tascar incendiaries'.. T7
Jog quotes figures for Indo-British trade showing 34,286 Indian vessels 'entered 
and cleared' [presumably at British ports] in 1857, carrying 33% of the tonnage as 
against only 2,302 in 1899-1900, carrying less than 2% of the tonnage. If these 
figures are correct 0og does not attribute them) it seems that Indian ship owners 
simply failed to match the combined competition of steam power, and the 
opening of the Suez canal, for which steam was essential.
It was open to them to buy new ships in Britain or second-hand ships anywhere 
in the world, and although capital costs were higher than for wooden sailing 
ships, investment money was certainly available from Parsi or Gujarati sources. It 
seems that the Bombay Steam Navigation Company would have done just this, 
but they operated in the coasting trade, for which Jog gives no figures. It is true 
that they lost out to BI and did not gain Government mail subsidies, but 
investment in ships did not entirely depend on this: there were many 
opportunities for unsubsidised ships to operate outside the disciplines of 
scheduled services and to pick up casual cargo. The 1857 traffic will all have 
been of this kind, with P&O the only scheduled carrier.
One answer lies in the nature of the competition and the brutal and overt pursuit 
of monopoly by British shipowners, notably, as far as the Eastern trade was 
concerned, by P&O and BI. Mercantile shipping has always been a ruthlessly
77 Bulley, Bombay Country Ships, p. 248, citing Asiya Siddiqi, T he  Business World of 
Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy' Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. XIX 3 & 4, p. 322, in 
turn citing Jamsetjee Cursetjee to Mr Pynton, 19th July 1851, JJL Vol. 366, p.313.
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competitive business, just as much when individual ship captains, in business for 
themselves, were competing with each other -  using bribery and even sabotage 
to secure cargo, and racing at considerable risk to reach a market first -  as when 
the large ship-owning firms, with huge investments and fixed costs at 75% to 
defend, regarded the elimination of competitors by purchase or by predatory 
pricing as legitimate tactics. The first rate-fixing "Calcutta Conference" was in 
1875, and shortly afterwards the Conference adopted what was known as the 
deferred rebate system -  a simple form of loyalty reward which outraged 
nationalist writers and which was indeed effective as a barrier to entry by new 
ship operators.
William Mackinnon's own attitude to competition was, as we have seen in his 
dealings with the Bombay S. N. Co., aggressive. Earlier that year he wrote about 
another threat to the Eastern route:
I trust Apcar & Co [an Armenian name] will not do so foolish a thing as to put on 
a direct steamer to Rangoon. If they do you must first run against them direct 
too, and put on our last ship.. .They are building for the Mauritius trade and if I 
thought they had any intention of running against us, I would endeavour to get 
up a successful opposition to them on the Mauritius line: As our contract is fast 
running out you should try ingratiating yourself with the Government folk and if 
possible make sure of a renewal. Perhaps Apcar's may intend to get their hand 
in ...78
In addition, the displacement of small indigenous country boats without scruple 
was dismissively foreseen in letter to James Hall from John Halliday, a founding 
Calcutta & Burmah shareholder:
Chittagong. 27th August 1864.
.. .1 arrived here this morning and have just been round with Gray having a look 
at the place. It is a miserable dead and alive tumbledown jungly hole and looks 
as if a shower of rain would make it commit suicide...If there is one native vessel 
I suppose there is a hundred lying up here all of which will doubtless get cargo 
to Akyab and other places. I don't see why with an energetic agency the 
steamers should not get a good deal of the cargo those Pariahs will take.. ,79
The inflexibility of a scheduled shipping line's costs meant that the intrusion of 
new capacity might be ruinous if there was not enough traffic, and an incumbent 
would readily cut the throat of any rash, upstart competitor, not just in India.
But the situation in India was indeed brutal, if Jog's unattributed figures are 
correct: ".. .most of the 102 Indian navigation companies which were registered
78 W.M. to Peter Mackinnon, 1 May 1861, Guildhall Ms. 27804.
79 Guildhall Ms. 27804.
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between 1860 and 1925...had to go into liquidation one after another"80.
Although P&O was the villain rather than BI, the case of Tata7s defeat is 
instructive. In 1894, in an attempt to secure lower freight rates for cotton yam 
exports to Japan, Jamsetji Tata set up a joint venture with a Japanese shipping 
company, Nippon Yusen Kaisha, bought two steamers, and undercut P&O's rate 
by nearly 40%. P&O responded by cutting rates to giveaway levels for shippers 
signing up to an exclusive contract. Tata appealed for help to the Government 
without success and was forced to dose the shipping business.
In 1906, the Swadeshi Shipping Company of Tutincorin, inspired by political as 
well as commerdal aims, as the name implied, was formed by Chidambaram 
Pillai to establish a service between Tutin corin, Colombo, Bombay and Calcutta, 
with the additional agenda of training Indian, Ceylonese and other Asiatic 
seamen. Shares were to be held "exclusively by the Indians, Ceylonese and other 
nationals of the East" and the house flag bore the provocative legend Vande 
Matara. Jog claims that "it was made difficult for the company to purchase or 
even to charter ships to start its business" (although he does not suggest how this 
was done) and only two steamers could be acquired, in Ceylon. BI shortly met 
this new competitor by exerting its influence to secure priority sailings from port 
authorities, which had a crippling effect on Swadeshi passengers and freight. 
Government servants were not permitted to travel with them. However, it 
appears it was politics rather than commerdal pressure that brought the 
company down: Chidambaram Pillai was arrested and sent to prison -  he was a 
follower of Lokamanya Tilak.
Another casualty d ted  by Jog was the Bengal Steamship Company, established in 
1907 by Jyotindranath Tagore, carrying passengers and cargo between Calcutta, 
Rangoon, Chittagong and Akyab reasonably successfully for three years until it 
was forced out of business by savage rate-cutting by BI, and sold its steamers to 
them.
Finally the Scindia Steam Navigation Company braved the battle in 1919 and 
survived, declining an offer from BI to buy the company and eventually securing 
some elements of protection from Government.81
> g ,  Saga of Scindia, p. 13.
81 All this information is taken from Jog, Saga of Scindia, pp. 14-16.
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William Mackinnon's personal role in tactics of this kind began to decline after 
1872, when the mail contract between Aden, Zanzibar and Natal was secured 
and his interest in Africa was ignited. Soon afterwards, in 1874, the 22-year-old 
James Lyle Mackay joined Mackinnon Mackenzie in Calcutta as an assistant in 
the shipping department, and four years later stepped in to run the Mackinnon 
Mackenzie agency in Bombay after Nichol & Co. were brought down by the 
failure of the City of Glasgow Bank -  a disaster with far-reaching ramifications, 
including the effective demolition of Mackinnon's financial reputation in 
Glasgow, for he had been a director and was sued (unsuccessfully) for giving bad 
investment advice.
Mackay had a meteoric career, eventually achieving an earldom (the Earl of 
Inchcape) and a reputation for being a "hard man" which even his obsequious 
biographer could not conceal.82 But he did not share Mackinnon's piety, 
preferring snipe-shooting to church on a Sunday, and being caught out when 
Mackinnon arrived for a visit by announcing that they would go to church "as 
usual" but discovering that the church had been shut for repairs for some 
months. However, beyond such anecdotes there is no archive of Mackay's 
papers, which he deliberately had destroyed. From the public history it is clear 
that, very like Mackinnon, he arrived in Calcutta with no skills beyond native 
shrewdness and relentless determination, and built on those qualities with 
ruthless industry. He came to hold powerful governmental and quasi- 
govemmental positions and in 1914 master-minded the merger of BI with P&O, 
"becoming the head of the largest shipping combine in the world, dominating the 
main passenger and cargo lines from the UK through the Mediterranean to the 
East and Australia".83
82 Hector Bolitho, James Lyle Mackay, first Earl of Inchcape, London, 1936.
83 Stephanie Jones, Two Centuries of Overseas Trading: the Origins and Growth of the Inchcape 
Group, Basingstoke, 1986, p. 56.
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M ackinnon Mackenzie & Co. and MacNeill & Co.: 
their complementary managing agency businesses.
Shipping dominated Mackinnon Mackenzie's activities/ but in the earlier period 
not to the. exclusion of other interests. In time/ however/ William Mackinnon 
came to pursue a policy of a deliberate division of these two managing agencies, 
in each of which he was the controlling partner, into specialist fields, Mackinnon 
Mackenzie concentrating on shipping and MacNeill on other, more 
conventional, managing agency activities -  tea, coal, jute and, less 
conventionally, inland waterway transport. The activities of MacNeill must be 
regarded as integral to William Mackinnon's managing agency business in India.
Duncan MacNeill (b. 1837) was the son of William's widowed sister Elizabeth. 
William arranged a position for him in his friend and colleague David Begg's 
firm in Calcutta -  Begg, Dunlop & Co -  a managing agency with large interests in 
tea. In time he became a partner there. William's letters show that the 
possibility was mooted of a merger between Begg, Dunlop and Mackinnon 
Mackenzie after Begg's retirement, but in the event this did not happen, being 
opposed by Begg, Dunlop's other partners. Duncan MacNeill left Begg, Dunlop 
in 1866 and returned to London, where he started a tea broking business, Duncan 
MacNeill & Co., in partnership with another of William's nephews, John 
Mackinnon, the younger brother of Peter, who was a partner in Mackinnon 
Mackenzie.
The two cousins started MacNeill & Co. in Calcutta in 1872 with an open line of 
credit from Mackinnon Mackenzie of Rs. 5 lakhs [nearly £2 million at current 
values]. Duncan MacNeill had already taken from Begg, Dunlop the managing 
agency contracts for the tea gardens in which he or William had a controlling 
interest, and in 1873 the firm took on the managing agency for the re­
incorporated Rivers Steam Navigation Company.
This had been set up originally in 1862 by Captain J.H. Williamson (with David 
Begg as one of the principal shareholders), to compete on the Brahmaputra with 
the long-established India General Steam Navigation Company, and when he left 
in 1865 to found Williamson, Magor & Co. (to become the leading tea agency
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house), Begg, Dunlop were appointed as managing agents of Rivers Steam.84 
However, the company went into liquidation after Begg's death in 1868, and the 
Mackinnon group bought it from its original owners (who included John 
Pender), putting up more than 50% of its initial capital. There was, of course, an 
immediate benefit to Rivers Steam from the tied freight business of the tea 
gardens controlled by the two managing agencies, a classic example of "playing 
both ends against the middle".
In 1882 Rivers Steam were awarded the contract for carrying the Assam mail, 
which triggered significant growth. By 1893 the capital had more than doubled, 
to £277,415, and they had a fleet of 46 steamers and tugs and 78 flats. It 
accounted for more than a third of MacNeill's annual fee income from managed 
concerns.
MacNeill's also took from Begg, Dunlop the agency for the Equitable Coal 
Company, which supplied sea-going and river steamships as well as jute mills, 
and again provided it with a lucrative captive market -  BI was the largest coal 
buyer in Calcutta.
Although Mackinnon Mackenzie already had an interest in jute, through the 
Serampore mill started in 1866 with 1,000 looms, MacNeill's were encouraged to 
enter the industry as well, managing the equally large Ganges Manufacturing Co. 
Ltd. (975 looms), set up in 1875, for which the Mackinnon and Hall families put 
up 40% of the capital.
Duncan MacNeill's early specialisation in tea at Begg, Dunlop, together with 
substantial new investments floated in London, helped to make the firm a 
leading player in the industry, ranking fourth, with 14,300 acres under tea in the 
Indian Tea Association report for 1886.85 Mackinnon Mackenzie's tea business 
had been much less successful. William Mackinnon's friend William Howarth 
had experimented with tea on his coffee estate in Chota Nagpur, and Mackinnon 
agreed to support him by floating the Ramgurgh Co. Ltd. in Calcutta, with 
Mackinnon Mackenzie as the managing agents. But the rainfall was too variable, 
and the business died. William also got taken in when he floated the Western
84 Sir Percival Griffiths, A  History of the Joint Steamer Companies, London, 1979, p. 27.
85 Cited by R.K. Renford, The Non-Official Bntish in India to 1920, Delhi, 1987, p. 59.
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Cachar company in Glasgow with three estates which turned out to be typical 
"tea mania" deceptions, planted with less than half the claimed acreage. By 1886, 
Mackinnon Mackenzie ranked only eleventh out of twelve members, with 4,400 
acres under tea.
In pursuit of the specialisation policy, Mackinnon Mackenzie withdrew from tea 
garden investment and management altogether in 1889, when they sold the 
Kondoli Tea Company, which then embraced all their tea interests, to the Salonah 
Tea Company, which was managed by MacNeill's.
Such an arrangement was very advantageous within the politics of the tea trade -  
MacNeill & Co represented the Mackinnon group within the planters7 
organisation, the Indian Tea Association, while Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co 
represented it within the shipping conference that determined the costs and 
terms of exporting tea from Calcutta. However, the tactic of working on both 
sides of the production/distribution divide depended upon ties of family 
sentiment to ensure that Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co, as shipping agents, 
received most of the consignments of tea cargoes made by MacNeill & Co as 
shippers...86
Mackinnon Mackenzie made no further investments outside shipping from then 
onwards.
86 Munro, Maritime Enterprise, p. 322.
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Afterword
For the sake of completeness it should be recorded that "on 22 June 1893, Sir 
William Mackinnon, Baronet, of Balinakill and Loup, and Companion of the 
Indian Empire, died in his personal suite in the Burlington Hotel, just off Bond 
Street in London's West End.. ."87 at the age of 70, of a lung infection contracted 
as a young man, leaving no children. He had never acquired a London town 
house.
According to Blake he left £750,000 [£43 million at current values]. The estates of 
Balinakill and Loup were in Kintyre, and in the glen near the former he created 
the model village of Clachan. He had also bought the lands of Strathaird in Skye, 
the traditional home of Clan Mackinnon.88
Mackay, the Earl of Inchcape, died in 1932 in his eightieth year, fittingly onboard 
his huge yacht in Monte Carlo harbour, leaving a son to take over. Today the 
once mighty Inchcape Group consists only of Mann Egerton, the motor business.
87 Munro, Maritime Enteiyrise, p. 1.
88 George Blake, BI Centenaiy 1856-1956, London, 1956, p, 157.
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Chapter 3
BIRD & CO
Also from relatively humble beginnings, with no specialist skills, a major 
business was built.
Established in a modest way in 1864, Bird & Co grew to be one of the largest 
Managing Agencies in Calcutta. The company history1 states that by 1917 the 
firm and the companies under management together had a capital valued at 
about £20,000,0002, a revenue of £3,000,0003 and employed directly and indirectly 
well over 100,000 people; as well as in Calcutta, it had offices in Bombay, 
Rangoon, Cawnpore and numerous agencies, and also had a presence in 
London, New York and East Africa. Birds7 early specialisation in labour 
contracting was not typical, but it is an important example of a successful British 
Managing Agency, and the existence of an archive enables an enquiry into the 
possible reasons for its success.
The Bird family
The brothers Sam and Paul Bird, the firm7 s founders, do not match the stereotype 
of stern Scottish Presbyterianism. Emile Moreau, who was their nephew, set out 
the family background.
Sam and Paul Bird, the founders of the company, were members of an old 
Suffolk yeoman family who settled in Earl Stonham in 1638 and, as freeholders, 
came to own "Deerbolts Hall77 which remained in the family for 188 years until 
1826.
Moreau7 s research showed it was not until the 19th century that anyone left
1 M.S. Jacomb-Hood, A  History of Bird & Co. 1864-1929, Calcutta, 1929, pp. 23/24.
2 £557m at current values.
3 £83m at current values.
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home. James Bird, the father of Sam and Paul Bird, was bom  at "Deerbolts Hall" 
in 1788, but was the first to break new ground and make a name beyond the 
village. He was known for fifty years as the "Suffolk poet", and several of his 
plays were produced in London; breaking away from Earl Stonham, he became a 
miller at Yoxford, another Suffolk village, but this one on the main coaching road 
to London, which he often visited to see his publisher and produce his plays. At 
Yoxford, Sam, his third son, was bom  in 1822 and Paul, his youngest, was bom  in 
1835.
Sam and Paul Bird broke away and went to sea in their teens, their eldest brother 
went to London and became a noted doctor there, but most of the other boys 
took to the sea, and spread themselves all over the world, leading adventurous 
lives, some in the gold rush to California, and one to Australia.
Sam and Paul Bird both became skippers of clipper sailing ships, and Paul was at 
one time harbour-master at Shanghai.
Adventure, and doubtless the hope of finding a fortune in foreign parts, seems to 
have been their simple motivation, rather than any higher moral purpose. 
Although today the occupation of captain of a clipper ship seems rare and even 
glamorous, the nineteenth century reality was more commonplace, with 
thousands of ships in commission round the world and tens of thousands of 
ships' officers employed. Nor did the occupation require expertise beyond 
practical seamanship and navigation, self-reliance and a facility for resolute 
command.
Later entrants to the firm were even less qualified. Emile Moreau arrived in 
Calcutta to join the firm at the age of 17, and Ernest Cable joined at the age of 21, 
after starting his first job in Calcutta at the age of 17, having been to school in 
India since he was 11.
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The first business enterprise -  labour contracting
Ernest Cable wrote:
It is not known to me how [Sam Bird] found himself in Calcutta, but he was a 
freight superintendent of the [India General Steam Navigation Co.] when my 
mother and father reached India in 1858; they all lived together, and he used to 
go round the house every morning with my mother, chastising any recalcitrant 
servant with a heavy stick.; he was later appointed agent to the I.G.S.N. Co. at 
Allahabad...4
As part of the maritime community in Calcutta, a 36-year-old skipper perhaps 
waiting for a new command, Sam Bird would naturally have known kindred 
spirits at the I.G.S.N. Co., whose steamer service to Allahabad (where it 
terminated in the dry season) was already carrying materials for the construction 
of the East Indian Railway, which had re-started after the Indian Mutiny. 
Doubtless the company relied on Sam Bird's initiative to compensate for his lack 
of local experience.
There are some inconsistencies in the cited dates for the opening of the E.I.R. line. 
Hena Mukherjee, in her carefully documented book, wrote:
In the middle of the year 1865, along with the completion of the Jumna bridge at 
Allahabad, the entire stretch of the main line of the E.I.R. from Howrah to the left 
bank of the Jumna at Delhi -  more than 1,000 miles -  was open to the public.5
Alfred Brame, writing in 1900 towards the end of his career with the I.S.G.N. Co. 
wrote:
The railway reached Allahabad in 1864, and passengers and choice freight were 
naturally attracted to the quicker route. About this time, too, the great irrigation 
system of the north-west provinces was commenced... The larger steamers could 
no longer reach Allahabad in the dry season, and this entailed transhipment into 
smaller craft...6
However, it seems clear that although the railway bridge over the Jumna river 
was not yet completed in 1864, there must already have been a rail service, at 
least as far as Allahabad, since in order to be able to offer a through freight 
service the E.LR. needed to provide a pontoon crossing, with freight manhandled
4 Jacomb-Hood, History, Lord Cable's Reminiscences, p. 3.
5 Hena Mukheijee, The Early History of the East Indian Railway, 1845-1879. Calcutta, 1994, 
p. 147.
Alfred Brame, The India General Steam Navigation Company Limited, London, 1900,
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for loading and unloading. Sam Bird identified this requirement as an 
opportunity to bid for a contract to provide the labour for this service, and may 
also have recognised that the days of the I.G.S.N. river service (and his agency) 
must be numbered.7
The circumstances in which Sam Bird negotiated the Jumna labour contract with 
the E.I.R. are extraordinary, and on the face of it appear to be a barefaced 
example of reciprocal European favouritism and of the deliberate relegation of 
indigenous interests.
An official meeting of the Board of Agency of the East Indian Railway was held 
in Calcutta, on Thursday, 1st December, 1864. Mr. Edward Palmer, the agent,
Mr. J.C. Batchelor, the traffic manager and Mr. Arthur Lovelock, the secretary, 
were present, at which the following was passed:
Resolution No. 307.
Resolved -  that the contract entered into between the traffic manager and 
Baboo Ashutosh Bhattacharjee, for loading and unloading wagons at the 
Jumna be officially recorded. The rate for loading and unloading to be 
As. 4 per wagon, subject to the conditions detailed in the stamped 
agreement.
At a meeting held a fortnight later, the following minute was recorded: 
Loading'Wagons at the Jumna
With reference to Resolution No. 307, the traffic manager informed the 
meeting that the contract entered into between himself and Baboo A. 
Bhattacharjee for loading and unloading wagons at the Jumna at As. 4 [£1 
at current valuesj per wagon, was fixed at too low a rate and on his recent 
visit to the Jumna he had cancelled it as he found it would not work. 
Resolution No. 357.
Resolved -  that sanction be recorded to a fresh agreement made between 
the traffic manager and Captain Bird to do the same work at As. 8 [£2 at 
current values] per wagon.
It is, of course, possible that Batchelor indeed found that Bhattacharjee was 
failing to fulfil the contract, having underquoted and being -unable to recruit and 
provide enough labour at the rates he could afford. There was a general shortage 
of labour resulting from the demand for construction workers, although the 
completion of that section of the track must have released some numbers. It is
p. 79. Brame's history seems more reliable than Perdval Griffiths, who drew on it 
extensively but not always accurately. Brame was writing from personal experience 
since at least 1880.
7 'The end came in 1874, when the India General finally withdrew their steamers from 
both Ganges and Gogra, closed their agencies, and abandoned the scene of their earliest 
attempts in search of more profitable adventures to the eastward. The Mirzapur was the 
last steamer to ply on the Ganges. She left Allahabad in November 1874, and closed 
each agency as she passed on her downward trip. The Government withdrew their 
steamers from the Ganges at the same time." Brame, The India General, p 90.
8 Jacomb-Hood, History, p. 81.
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also possible, as Jacomb-Hood speculates, that Bhattacharjee was retained as a 
sub-contractor, perhaps at an enhanced rate. In any case, the extraordinary 
acceptance of the 100% premium for Sam Bird's European supervision, even for a 
petty contract, must have been subject to scrutiny by the Directors and 
eventually by Government.
It is clear from the detailed research recorded in Ian J. Kerr's definitive book9 that 
the East Indian Railway, in common with other railway companies, favoured the 
employment of European contractors as supervisory intermediaries controlling 
indigenous sub-contractors in the work of construction. Although it was not 
unknown for European contractors to fail, the rate of failure among Indian 
contractors was far higher, a tendency ascribed by Kerr largely to inadequate 
capital funding but also to weakness in administration. Kerr cites examples of 
Indian contractors who appear to have been liked and welcomed by their clients, 
and does not suggest other than pragmatic reasons for preferring Europeans.
Kerr also describes the daunting responsibilities accepted and tasks faced by 
contractors and sub-contractors in recruiting, retaining, deploying, and 
supervising labour, and not least in financing and paying wages.
Jacomb-Hood wrote a spirited case for European contractors:
. ..in the employment of labour contractors on a large scale, agents [of public 
carriers] saw the solution of the problem of "handling"; they perceived that, 
given a thoroughly reliable contractor, one employing European assistants, and 
of sufficient status in the financial and mercantile circles, whose appointment 
would be finally sanctioned by their own boards of directors, they would be free 
of all responsibility and in possession of a valuable scapegoat in times of stress, 
to be utilised as, and when, required...the following views expressed by the 
Director-General of Railways in his report (1887-88) were those generally 
accepted.
"The 'handling7 contracts [for the Eastern Bengal Railway] let to Messrs. 
Bird & Co. were satisfactorily carried out, but the rates were in excess of 
those given to the petty contractors who worked previously. At the same 
time the work was carried out efficiently and the customary delays in the 
busy season were avoided.
On the whole it is considered that the certainty of getting the 'handling7 
done at all times, without delay to vessels or rolling stock, more than 
compensated for the enhanced rates, and the contract will continue to be 
given to Messrs. Bird & Co."10
9 Ian J. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj 1850-1900, Delhi, 1995.
10 Jacomb-Hood, History, pp. 145-6.
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Perhaps the famous "mystic bond" was not mysterious at all: prosaically, 
Europeans found other Europeans more reliable.
But referring to the original Jumna contract the author of the History allows 
himself the comment that; "subsequent events shew that Mr. Batchelor was a 
very good friend to Capt. Sam Bird, and for the following ten to fifteen years 
joined with the Birds and Capt. Scott, the manager of the India [General] Steam 
Navigation Co., Ltd, in many of their projects, both speculative and otherwise."
As a parenthetical illustration of the "spirit of enterprise" which informed the 
times, Captain G.J. Scott's career is interesting.
On the departure of Captain Stace from the secretaryship [of the I.G.S.N.] in 1860, 
his place was taken by Captain Salmon, who had but a short reign, as he was 
drowned in the cyclone of 1864. (Captain Salmon had been in bad health, and 
took a trip to Burmah. The Cheduba, in which vessel he was travelling, was lost in 
the cyclone of October 5th.) To him succeeded Captain G.J. Scott (Captain Scott 
had joined the company in 1853, and was at this time captain of the Lahore.) and 
we now for the first time meet a man who for twenty-five years exercised a 
powerful interest over the fortunes of the company, and whose energy and 
ability pulled the concern through serious periods of depression. When 
appointing Captain Scott, the remuneration of the secretary was passed under 
review, and it was decided that the emoluments of the post should never fall 
below Rs. 1,000 per month, and on the other hand the gross income derived from 
all sources should not go beyond Rs. 2,000 per month [£7.700 at current values].11
Described by Percival Griffiths12 as "a very able man", and one with "great 
energy and a spirit of enterprise", he was instrumental in starting a steamer 
service on the river Irrawadi in Burma in 1871 which was disastrously 
unprofitable (except for the captains, who did very well out of private trade).
The I.G.S.N. Co. withdrew in 1874, having incurred a loss of over Rs. 11,00,000 
[£4 million at current values.]
Although the management of the I.G.S.N. Co. was handed over to Schoene, 
Kilburn as Managing Agents in 1873, "the managing agents busied themselves 
principally with accounts and finance, leaving the practical working of the fleet 
in the hands of Captain Scott, the secretary."13 In 1878 steamer services run by 
various individuals to Chandballi, in Orissa, had been discontinued. Since this
11 Brame, The India General, p.69. The pay was fixed at Rs. 500 a month and a 2% 
commission on the nett earnings. The review was triggered by the very high 
commissions earned by steamer captains on government contracts during the period of 
the Indian Mutiny, so Scott was probably already well-off.
12 Sir Percival Griffiths, A History of the Joint Steamer Companies, London, 1979.
13 Brame, The India General, p. 99.
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was an important stage on the way to the great Jagannath temple at Puri which 
was visited annually by vast numbers of pilgrims,
Scott seized the opportunity of establishing his own sea-going coastal service on 
that route, In the 19th century it was not altogether uncommon for an employee 
of a company to have outside ventures, but the IG shareholders disapproved of 
Scott's action. The matter was settled by the purchase of Scott's steamers by the 
IG...[in 1881, for Rs. 2,80,000 - £1 million at current values - according to 
Brame.]14
In his "Reminiscences" Ernest Cable referred to the close relationship between 
Scott and Sam Bird, stating that when the Bird brothers moved to Calcutta in 
1870 "the Birds became very thick with Capt. Scott, secretary of the I.G.S.N. Co., 
and many a thousand was made by 'bulling' and 'bearing' I.G. shares by the trio 
in the know."15 But Scott will have had no direct influence on the 1864 E.I.R. 
contract, even if his friendship with Bird may have started earlier than Cable 
knew. However, it seems that Birds were already handling I.G.S.N. Co. contracts 
before Emile Moreau joined in 1873.16
Notwithstanding the dubious circumstances of its award, Sam Bird must have 
performed the Jumna contract well. Since the contract was necessarily short­
lived, until the bridge was finished, Bird needed to extend the scope of his work 
for the E.I.R., and he was wholly successful in doing so. In 1867 he made an 
exclusive agreement with the E.I.R. (Mr Batchelor again) and the Indian Branch 
Railway (to Oudh) for the cartage of goods between their two separate railway 
stations at Cawnpore, which allowed both railway companies to offer through 
booking of freight in each direction. According to Jacomb-Hood, Batchelor then 
took the initiative in proposing a new scheme to contract out liability for theft 
along with the responsibility for handling. In July 1868 Bird & Co.'s tenders for 
handling on these terms at Benares, Mirzapore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Agra, 
Hattras, Allyghur, Khoorjah and Delhi were accepted, and at the same time their 
tenders for labour supply at Howrah, Calcutta, Burdwan and Chandanagore 
were also accepted. In 1869 Bhaugulpore, Sahibgunge, Etawah, Colgong and 
Suma were added, and another thirteen stations were added in 1870.
14 Griffiths, Joint Steamer Companies, p. 39.
15 Jacomb-Hood, History, Lord Cable's Reminiscences, p. 3.
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Sam Bird needed support to achieve this. According to Emile Moreau he 
induced his younger brother Paul to join him at Allahabad, and they then 
transferred to Calcutta, bringing their nephew-in-law, Henry Kinnaird York, into 
the partnership and leaving him in charge of the Allahabad office.
At first, they were solely labour contractors for the East Indian Railway, one 
development of which was to start a "bullock train" to serve Darjeeling, long 
before the Eastern Bengal State Railway went in that direction, or the Darjeeling 
Himalayan Railway was dreamt of. This primitive service survived the opening 
of The Eastern Bengal State Railway or North Bengal State Railway, as the 
narrow gauge line was then called, to Siliguri, and competed successfully with it 
for years.
hi 1872 Birds started working with the Eastern Bengal State Railway. In the early 
days the contract assignment was small, unprofitable and unstable, and 
according to Ernest Cable was lost "and then an Armenian named Vertannes had 
it, and later, I think, a couple of natives had it." The contract was regained on a 
larger scale basis in 1886, and was retained until 1922.
In 1873 the Government of India decided that the risk of famine in north-west 
Bengal and Bihar was serious enough to require supplies of rice to be imported 
from Burma, and purchased 40,000 tons. Birds were successful in tendering for 
landing this amount and for delivering to the railhead.
The 17-year-old Emile Moreau had just arrived in the Calcutta office, and 
recalled:
... it fell to my lot to open a letter from the Government of India, enquiring if 
Messrs. Bird & Co. would be prepared to land 400,000 tons or more of rice at the 
same rate as the Firm had contracted to land 40,000 tons, and the writer, at once, 
took this letter to Sam Bird, who read it, locked it in his office table, and bound 
me to silence.
Within an hour Sam Bird had the manager of The Calcutta Landing & Shipping 
Co.17 in the office, and contracted with him to take up the whole of his fleet for 12 
months.
16 Jacomb-Hood, History, p. 105.
17 According to Jacomb-Hood, this was the ubiquitous Captain Scott, although he was 
still secretary of the I.G.S.N. Co. which was not apparently connected. Brame completed 
Scott's story: "Captain Scott was in 1881 compelled by ill-health to give up continuous 
work in India. It was not intended that he should sever his connection with the 
company, so he was appointed chief superintendent in England, with the prospect of a 
yearly cold weather visit to India... [he] finally retired from all India General work in
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He then sent for the leading firm of brokers... gave him carte blanche to buy up 
The Calcutta Landing & Shipping Co. shares, and within 48 hours had bought 
nearly half its capital...
Sam Bird, having cornered the floating transport of the Port, was then able to 
conclude a new contract with the Government, at a considerably enhanced rate, 
to land 400,000 tons or any greater quantity that might be imported.. .Thus 
Messrs. Bird & Co, in the year 1874, made from this one contract, and all the extra 
"handling" it gave them on the railways, more than they had made in their 
whole existence up to then.18
The History, working from documents, dates the original contract (for 40,000 
tons) as 15 November 1873, and the advice from Government of the increased 
requirement as February 1874. The new contract was dated 24 March 1874, and 
was for a rate 50% higher than the first contract. The board minute of The 
Calcutta Loading & Shipping Co. approving the contract with Birds was dated 9 
February 1874.
Sam Bird's astute and decisive exploitation of the opportunity presented by 
disaster was well-rewarded, and the amount of the fortune amassed developed 
mythic proportions in Ernest Cable's and Emile Moreau's recollections. More 
coolly, Jacomb-Hood points out in a footnote that Sir George Campbell (the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal at the time) estimated the total quantity of rice 
imported as "nearly 400,000 tons", which at the rate agreed (As 1.5 per maund) 
would suggest a bill to Government of less than Rs. 10 lakhs, from which a 20% 
margin would produce Rs 2 lakhs (£710,000 at current values, arguably funded 
by the Indian land revenue).
Birds lost the E.I.R. contract to Bum & Co. in 1875, apparently because Sam Bird 
misjudged the strength of Birds' position, refused to lower his rates, failed to win 
over the senior management in London, and, perhaps most significantly, was no 
longer dealing with Mr Batchelor. A passing remark by Ernest Cable may also 
have some significance: "George Rae, a district traffic superintendent of the 
E.I.R., who had worked up the rates, etc., for them, was taken over by Bums." 
This was a major setback for the firm, since the E.I.R. contract provided 75% of its 
revenue. Emile Moreau, who had been managing the work, left Birds after a 
quarrel with Paul Bird and joined Bum & Co., who had an established
1892. (Captain Scott is still living [1900] and has lost none of his enterprise and activity." 
Brame, The India General, p. 145.
18 Jacomb-Hood, History, Emile Moreau's Recollections, pp. 34-35
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connection with the E.I.R. as successful construction contractors. Birds re-pitched 
for the contract when it was put out for tender every three years, but were not 
successful until 1892, after Paul Bird (at Ernest Cable's urging) had persuaded 
Emile Moreau to come back in 1888 (with the promise of a partnership), bringing 
with him unrivalled special knowledge -  "I knew all there was to be known of 
the work to be done in connection with this contract, from Howrah to Delhi, as I 
had spent eleven years of my life on it, and knew every man on the line from the 
agent to the station-masters."19
On his return, Moreau took bold action to re-organise the sub-contracting system 
for the Eastern Bengal State Railway handling contract. The long-established 
position he inherited was one where all the labour was recruited and managed 
by two large Indian sub-contractors, irrespective of which European firm held 
the labour contract. The railway management was well aware of this, and it 
made Birds' position very vulnerable to commercial blackmail. Moreau wrote:
Cable agreed with me that the only thing to consolidate our position with the 
railway was to break these sirdars, and being willing, with me, to face the cost of 
doing so, I undertook to do it, though it meant working the contract for a year at 
a loss.
We succeeded, however, ...gradually we substituted a number of petty sirdars 
with whom we dealt direct, for the one big sub-contractor...
I think the railway were more surprised than anyone at our success in doing this, 
and it turned the executive officer most opposed to us on the railway, into a 
friend, partly, I think, because he found we were too strong for him, and of 
course it consolidated our position enormously with the railway company.
Ernest Cable wrote of these events more tersely:
In those days we used simply to sublet to a native contractor who deposited Rs. 
2,000 or Rs. 3,000 and when he fell short of coolies, we sent up men. and debited 
him; this system, with the growing scarcity of labour, became gradually useless 
and dangerous, and to Moreau belongs the credit of our present sirdari 
system...he worked at Goalundo one year entirely on daily men to break the 
back of previous abuses, at a heavy loss but it was done; a 
third of the men used to skulk under the wagons and break away to their lines; 
we had a cordon round the place to guard the men and keep them at w ork.. .20
This was plainly good business practice, and demonstrated the advantage of 
employing a main contractor with not only the determination but also the 
financial resources to intervene in the established "custom of the trade".
19 Jacomb-Hood, History, Emile Moreau's Recollections, p. 42.
20 Ibid., Lord Cable's Recollections, p. 7.
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Nevertheless, it also illustrates the ability o£ European interests to marshal 
enough strength to subordinate indigenous operators, reflecting imperial practice 
but not dependent on it.
There seems to have been a very wide margin between the rate charged by the 
sub-contractor and the rate charged to the ultimate client by the main contractor:
. .the difference between Sadoo's tender to us and ours to them [the Port 
Commissioners] is some 35 per cent, to 40 per cent."21
Birds7 labour contracting business grew, under Moreau's management, to huge 
and near-monopolistic proportions. In addition to the two big labour contracts 
with The East Indian Railway and The Eastern Bengal State Railway, they had 
contracts with the two inland steamer companies and with the Sulkeah 
Government salt golahs. Starting with coal handling, Birds extended their reach 
gradually throughout the whole of the Kidderpore Docks in Calcutta, then to the 
new tea warehouses opened there, and, further down the river, to the Port 
Commissioners7 kerosene oil depot at Budge Budge. Moreau proudly wrote that 
"we had 15,000 men on our labour contracts and another 15,000 men, women and 
children employed at our jute mills and collieries at that time [1895]77.
Ernest Cable wrote an internal memorandum ("many years ago77), cited by 
Jacomb-Hood;
Do the Firm realise the magnitude (I had almost said majesty) of their labour 
department? I suppose not a ton of goods leaves Calcutta which we have not 
touched once or twice. We feed the shipping, we release thousands of wagons 
daily, all over the country; I suppose, sometimes, we move 50,000 tons of goods 
in one day, and employ, on an average, 20,000 to 25,000 coolies.
The fact is, that upon labour monopoly alone, do we thrive.. .What are these 
contracts worth to us? They are worth as much as our [jute] mills and coal 
department taken together; they enable us to put money into new companies, in 
short, they are our backbone.22
One should not discount the economic value of the infrastructure service that 
Birds performed with efficiency and reliability on a very large scale, nor dismiss 
it as parasitical. Nevertheless, a Marxist historian would doubtless observe that
21 Jacomb-Hood, History, p .128.
22 Ibid., p. 148.
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substantial amounts paid to the contractors were severely attenuated by the time' 
the money trickled down to the labourer.
One must also admire the skill which enabled Moreau to administer such a large 
undertaking, embracing 72 locations spread over more than 1,000 miles east to 
west, and five hundred north to south, relying on the telegraph alone for 
communication and on manual book-keeping, dealing with sub-contractors who 
were in many cases illiterate and with labour speaking a variety of languages and 
dialects. Competition was fierce (Jacomb-Hood records 28 competitors for the 
1879 tender) and often unscrupulous, fomenting strikes and inventing 
complaints, where local railway officials themselves had ambitions to handle the 
labour direct.
Branching out into coal and jute
After the loss of the East Indian Railway labour contract in 1876, the business was 
reduced to an insignificant size, and the Birds, although they had amassed small 
fortunes, were interested in re-investing and sought new profit opportunities. 
These came about more by accident than by design, although in 1878 a saw mill 
was set up on the bullock train route to the Terai, presumably to supply tea 
chests, but it lasted no more than three years. Then a more interesting 
opportunity materialised.
Another Calcutta Managing Agency went bust -  R. MacAllister & Co 
(MacAllister was an American, and another retired sea captain). They had two 
agencies, for the Burrakur Coal Company and the Oriental Jute Mill, neither of 
which was in good shape. The coal company had only one seam of good coal 
being worked, and was in litigation with the giant Bengal Coal Company over 
their land title. The jute company was almost derelict, with its shares at 10% of 
the flotation price.
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The Birds used their contacts to secure both agencies, put the jute company into 
liquidation and refloated it as the Union Jute Company, and found extremely 
competent managers for the two concerns.
Emile Moreau also points out that:
Neither Sam. nor Paul Bird had any acquaintance with the technical side of jute 
mills or coal mining; but in these two instances the "luck" of the Birds held good 
and by finding the right men to work them, both The Union Jute Mill and the 
Burrakur Coal Co. became successful concerns and made Messrs. Bird & Co's 
name as successful managing agents.23
The "right men" were, unsurprisingly, Europeans -  Charles Earp at the colliery 
and W.M. Colville at the jute mill. Ignorant of the technicalities though the Bird 
brothers were, they approached the considerable problems of the two businesses 
with vigour and commonsense. Faced with the prospect of losing their rights to 
the only coal-bearing seam at the colliery, they set about finding an alternative 
source, and in 1881 acquired "Lot Alipur" and floated the Alipore Coal Company 
the following year, when the Burrakur shareholders (inducting Captain Scott) 
were the prindpal subscribers. An even more exclusive arrangement had been 
contemplated (but was apparently not pursued), when Paul Bird wrote to his 
brother in London on 14th November 1881:
Earp is more impressed than ever with the value of the Alipore Lot and is willing 
to put some money into it.. .the most satisfactory way to my mind, is for you and 
I to buy the whole tiling up, it will always be valuable, and supposing that we 
had to give even Rs. 150 for the balance of the shares, we should still be the 
owners of a dirt cheap estate, not likely to decrease in value; when I say the 
whole thing, I would still leave in the Mem. [Cable's mother], Syl [vester 
Dignam, the lawyer and friend], Earp, Tyke [Ernest Cable] and Scott, these 
together hold 362 shares, and as we hold 429 between us, to which may be added 
the 501 have bought, why there only remain some 650 shares, which could be got 
for something under a lakh [£385,000 at current values].24
Birds were, of course, appointed managing agents.
Unexpectedly, however, the litigation with the Bengal Coal Co. was decided in 
Birds' favour on appeal, and the Kumardhubi seam was worked as opencast very 
profitably until by 1889 it was exhausted. Meanwhile the promising Alipore field 
had not yielded any coal at all.
23 Jacomb-Hood, History, Emile Moreau's Recollections, p. 35.
24 Jacomb-Hood, History, p. 155.
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The jute business also had an ill-starred beginning. The Oriental Jute 
Manufacturing Co. was deeply in debt to the Agra Bank, and an attempt to re­
construct the re-capitalised company and transfer the debt fell foul of the Agra 
Bank's London directors. The company therefore had to be liquidated. Jacomb- 
Hood cites a letter from the Bird partner Gordon Stewart to Paul Bird in London, 
dated 22nd September 1880, implying some very unethical behaviour being 
contemplated. A secret agreement had been made between the Agra Bank and 
the liquidators, whereby the Bank would bid Rs. 2,81,000 for the company 
inclusive of their debenture claims but would only have to pay for any balance in 
excess of those claims.25
Perhaps it was as well that this deal was not pursued, and a syndicate (led by 
Captain Scott, according to Jacomb-Hood) registered The Union Jute Co., Ltd. on 
5th October 1880 and purchased the Oriental Jute Company for a more 
respectable price of Rs. 4,50,500 (£1,740,000 at current values). Sam Bird held 
2,250 shares, Scott 1,415 and Paul Bird 1,172. Cable's mother was also a 
shareholder.
So Bird's acquired control of a "dirt cheap" jute mill, which "was found to be 
equipped with old, inefficient engines and boilers, and out-of-date machinery, its 
godowns, etc., relics of the goods sheds built in connection with the Port Canning 
scheme, too, were quite inadequate".26 Given the fresh capital, improvements 
could be made, and the mill showed a profit of Rs. 65,000 at the end of the first 
six months and nearly Rs. 2,00,000 in the next half year, which was a dramatic 
reversal of its previous performance.
Moreau attributed the steady success of The Union Jute Co., partly to the 
establishment of its own raw jute buying agencies at Naraingunge and Chandpur 
which were eventually equipped with large storage sheds and power baling 
presses, making the company independent of the fluctuations of the Calcutta jute 
market for its raw material, and perhaps, in the view of some economists, 
depressing the prices paid to the peasant growers.
The jute and coal acquisitions were to prove the foundation for the firm's 
eventual business empire, but it is clear that the developments were speculative,
25 Jacomb-Hood, History, p. 187.
26 Ibid., p. 185.
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undertaken without special knowledge of the processes, reinvesting some of the 
retained profits from their labour contracting business. There was no apparent 
strategic direction, only an opportunistic recognition of concerns for sale at 
bargain prices, helped by the business contacts, cronyism perhaps, which 
facilitated the transfer of the agencies and the raising of capital. It was also 
significant that:
.. .by this time [1876] Sam Bird had acquired what was a very large fortune in 
those days, and had really no further necessity to work, so without retiring from 
the Firm, he gave a larger share to Paul Bird, and, until he finally retired, he only 
remained in India for one more hot weather to allow his brother to escape it...27
They were rich enough to be able to gamble large sums on commercial 
speculation, and old enough not to be fiercely ambitious -  in 1880 Sam was 58 
and Paul was 45 (a retiring age of 55 was standard for Europeans in India until 
well into the 1960s). They evidently had much experience of commercial 
speculation: "[Sam Bird's] money was made out of speculation as much as from 
the business," wrote Ernest Cable.28 Cable's mother, a close friend of Sam Bird's, 
also seemed to have money to invest, even though her late husband had, 
according to Ernest Cable, "never made any money to speak of".
There is no evidence of any competition from indigenous investors, and yet there 
was no shortage of enthusiastic Indian speculators not long afterwards, during 
the "gold rush" of 1890.29
The making of an entrepreneur
In November 1888 Ernest Cable arrived back in Calcutta after 6 months leave in 
England, bringing his new bride with him. He was 29 years old, and had been 
the junior partner in Calcutta responsible for the coal business since 1886, having 
joined the firm in 1880. He must have been bom  in Calcutta, since his parents 
arrived there in 1858, the year before his birth. He wrote of his father:
27 Jacomb-Hood, History, Emile Moreau's Recollections, p 31.
28 Ibid., Lord Cable's Recollections, p 10.
29 "The same Marwaris, who brought bags of silver to the office to subscribe to the 
company, turned on us when the "boom" was over..." Ibid., p. 16.
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Gordon Stewart [a subsequent partner] was at one time in my father's firm, Keep 
& Co., and ousted my father (who was over-devoted to theatricals) from it; Keeps 
were one of the small piece-goods houses which did a trade before the indent 
business killed them off. He (G.H.C.) never made any money to speak of and 
ended as the head of the statistical department of the Customs house on Rs. 500 a 
month...30
As was normal for European children, he must have been sent or taken back to 
the U.K. when quite young, but:
I ought, perhaps to say of myself, I had been brought out to Calcutta at the age of 
eleven, as the winters were giving me throat diseases, and completed my 
education, such as it was, at Mussoorie.31
Nothing is recorded about his parents, but Ernest's nickname "Tyke", which 
stuck to him throughout his life, implies a Yorkshire origin. Elis grandmother 
was a Dignam, and therefore related to Sylvester Dignam, who was a 
distinguished Calcutta solicitor and a close friend of Sam Bird. This might be the 
connection which originally brought the Cables to Calcutta and led to the close 
friendship between the families.
Neither Sam nor Paul Bird ever entered largely into the social life of Calcutta in 
those days, and although they were well known to many people, their actual 
intimacies were restricted, and may be said to have been centred in one family 
only in Calcutta, the Cables, with whom was associated Sylvester Dignam, one of 
the leading solicitors of those days, a kinsman and a very intimate friend of the 
Cables, with whom, he always lived in Calcutta.
Sam and Paul Bird, from 1870 to 1880, had a very fine flat in the Esplanade.. .but 
from 1880 to the close of their connection with India, Sam and Paul Bird, 
whenever in Calcutta, lived with the Cables, who had taken a very fine house at 
Alipore called "Hastings House", with enormous grounds, even for those 
days...32
Ernest Cable joined Bird & Co. in 1880, after experiencing the failure of the two 
firms by which he had previously been employed, an illustration of the 
sometimes forgotten mortality rate among European enterprises.
Gordon Stewart had joined the firm in 1874 and had been a partner since 1879. 
He had been instrumental in securing the labour contract for the Eastern Bengal 
State Railway in 1886, which was particularly valuable given the loss of the East 
Indian Railway contract but he was not much liked, and in May 1887 Paul Bird 
wrote from the U.K. to Ernest Cable saying: "Entre nous, I am gradually
30 Jacomb-Hood, History, Lord Cable's Recollections, p. 5.
31 Ibid., p. 19.
32 Jacomb-Hood, History, Emile Moreau's Recollections, p. 31.
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hardening myself against renewing with Stewart. Go on as you are doing and 
prove he is not necessary."33
Stewards partnership agreement finished at the end of 1888, and when it was 
clear that it would not be renewed he made preparations to set up his own 
business which included plans to take over the Eastern Bengal State Railway 
contract, due for renewal early in 1889. In the absence of Paul Bird and Ernest 
Cable, the formal notice of termination and tender invitation to Bird & Co. came 
to Stewart, who put it away and did not respond to i t  He also offered a job in his 
new business to the chief labour clerk and sent him upcountry where strikes 
immediately followed.
Paul Bird expressed his views:
Can you prove Stewart organised these strikes? if you can I will make it hot for 
him. Let the Eastern Bengal railway know that we were tricked out of it by a 
treacherous partner, we will make it so hot for Stewart & Co. that the traffic shall 
be unworkable. How did that revised contract lay for weeks in our office? Was 
it not Stewart's duty to sign it for the Firm? He takes money from me to clear out 
quickly, and then tries to pick my pocket.. ,34
Although he had no formal seniority in Paul Bird's absence, Ernest Cable took 
charge of a worsening situation, showing remarkable determination and courage. 
The events stayed fresh in his memory, and his reminiscences deal with them 
vividly and at length.35
The challenges to Cable went beyond the threat to the railway labour contract. 
The opencast coal field at Burrakur was worked out and after five years there 
was still no coal being raised at Alipore. A minor field acquired nearby at 
Mohanpur was also worked out, so it was necessary to buy coal in, ruinously 
unprofitably, to fulfil supply contracts. Cable summed up  the quandary and 
described the good fortune and decisive financial management with which he 
resolved the looming crisis;
Now the Burrakur company had credit and no coal, while the Alipore company 
had neither credit nor coal, but within a few months Agabeg, who had gone into 
the heart of our property, discovered the Gourangdhi seam, so I threw file two 
concerns into one with three lakhs capital, and Alipore company disappeared;
33 Jacomb-Hood, History, p. 111.
34 Ibid., p. 113.
35 Ibid., Lord Cable's Recollections, pp. 11-16.
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the new company had credit, plus the new seam (just discovered); on the profits 
of that seam for years and years the company flourished...
Meanwhile, Cable successfully negotiated the renewal of the Eastern Bengal State 
Railway labour contract, beating off the competition from the much older and 
more experienced Stewart. He turned the strikes fomented by the defecting clerk 
into an advantage:
I saw Boughey, the [E.B.R. j manager, and pointed out that these strikes would be 
chronic unless he gave us an absolute extension of three months (up to 31st 
March 1889) to enable us to look around and quote lower; this was granted, and 
we were able to beat Stewart, who was cocksure, when the tenders went in. It 
was a private affair and I went up with three rates in my hand, each lower than 
the other, but my first offer and the higher was sufficiently attractive.. .36
But Cable remembered that following Paul Bird's death in February 1889 his 
confidence was not entirely secure:
I remember writing to [the manager] that if he were in doubt as to our financial 
ability (all three seniors being out of the concern) to carry on the work, I would 
produce two sureties; however, these were not asked for...37
Once again, personal contacts played an important part in Birds' success. Cable 
wrote a footnote: "Mclnnis of Thomas' did me a good turn with [The Eastern 
Bengal State Railway] knowing them well socially, and McFayden of Kilbums 
wrote a special private letter to Boughey at my begging." This marshalling of 
European contacts and influence had been, as we have seen, characteristic of the 
railway contract business. All railway officials were European, as a "national 
security" measure.
In addition to these problems, Cable had to face a major financing problem 
following Paul Bird's death, with the need to purchase from his executors his 
controlling shareholdings in the two companies whose agencies were vital to the 
firm. Cable's courage in exposing himself to financial ruin and his skill in 
negotiating an outrageously large loan are exemplary, and show him to have 
been an entrepreneur of classical quality -  and one who never lost those abilities 
over the following forty years, in spite of setbacks and misjudgements.
At the time of the crisis, after Paul Bird's death, another blow came upon me and 
that was, a large block of his shares in Union and Burrakur was offered for sale to 
pay out legacies, etc.; it was imperative that we should have a say in these 
companies and so I bought shares, about one lakh's [£470,000 at current values]
36 Jacomb-Hood, History, Lord Cable's Recollections, p.12.
37 Ibid.
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worth, putting up as margin my entire capital of Rs. 10,000; Wood, of the Agra 
bank, gave me the required accommodation, after gasping with astonishment at 
my cheek; needless to say, I have always regarded Wood as one of the best 
bankers who ever went out to the East.38
It is necessary to acknowledge that the "mystic bond" will have been a major 
factor here; it is not likely that the European management of the bank would 
have accepted such a risk from an indigenous applicant. But Cable's 
entrepreneurial determination did not only rely on favourable responses from 
the banks, and he was willing to take the risk of guaranteeing another loan.
Among the top-hamper left us, as a legacy, on Paul Bird7s death was Baragunda 
[Copper Co.]. ...the concern wanted more funds, and The Oriental Bank would 
only advance on Birds7 guarantee; now, I deemed it important to show the public 
and the shareholders (who were in rampant mood) that their junior agents were 
not financial dummies, and so we guaranteed this sum; it was the last transaction 
Lawrence of the bank put through before his sudden death, two days later, and 
we should have saved our loss on this guarantee, for the officiating manager 
would not have taken the onus of the business on himself; still, the affairs 
brought us forward as real live agents and, on the whole, I always considered the 
loss was recouped by a gain in position.39
How the Birds commercial empire was built
Ernest Cable's remarkable and admirable responses to the crisis of 1889 
established him as the natural leader of the firm, and evidently gave him the 
confidence to expand it on a very large scale.
After regaining the East Indian Railway handling contract in 1892, the labour 
business took an important step towards monopoly when the Calcutta docks 
contract was gained in 1895. This success was not achieved without manoeuvres 
bordering on sharp practice, which in any case seemed to be commonplace at the 
time. According to Ernest Cable the Deputy Chairman of the Port Trust and 
Atkinson, a competing labour contractor, were "brother Irishmen", and the Irish 
contractor was initially awarded the contract at what Cable called "a trifling
38 Jacomb-Hood, History, Lord Cable's Recollections, p. 15
39 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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reduction on our rates/' Cable was not about to admit defeat, and, in Emile 
Moreau's words:
.. .it was Cable's clever, scheming brain that got us our first foothold as labour 
contractors at the Docks. The chance arose when we took some of the docksheds 
for storing our export coal, before the Docks were much used by the liners or 
even any ships, and before the separate coal wharves were built; Cable filled 
three of these big docksheds with coal, gradually, and then sent three steamers at 
once to load therefrom, the Port Commissioners' own labour arrangements at the 
Docks were quite unable to tackle this sudden rush and this contretemps led to us 
"getting in" as labour suppliers for the coal "handling", and soon resulted in us 
taking it over for the general cargo at the Docks.40
These triumphs seemed to lead to a sequence of major developments, inspired by 
Cable's energy and determination and made possible by the firm's growing 
reputation for reliability and integrity in founding and managing successful 
enterprises.
In jute, Cable built on the success of the original Union Jute Company by floating 
the Standard Jute Company in 1895; by taking over the Clive Mills Company in 
1899, refinancing it and greatly improving it; floating the Dalhousie Jute 
Company in 1903; the Lawrence Jute Company in 1905; and the Auckland and 
Northbrook Jute Companies in 1908.
In coal, he followed the success of the Burrakur Coal Company by forming four 
new companies in quick succession -  The Central Jherria in 1900, and the 
Jamgram, Jumoni and Bhaskajuri Coal Companies in 1901.
As their export coal business increased rapidly, Cable took a further gamble and 
bought two new steamers [the SS Florrican and Flamingo for Rs. 15 lakhs - £7 
million at current values] as colliers, making Birds at least partially independent 
of the big shipping companies.
By 1909 Bird & Co. had eleven collieries under management, raising and selling a 
total of nearly 1 minion tons of coal (in 1880 they had raised 50,000 tons). In 1927 
the nine jute mills under management were running more than 6,000 looms, 
employing 40,000 workers and turning over Rs. 685 lakhs [£162 million at current 
values].
40 Jcomb-Hood, History, Emle Moreau's Recollections, p. 43.
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Cable became President of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce [1903-4], a member 
of the Imperial Legislative Council and of the Calcutta Corporation [1903-5] and 
also Sheriff of Calcutta [1905] He was knighted by King George V when, as 
Prince of Wales, he visited Calcutta in 1906, and was created a baron in 1921.
He was succeeded by his son-in-law, Edward (later Sir Edward) Benthall, in a 
dynastic tradition common to the business.
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Chapter 4
THE TEA INDUSTRY
A new development for India, created by Britons and the British Managing 
Agencies (notably Williamson Magor), which became a major asset to the 
national economy.
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Introduction
The managing agency system was particularly well-suited to the needs of 
investors in the fledgling tea industry, and by the end of the nineteenth century 
there were few tea gardens in the north east outside their control. A. K. Bagchi1 
dtes The Indian Industrial Year Book for 1911 to show that seven British 
Managing Agencies controlled 61% of the rupee tea companies, and that the 
London correspondents of four of these controlled a further 34% of sterling tea 
companies. His tables for the tea industry show:
Name of managing agents Rupee tea
or secretary companies
controlled
Andrew Yule & Co. 10
Begg, Dunlop & Co. 10
Shaw Wallace & Co. 2
Williamson Magor 10
George Henderson & Co. 2
Planters' Stores and Agency 1
Kilburn & Co. 6
Octavius Steel & Co. 10
Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. 1
Kettlewell Bullen & Co. 1
J. Mackillican & Co. 2
C.A. Stewart 4
Duncan Bros. 12
Davenport & Co. 8
Hoare, Miller & Co. 1
Jardine, Skinner & Co. 2
McLeod & Co. 3
Barry & Co. 3
Total
Name of managing agents Sterling
or secretary/London companies
correspondent controlled
F.A. Roberts & Co. 5
R.G. Shaw & Co. 5
George Williamson & Co. 18
Planters' Stores and Agency 6
Octavius Steel & Co. 13
Walter Duncan & Co. 6
Thomas Hoare & Co. 2
McLeod Russell & Co. 5
James Finlay & Co. 5
C.A. Goodricke & Co. 4
P.R. Buchanan & Co. 4
Alex. Lawrie & Co. 4
Others 47
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Source: IIYB 1911, Calcutta, 1911. Source: Tea Producing Companies 1914
and Tea Producing Companies 1923-24, 
compiled by the Mincing Lane Tea and 
Rubber Share Brokers' Association Ltd. 
and the Indian Tea Share Exchange Ltd., 
London, 1914 and 1924.
Managing Agencies came to provide an elegant management solution to the 
problems of remote (and largely ill-informed) British investors served by remote 
and inexperienced pioneers with little commercial or horticultural expertise. 
They provided centres of technical knowledge, as well as commercial disciplines
1 A. K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 176-179.
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and active financing/ syndicated to a number of tea estates -  in Williamson/ 
Magor7 s case there were forty-four in 1895,
As has been noted elsewhere, the individuals who set up as agents, and then 
managing agents, had brought with them to India few special skills beyond 
book-keeping, but they were able to develop a sophisticated network of inter­
related services, ranging from labour recruitment to transport, from the provision 
of equipment and stores (including currency for wages) to the sale and shipment 
of tea, down to the detailed "hands-on" supervision of the management of the 
gardens. Letters from the partners in many of the firms display a more detailed 
preoccupation with the issues of successful tea estate management and 
manufacture than with parallel production matters in the jute and coal 
industries.
The development of the tea industry in North East India had far-reaching social, 
economic and environmental consequences, and was significantly more 
disruptive than the development of jute. It was, however, less damaging to the 
environment than, for example, the introduction of sugar planting in the 
Caribbean, and although there were social casualties among the indigenous 
forest dwellers, of which loud echoes persist, the justification seems to lie in the 
economic benefit for the larger community. The tea industry transformed Assam 
from a sparsely-populated frontier province, useful as a strategic buffer against 
Burma, into a thriving, revenue-producing element of the Indian state, albeit 
with a lasting capacity for insurrection.
The most disruptive and ethically questionable development was the importation 
of very large numbers of labourers from further West, and the deplorable record 
of sickness and death among them. If much of the immediate responsibility for 
this lay with Indian labour contractors, the reluctance of the planter community 
to accept an overriding duty of care was apparently indefensible even in the 
harsh context of prevailing social attitudes in Britain (and, indeed, Europe), and 
perhaps surprising given the contemporary surge in evangelical Christianity.
There is no convincing evidence of any systematic exclusion of indigenous 
participation in the tea industry, apart from the short-lived response to special
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pressures in the Dooars in the early 1920s. The notion that Maniram Dewan was 
somehow a victim of such an exclusion policy appears to be entirely fanciful.
The early history of the tea industry
The problems of opening out a garden and operating it successfully became 
notorious, for it had taken years to bring the pioneering Assam Company into 
profit, after it had been formed in 1839 to take over the East India Company's 
successful experimental tea gardens, created by the remarkable Charles Bruce.
By 1844 the Assam Company was struggling to survive the operating losses of its 
first years, and the London directors, themselves wholly ignorant of tea garden 
management, could only rely on local expertise. However, even that was beset 
by the simple difficulty of communication. Antrobus describes the predicament 
of the newly-appointed superintendent J, M. Mackie with a hundred miles of 
territory to cover from north to south:
Even a straight journey of such a distance with the means of transport then 
available, an elephant at three miles an hour, could not be accomplished in under 
five or six days at the best time of year; but Mackie had twenty tea tracts., .to 
inspect.2
Antrobus estimates that a journey from Calcutta to Assam by country boat would 
take two and a half months, and cites an account by a Government official of an 
upstream journey with his wife by country boat:
Our progress down the Kullung River up to Kopili was slow. After twelve days 
tedious travelling, propelling our craft with poles, or dragging it with ropes, on 
the night of 14th March 1846, we were surprised unexpectedly by the birth of our 
second son...3
2 H. A. Antrobus, A  History of the Assam Company, 1839-1953, Edinburgh, 1957, p. 55.
3 Ibid., p. 420.
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It was probably not until 1865 that bullock carts were introduced in Assam, as a 
remedy for the shortage of elephants.4
The Assam Company's results were so poor that by late 1846 the London 
directors were contemplating winding it up, and although they decided to 
continue, the company was to all intents and purposes bankrupt, and the 
operations in India in 1847 had to be financed by personal loans from two 
Calcutta directors. Antrobus does not mention the general financial crisis which 
was then sweeping London and Calcutta, but the future of the tea industry 
cannot have looked worse. The Assam Company was considering desperate 
measures, including abandoning a large part of their holdings and examining the 
possibility of independent ryot cultivation on the model of sugar and indigo 
plantations in the United Provinces. This proposal was turned down, on the 
grounds that Assamese ryots were too few and would be unwilling to undertake 
the work -  as a sugar manufacturer in Lower Assam had discovered.5
Changes in the Calcutta management and in the field brought the company back 
into profit, but the crucial turning point was the appointment of George 
Williamson Junior as Superintendent in Assam in 1854. He is credited with 
revolutionising the cultivation and manufacture of tea in Assam, and the lucid, 
innovative and comprehensive report which he wrote following his first tour of 
Assam, cited in full by Antrobus,6 was seen as a management blueprint then and 
still has resonance for a Visiting Agent 150 years later. Although little is known 
about his previous experience (one source states that he was a sugar planter in 
Bihar7), it could not have been in tea cultivation or manufacture, and his is a 
prime example of the empirical methods which drove the development of the 
industry from first principles, having abandoned the attempt to utilise imported 
Chinese experience. Neither he nor Charles Bruce before him brought with them 
to India any specialised agricultural or horticultural skills.
4 see letter from G. B. Stevens, Superintendent, The Jorehaut Company, to the Board, 17 
October 1865, cited by H.A. Antrobus, A  History of the Jorehaut Tea Company Ltd, 1859- 
1946, London, 1948, p. 71.
5 Antrobus, Assam Company, pp. 72-73, citing an undated report from Henry Momay, the 
company's Secretary in Calcutta.
6 Ibid,, pp. 479-485.
7 Peter Pugh, Williamson Magor Stuck to Tea, Cambridge, 1991, p. 26.
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He went on to found the Jorehaut Company with his cousin George Williamson 
Senior, who was active in acquiring land leases and establishing tea gardens, and 
his brother, Captain James Hay Williamson, who was captain of a Government 
inland steamer, an occupation which allowed him to profit from trading on his 
own account en route. It was this latter Williamson who was eventually to found 
the Managing Agency which bore his name.
The Jorehaut Company, the second public tea company, was incorporated in 
1859, and was from the outset a substantial rival to the Assam Company, 
although the rivalry was in many respects peculiar, as we shall see. Three of its 
principals had been associated with the Assam Company, including George 
Williamson Junior, who became the new company's Superintendent, and Henry 
Burkinyoung, who was still a major Assam Company shareholder, had once 
been its Managing Director, and who later was to become chairman of Jorehaut. 
In an unregulated corporate environment it was apparently not seen as a conflict 
of interest for 88% of the new company's capital to be used to buy four tea estates 
from the directors -  Cinnemara and Oating from the three Williamsons jointly for 
£30,000 [£1,400,000 at current values}, Koliabar from George Williamson Junior 
for £5,000 [£240,000] and Numaligarh from Burkinyoung for £18,000 [£860,000].8
The examples of the Assam Company and the Jorehaut Company finally showed 
that profitable operation was possible, and by 1859 there were 51 tea gardens in 
Assam. By 1862 there were 160 tea gardens, producing more than lm  pounds 
weight of tea, owned by five public companies and 57 private individuals or 
private companies, all British.9 Many of these had been opened up cheek by jowl 
with Assam and Jorehaut Company properties by assistants still working for 
them and helping themselves unashamedly to seed, labour and other supplies, 
and in the case of the Assam Company, almost certainly with the connivance of 
the Calcutta management, whose directors were doing the same thing.
Assistants were very poorly paid -  in 1863 salaries were increased to a range 
from £100 up to £200 [£4,800-£9,600 at current values]10, and no doubt the 
principal attraction of a thankless and risky job was to be able to learn the 
techniques and then grasp an opportunity to apply for a land grant and to set up
8 Antrobus, Jorehaut Company, p. 36.
9 Sir Perdval Griffiths, A  History of the Indian Tea Industry, London, 1967, pp. 70 & 75.
10 Antrobus, Assam Company, p. 425.
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independently, often with a view to selling the garden sooner rather than later to 
investors in London and Calcutta, rather than developing the garden themselves. 
In 1864 the Jorehaut Board instructed the Superintendent to prohibit his 
assistants from owning land on their own account, but after vigorous protests 
they were allowed to take up land but not to manage it as a tea plantation.11
However, dubious practice had not been confined to junior assistants.
The Assam Company was finding the dual relationship with Jorehaut irksome, in 
particular because Burkinyoung was pressing for the appointment to the Assam 
board of the Jorehaut Managing Director, William Roberts. The matter came to a 
head in 1862, when W.J. Judge, the Calcutta chairman of the Assam Company, 
wrote to Burkinyoung:
The Assam Company's office premises, servants and boats have been used for 
the benefit of the Jorehaut Company, and the coolies of the Assam Company 
have been made over in large numbers to the Jorehaut Company, by the orders of 
the Calcutta Agent of the Jorehaut Company, Mr Carter, while acting as Secretary 
and Honorary Managing Director to the Assam Company.12
There were also dubious transactions in seed, and Carter, as well as the Assam 
Superintendent Mackie, were forced to resign. Burkinyoung resigned from the 
London Board, although it was not alleged that he knew what was going on.
Meanwhile George Williamson Junior was using his position at Jorehaut to 
develop a garden of his own in Cachar, and to acquire land for himself while 
negotiating for land on behalf of Jorehaut. In 1861, in an act of extraordinary 
blatancy, he sent the Jorehaut board a prospectus for the nascent East India Tea 
Co. Ltd., of which he was also acting simultaneously as Superintendent. He left 
Jorehaut in 1862, pleading ill-health rather than acknowledging any conflict of 
interest.
At that point the Jorehaut Company themselves appointed a Managing Agency -  
Begg, Dunlop, which we have seen figure in the affairs of Mackinnon Mackenzie. 
William Mackinnon/s nephew Duncan MacNeill was a partner there at the time,
11 Antrobus, Jorehaut Company, p. 40.
12 Antrobus, Assam Company, p. 118.
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and William's close friend David Begg himself joined the Jorehaut Board in 1859, 
and became Chairman in the same year, continuing until his death in 1868.
The "tea mania" of the early 1860s demonstrated the dangers of investing in a 
far-distant enterprise on the sole word of its promoter, and fraudulent 
prospectuses combined with inexperienced and incompetent garden 
management left a trail of financial disaster, even catching out the shrewd 
William Mackinnon. The 1854 Waste Land rules were applied progressively 
more laxly, survey information was inadequate, and large areas of land were 
taken up purely as speculation, encouraged further by the Tee Simple Rules of 
1861. The failure of the Agra Bank in 1866 was the final blow and a collapse in 
investor confidence led to panic selling and many business failures.
In this context of dubious business practice a good managing agency, by contrast, 
was able to assess the potential of existing estates and of virgin grant land; to 
syndicate expertise in garden management and tea manufacture and to keep 
managers under supervision; source seed, horticultural supplies and factory 
equipment; contract for the importation of labour; contract for the transportation 
of manufactured tea to Calcutta and arrange either for its sale there or for its 
shipment to London; and, most importantly, it could fund garden expenditure by 
making hypothecation advances against the new season's crop. It was therefore 
in an authoritative position to promote investment in new tea companies, and its 
reputation for integrity, as well as for the success of the gardens already under 
management, was the vital factor. Although the process was not without risk, 
investors in Britain (often private individuals w ith small shareholdings) could be 
reassured that trustworthy compatriots in Calcutta, already at a vast distance 
from Britain, had the experience and expertise to manage their company, even 
though it was another vast distance away in Assam or Darjeeling. In 1867, The 
Assam Company themselves, faced with another downturn in business and a 
management crisis, put the business in the hands of a managing agency -  
Schoene Kilburn.
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The achievement of the tea industry
The establishment of the tea industry in north east India was once widely 
regarded as a triumph of British enterprise, creating as it did the largest tea 
producer in the world, one of the largest earners of foreign exchange for India, 
and an enduring economic legacy to the post-colonial state. Even in the days of 
bitter Indian nationalist recrimination and vindictive fiscal legislation in the 
1970s the tea industry's value to the national economy was seen to justify the 
exemption of the sterling tea companies from the draconian provisions of the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The industry still flourishes in the 21st 
century, largely under Indian ownership, on estates first cleared and planted by 
the British.
Writing in 1926, Sir Edward Gait, sometime Commissioner of Assam, wrote, 
more or less as a footnote to his scholarly history of the Province:
The benefits which the tea industry has conferred on the Province have been 
many and great. The land most suitable for tea is not adapted to the cultivators 
of rice, and the greater part of it would still be hidden in dense jungle if it had not 
been cleared by the tea planters. The gardens gave employment in 1923 to 
527,000 labourers...The gardens provide an unfailing source of employment for 
local cultivators who, for any reason, may wish to work for hire. The literate 
classes have obtained numerous clerical and medical appointments on the 
gardens; and the demand for rice to feed the coolies has considerably augmented 
its price in Assam, and so enabled cultivators to dispose of their produce at a 
greater price than would have been possible had they been obliged to export it to 
Bengal. A great impetus has also been given to trade, and new markets have 
been opened in all parts of the Province. The existence of the tea industry has 
been a potent factor in the improvement of communications by rail river and 
road.13
The pioneering work of the early planters was seen as heroic, and indeed they 
risked personal danger, physical hardship and disease which claimed many of 
their lives. If the exploits they described (and perhaps exaggerated) in memoirs 
smack of the boys' adventure stories of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, there is no doubt about their courage and self-reliance in tackling 
formidable tasks for which no precedents were available.
13 Sir Edward Gait, A History of Assam, 2nd edition, Calcutta & Simla, 1926, p. 361.
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Sociological and environmental considerations
But this Panglossian version of Whig history was accompanied by deep 
uneasiness about the treatment of immigrant labour, both in transit to Assam and 
on the gardens. The deplorable truths uncovered by successive Government 
enquiries could not be excused or ignored, but even as the need to recruit labour 
from distant places declined with the increasing numbers who had chosen to 
remain on the gardens, the working and living conditions improved only 
marginally until well after the second world war.
The topic has been fairly thoroughly explored, and the roots of the problem can, 
with hindsight, be easily identified. It was (it still is) impossible to cultivate tea 
without a large manual labour force; local inhabitants in Assam were self- 
sufficient ryots who were not attracted by the rigours of paid work and were 
heavy opium users; hill tribes further west, particularly in Chota Nagpur, were 
physically strong but impoverished, and could be persuaded to accept three-year 
indentures to work in Assam, sweetened by substantial advances of wages. The 
cost of recruiting and transporting these labourers was considerable.14 Antrobus 
dtes a cost in 1865 of £20,000 for 1,000 coolies [£1,000 a head at current prices],15 
and costs of this order needed to be amortised over a period long enough to 
make economic sense for employers; many arrivals, doubtless already 
traumatised by the long journey, found the work, the rewards and the climate 
much less agreeable than the recruiters had promised, and wanted to go back 
home. Their indentures prevented this, and were enforceable by law, on pain of 
imprisonment. But there were many cases where planters used brutal extra-legal 
methods to dissuade would-be absconders.
This was not a short-term problem. In 1903 A. Logsdail, an SPS missionary in 
Chota Nagpur, wrote that:
14 Parenthetically it is interesting to note the inflationary effect of the demand for labour 
for export to Mauritius, where rates of advances were higher and where living 
conditions were more agreeable. Export to the Caribbean was continuing, but was not 
cited by Williamson.
15 Antrobus, Assam Company, p. 146.
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From 1894-1901141,063 men and women deserted
From 1894-1899 40,366 women deserted (included in the above figure)
In the "above eight years" 4,192 warrants were issued,
4,644 men and women were arrested, 
4,123 were convicted.
In 1900, out of 323 convicted, 294 were imprisoned.
In 1901 out of 270 convicted 247 were imprisoned.16
In May 1906 Richard Magor, still the Senior Partner of George Williamson in 
London, wrote to his Calcutta colleague, L.A. Smith:
Absconders:
We consider it most injudicious to have sent an extract from Mr Catto's letter to 
the Lieut. Governor embodying his admission that he had taken the law into his 
own hands and chastised the absconding coolies that were captured, and the 
position is not improved by the fact as we now learn, that these coolies ere free 
labourers.
This makes it a still more glaring breach of law and how anyone can calmly ask 
the Government to assist them in illegally capturing free men under no contract 
surpasses our comprehension.
You of course did not know this at the time but you were aware that the Lieut. 
Governor views with considerable disfavour the right of capturing runaways 
even when under an agreement, also that the law requires that when caught they 
should at once be taken before a magistrate.17
Several factors contributed to this situation. Tea planters, particularly in the 
early days, were extravert adventurers, perhaps with seafaring or even 
agricultural experience, but certainly without experience of managing a thousand 
or so hill tribesmen and women. They were working in isolation, often the 
solitary European on the garden. The shortage of labour was a constant 
impediment, and it was by no means unknown for a planter to employ labour 
absconding from a relatively nearby garden. Labour was the principal cost 
element and therefore had a direct impact on profitability, but too little labour 
would reduce output and compromise future production: there was therefore 
intense pressure on labour rates.
Subhajyoti Ray, writing of the tea industry in the Dooars, pointed out that 
immigrant labour there was not indentured, making possible "a more nuanced 
approach to the issues of labour recruitment and control. Placed alongside the
16 A. Logsdail, 'Assam Tea Garden Labour Question', Calcutta Review 116/236,1903, 
p. 259.
Cited by Pugh, Williamson Magor, p. 44.
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same issues in the agrarian sector, especially in the use of advances, it establishes 
an uncanny "continuity7 between the two."18 He suggests that tea garden labour 
issues have been "interpreted predominantly through the prism of colonial laws 
and court decisions rather than on the basis of the actual working of a plantation 
unit"19, and dies the fact that more enlightened managers made sure that family 
units could enjoy accommodation no worse than that at home, and have the 
benefit of a small allotment of land for growing foodstuffs and even keeping a 
cow. The marginal cost of this was less than the cost of losing and replacing 
labour, although not all planters understood the equation. He also warns that 
"analysis of labour control has been undertaken from a "nationalist7 perspective 
in which a catalogue of the oppressive methods of employment, harsh working 
conditions and collusion between the planters and the colonial state (very basic 
and crude elements of anti-colonial ideology) has sufficed as explanations for 
evidently more complex processes"20.
Health was also a major problem. Many labourers were sick when they arrived, 
debilitated by the appalling conditions of the journey. Malaria and cholera took 
a terrible toll, and there were occasional epidemics which swept through the 
coolie lines. On one occasion almost the entire workforce of a garden died.
However, mortality on the journey to Assam was so high that it threatened the 
viability of the migration scheme, and in 1861 was the subject of the first of 
several Government enquiries to reach damning conclusions. In particular it 
laid down that responsibility for the welfare of migrant labour could not simply 
be shrugged off on to the Indian labour contractors who undertook recruitment 
and transportation. Griffiths summarises the 1861 statistics: "Mortality on the 
voyage to Assam commonly reached ten or twelve percent, while on one 
occasion it had been as high as fifty percent, and as the contractors seem to have 
been paid in full even when the coolies died on the way, most of them made no 
attempt to secure cleanliness or provide satisfactory food."21 The 1906 enquiry 
detailed the mortality after arrival in the tea gardens: . .out of 84,915 labourers
landed in the tea district between 1 May 1863 and 1 May 1866 over 30,000 had
18 Subhajyoti Ray, Transformations on the Bengal Frontier: Jalpaiguri 1765-1948, London, 
2002, p. 13..
19 Ibid., p. 12.
20 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
21 Griffiths, Tea Industry, p. 269.
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died by 30 January 1866."22 Griffiths points out that these were the years of "tea 
mania", when many tea gardens were being opened out by unscrupulous and 
ignorant speculators.
George Williamson, the Jorehaut company's superintendent, reported on 5 July 
1860 that: "I have received the first batch of emigrants -  of 51 shipped, 38 have 
been landed, the remaining 13 having either died or absconded."23 Later he gave 
a first-hand account in a letter to his Managing Director dated 21 September 1860, 
"...[of] the excessive mortality on the passage up, from cholera generally, 
averaging not less than 20 per cent." He went on the describe the conditions he 
witnessed when he joined the steamer at Gauhati:
The most obvious inconveniences were: first, insufficient cooking 
accommodation, causing undue delay in the preparation of their meals, and as 
each individual or family had their rations served out to them in their raw state, 
those who were the latest to cook, rather than wait, satisfied the cravings of 
nature with uncooked food. Secondly, no private conveniences for relieving the 
calls of nature; nothing but the ship's side, in the most public manner, the 
candidate for relief requiring another person to hold on by the hands, if a 
woman, this was a source of positive terror to the female emigrants, several of 
whom are dropped overboard on each trip...These are serious evils...24
It may be satisfactory to know that these "evils" were recognised so early, but it took 
many years for them to be remedied, and it may be suspected that Williamson's concern 
was informed as much by pragmatic self-interest as it was by humanitarianism.
Land distribution change
Among the immigrant labour force the human cost of developing the tea 
industry was therefore considerable, and some of it, at least, could well have 
been minimised. However, the incomers were not the only people affected, and 
contemporary Assamese sub-national awareness has stimulated the study of the 
specifically Assamese perspective. In his thoughtful and restrained article25
22 Ibid., p. 270.
23 cited by Antrobus, Jorehaut Company, p. 49.
24 cited by Antrobus, Jorehaut Company, p. 51.
25 Sanjib Baruah, 'Clash of Resource Use Regimes in Colonial Assam: a Nineteenth- 
Century Puzzle Revisited', The Journal of Peasant Studies, 28,3, April 2001, pp. 109-124.
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Sanjib Baruah shows how the impact of imperial land-use regulation, and in 
particular the designation of waste land, dispossessed the settled ryot of access to 
what had been essentially common forest land, as well as disrupting the lives of 
the forest-dwelling people.
The other side of recording land rights was the colonial state's assertion of claims 
to the vast majority of land in which, it assumed, no private rights ever existed. 
That was the land on which the colonial state made the most far-reaching of 
decisions. Among them were lands declared waste lands enabling their 
allocation to tea plantations.. .26
Whatever its contribution to 'progress', the colonial land settlement project 
resulted in significant dispossession of the Assamese peasantry and of the 
shifting cultivators and hunter-gatherers of the Brahmaputra Valley and the 
surrounding hills.27
This scenario was not, of course, exclusive to Assam, to the period or to the 
imposition of British imperial rule. Richard H. Grove points out that 
"Widespread deforestation in connection with rises in population, state- 
sponsored colonisation, state-building and urbanisation in many parts of the 
world in the early "medieval7 period after about AD 1200 has frequently involved 
the progressive over-running of "forest tribes" in places as far apart as eastern 
Germany or the Gangetic plain.7728 . Elsewhere, Grove also writes that:
A growing awareness of ... pronounced pre-colonial deforestation episodes leads 
one seriously to question the objectivity of some recent historical essays that have 
tended to characterise the pre-British period as an ecological and pre-capitalist 
golden age of common property rights and sustainable resource use... In fact, far 
from being a paradise of so-called common property, the non-arable Indian 
environment has, from a very early date, been subject to attempts at management 
and control by both states and dominant groups...29
These topics are also explored in depth (and at much greater length) by Simon 
Schama in Landscape and Memorif0, but meanwhile Baruah points out that in 
Assam the post-colonial state has continued the process, to the point where in the 
1980s the Bodo people protested at being treated as encroachers ""after nearly a 
century when many of them were able to move around cultivating lands
26 Baruah, Clash of Resource Use, p. 111.
27 Ibid., p. 114.
28 Richard. H. Grove, 'Colonial conservation, ecological hegemony and popular 
resistance: towards a global synthesis', in John M. MacKenzie (ed.), Imperialism and the 
Natural World, Manchester, 1990.
29 Richard H. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial expansion, tropical island Edens and the 
origins of environmentalism, 1600-1860, Cambridge, 1995, p. 386.
30 Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory, London, 1996, pp. 37-240.
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formally designated as protected forests".31 Armed protest has been rife in 
Assam for decades, denounced as terrorism and posing a significant security 
problem to the State as well as to the vulnerable tea estates.
Neither Grove nor Baruah goes so far as to suggest that taking very lightly- 
populated wilderness land into cultivation is intrinsically undesirable, which 
would be difficult to reconcile with the realities of human population growth 
over ten millennia.32 But since this activity has often caused severe ecological as 
well as sociological damage, it has, at least since the eighteenth century, been 
viewed with caution, if not suspicion, and now more widely in the context of 
current concerns about the global health of the ecosystem and the global reach of 
capital wealth. Allied concerns about botanical manipulation, either in the 
contemporary sense of genetic engineering or in the historical sense of 
introducing exotic plant species into colonised lands, have invited more specific 
scholarly study, formulating a concept of 'plant colonialism' as a parallel to, or 
even a surrogate for, the political and military impositions of empire.
However, the wholesale changes in large parts of the Assam landscape made 
during the nineteenth century by forest clearance and tea planting do not seem to 
have damaged the ecology, although in 1882 a tea planter suggested that forest 
clearances had slightly reduced rainfall, which was beneficial in making 
cultivation and plucking easier.33 Tea plants are famously indigenous to Assam, 
and are themselves trees, even though kept heavily pruned in cultivation. The 
requirements of commercial production and the capital value of the land ensure 
that the soil is not eroded, and even the use of inorganic fertilisers is often 
avoided in order to protect the taste quality of the leaf. While it is true that the 
orderliness of a tea garden contrasts with the disorder of the 'jungle' which often 
surrounds it, it is fanciful to read into this a paradigm for imperial control: the 
successful cultivation of tea requires horticultural disciplines which were 
developed experimentally by practical men, motivated by the prospect of wealth.
31 Baruah, Clash of Resource Use, p. 121.
32 Grove, Green Imperialism, p. 266 cites but does not endorse Emmerich de Vattel's Law of 
Nations (London, 1760): 'Those who did not cultivate it had no right to retain control of 
the land.'
33 Samuel Baildon, The Tea Industry in India: a review of finance and labour, and a guide for 
capitalists and assistants, London, 1882, p. 135.
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Jayeeta Sharma34 has been much impressed by Richard Drayton's work on the 
politics and philosophies of nineteenth century botany, (as well as on the 
particular example of the Caribbean) but the attempt to impose its conclusions on 
the development of the tea industry does not seem to be convincing:
...an idyllic vision of unordered Nature blooming into ordered gardens requires 
examining as part of a general doctrine which Richard Drayton terms the 
'economics of Eden' where 'the rational use of Nature replaced piety as the 
foundation of imperial Providence, government became the Demiurge, and 
universal progress, measured by material abundance, its promised land'35
The notion of "Edenic" characteristics in the extremely hostile jungle 
environment of Assam certainly did not occur to the early botanist explorer, John 
Maccosh36, who did not romanticise it, and David Arnold wrote that . .it would 
be wrong to imagine.. .that there existed a single, Edenic, image of the tropics"37. 
The planters who had to work there certainly found Assam conditions 
threatening, although once established and acclimatised, many of them 
developed a surprisingly strong attachment to the landscape and to its human 
and animal inhabitants.
Indigenous participation in the tea industry
Indian participation in tea planting came late and was very much in the minority 
until the wholesale changes of ownership in the 1970s, which saw Marwari 
investors taking over. The official chronology appears to have been that "the first 
Indian tea estate was started by an inhabitant of Sylhet in 1876.. .Mr. B. C. Gupta 
and his companion Mr. D, N. Dutt"38. Percival Griffiths says that "in 1879 the 
first Indian-managed tea company in Bengal was formed by a few enterprising 
Bengali lawyers and clerks. The company was known as the Jalpaiguri Tea
34 Jayeeta Sharma, 'An European tea 'garden' and an Indian 'frontier': the discovery of 
Assam/ Centre of South Asian Studies (Cambridge), Occasional Paper No. 6, 2002, p. 25.
35 Richard Drayton, Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain and the 'Improvement'  of 
the World, Yale, 2000, p.80.
36 John Maccosh, Topography of Assam, Calcutta, 1837.
37 David Arnold, The Problem of Nature, Oxford, 1996, p. 149.
38 W. H. Ukers, All About Tea, New York ,1935, p. 407.
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Company, and its only garden was Mugalkata" .39 Neither source records a 
parallel start-up in Assam, and Ukers says: "In Assam proper, very few gardens 
are Indian-owned, but in Kangra, Darjeeling, the Dooars and the Terai fair areas 
are owned by Indian companies."40 In a personal communication Subhajyoti 
Ray suggests that the inaccessibility of the tea areas in Assam discouraged Indian 
exploration there, whereas the Dooars and Sylhet were both literally and 
figuratively "closer". As early as 1853, a District Officer wrote:
The population increases very slowly indeed, on account of the excessive 
mortality that takes place annually from cholera and smallpox. It is never 
increased by foreign settlers. Neither Bengalees nor Hindostanees can be 
induced to settle in Assam for fear of these and other diseases, although the 
utmost encouragement has been given to them and others to do so since the 
Province has been in our possession.41
Is it possible that it was the same cultural factors which motivated so many 
nineteenth century British explorers that led them to confront the dangers in 
Assam?
However, several Assamese entrepreneurs, some having trained on British- 
owned gardens, started their own, "Roseswar Barua, one of the greatest of these 
pioneering tea planters, who had opened out half a dozen gardens in the 1860s 
had to sell off many of his gardens.. . and it was not until the 1880s that 
"Bisturam Barooah secured a land grant to open up Thengalbarie Tea Estate"42. 
Amalendu Guha says that the tea "crisis" of 1866-69, which cost Barua his 
gardens, also claimed sixteen Indian tea gardens in the Goalpara district alone.43 
It is probable that many of these small gardens had no tea manufacturing 
capacity of their own, and would sell plucked leaf to a nearby garden which did. 
Some will have concentrated on producing seed, for which there was a strong 
market during the tea "mania".
Many Indian and Assamese historians are convinced that British land grant 
policy, and British planters, deliberately set out to prevent indigenous 
participation in tea planting, although the evidence for this is not strong. The
39 Griffiths, Indian Tea Industry, p. 115.
40 Ukers, All About Tea, p. 407.
41 A.J. Moffatt Mills, Report on the Province of Assam, Guwahati Publication Board, Assam, 
1984 (originally published in 1854). Letter to Captain Jenkins from Captain Veitch, p. 76, 
cited by Sharma, European tea 'garden', p. 38.
42 Arup Kumar Dutta, The Khongiya Barooahs ofThengal, Guwahati, 1990, p. 47.
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principal accusations are that tire terms of land grants were unreasonably 
restrictive in terms of qualification and then unreasonably generous in terms of 
revenue payments. The Waste Land Grant Rule of 1838 was in operation until 
1854, and was deliberately framed to encourage venture capital investment in 
clearance and cultivation, and had parallels in other "empty" parts of the world, 
notably in North America and Australasia. Its provisions were that any tract of 
waste land, from 100 to 10,000 acres, might be taken up on a forty-five years' 
lease, with a rent-free period of from five to twenty years, depending on whether 
the land was open, under reeds or under forest. It was a condition that a quarter 
of the area should be cleared within five years, or the lease would be forfeited. 
When the rent-free period expired, 25% of the area continued to be rent-free and 
the remaining 75% was assessed for revenue tax progressively, rising to Rs. 1 -  2 
per acre. It is pointed out by several writers that this was less than the rate paid 
by ryots for agricultural land. At the end of the lease 25% of the area would 
remain rent-free in perpetuity and the remainder would be assessed either at 25% 
of gross profits or at the rate paid for rice lands in the neighbourhood, at the 
option of the tenant.44
In 1854 the provincial magistrate, Moffatt Mills, wrote his report to Government 
and recommended a significant liberalisation of the rules, since European 
"speculators" had evidently not taken up leases in the numbers that had been 
hoped for.45 As a result the rules were revised in 1854, providing 99 year leases, 
and reducing the progressive assessments to only As. 6 per acre after 25 years. 
However, the minimum area was increased to 500 acres -  a more realistic size for 
a viable tea garden -  and applicants had to prove financial resource in capital or 
stock of at least Rs. 3 per acre. The grantee had to dear one eighth of the land in 
the first five years, one quarter within the first ten years, one half within the first 
twenty years and three-quarters before the expiry of thirty years, in 1861 the 
capital threshold was raised again, with the introduction of 'fee simple' grants, 
under which land was sold at prices ranging from Rs. 2 As. 8 to Rs. 5 per acre, 
without any clearance condition. In 1876 the sale of land outright was stopped, 
and a system of 30-year leases substituted.
43 Amalendu Guha, Planter Raj to Swaraj: Freedom Struggle and Electoral Politics in Assam 
1827-1947, New Delhi, 1977, p. 21.
44 See Gait, History of Assam, pp. 359-360.
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It is sometimes argued that these provisions discriminated against Indian and 
Assamese investors since the requirement to clear land within the time limit, to 
commit to leasing large minimum areas and to prove minimum wealth needed 
capital beyond their resources. Jayeeta Sharma describes this as "active 
discouragement to indigenous applicants"46, and quotes from Mills' 1854 report, 
where he points out that "natives have no capital and their only resource is to 
settle other ryots in these grants so that as much or even more becomes waste in 
one place than is reclaimed in the other." A more extreme view is in an overtly 
Assamese sub-nationalist website47 which publishes a bi-lingual newsletter 
(undated) headed Social History o f Assam:
The policy of "Waste Land Regulation" was imposed from the starting of tea 
cultivation as a tactic of depriving the local people. Under the "Waste 
Land Regulation" the rate of revenue of the land was far less than that of 
Assamese local people. On the other hand the industrialists with less capital 
were deprived of possession of land in accordance with the regulation that 
prohibited anybody to get a lease of land less than one hundred acres.
However, it would not be logical for any state to offer advantageous waste land 
grant (or homesteading) terms without some reliable expectation of development 
return, and although it was assumed that risk capital would come from British 
sources, there was no indication of any intention to exclude indigenous investors 
if they could meet the necessary criteria. Amalendu Guha, who is far from 
sympathetic with the British, states that "indigenous aspirants were not 
discriminated against as such"48 in the 1838 Rules, and that under the 1854 Rules 
the minimum 500 acre requirement "was later [in 1856] reduced to 200 acres and 
made relaxable even to 100 acres in special cases, if native applicants could 
satisfy the Collectors of their ability to bring ryots from outside Assam"49.
Indeed, there were certainly many Indian capitalists outside Assam who had the 
wealth, but although it has been suggested that they regarded Assam as 
impossibly distant and the project unacceptably risky, the very first venture 
capital initiative was the formation of the Bengal Tea Association in 1839 by 
Dwarkanath Tagore and his Indian and European associates, through the Carr, 
Tagore managing agency. This was, by mutual agreement, very shortly
45 Mills, Report, cited by Baruah, Clash of Resource Use, p. 118.
46 Sharma, European tea 'garden', p. 17.
47 (www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7434/history.htm#Modem%20Age)
48 Guha, Planter Raj to Swaraj, p. 13.
49 Ibid., p. 14.
133
subsumed into the London-based Assam Company, and a Tagore family member 
was one of the original Calcutta directors, as was Motilal Seal, who signed one of 
the original share certificates. When the company was floated, the demand for 
shares in India was as strong as in London, and 22% of the final allocation was 
held in Calcutta;50 later company history shows that Indians were well 
represented as shareholders.
An invented history?
In support of the thesis that indigenous tea planting was actively discouraged by 
the authorities and opposed by European planting interests, a persistent, 
unsubstantiated and conceivably invented narrative concerns the tea planting 
activities of the Assamese folk-hero and "martyr" Maniram Dewan Dutt Barua, 
who was executed in 1858 for inciting to rebellion the young Ahom Saring Raja 
(to whom he was Diwan). Versions of the story have gained fairly wide 
currency, and one has been repeated by Jayeeta Sharma in her recent paper. It 
also appears in a commissioned history of Williamson Magor & Co51; in a 
hagiography of an Assamese family which eventually became tea garden 
owners52; in an undated website document53 published by MRB Enterprises, tea 
brokers, estate owners and merchants in Guwahati; and in a paper presented at 
the Indian History and Culture Society Annual Conference in October 1997 at 
Garhwal University Srinagar by Kanak Chandra Deka.54 It is not possible to 
discern where the story originated, but Gupta's version appears to be a shortened 
transcript of the MRB Enterprises version.
Some of the facts of Maniram's history are straightforwardly agreed. Gait says 
that in 1857 sepoys in Dibrugarh were found to "have entered into a conspiracy 
with the Saring Raja" (Prince Kandarpeswar Singha) who was arrested. His
50 Antrobus, Assam Company, p. 42.
51 Sujoy Gupta, Four Mangoe Lane, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 20-23.
52 Dutta, The Khongiya Barooahs.
53 www.mrbtea.com
54 www.picatype.com/dig/ dnlaa07.htm#
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house was searched and "treasonable letters were discovered from Maniram". 
Maniram was in Calcutta, where he was arrested, and then sent to Assam for 
trial. Deka records that Maniram was tried by a Mr. Holroyd and hanged on 
26th February 1858, and that one of his friends was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, three more to 14 years, and two villagers were transported for life.
However, the MRB account puts quotes around "conspiracy" and refers to "a 
travesty of a trial" and Gupta adds a gloss of "trumped-up charges".
Several sources state that Maniram worked for the East India Company, some 
quoting Stanley Baldwin, Assam's Tea (not traced), as a sirastadar or gomastha 
with Captain Neufville in his expeditions against the Singphos and the Khamtis 
in 1824-5, and then as Revenue Seristadar and Tehsildar. According to Sharma 
he was then appointed Barbhandar Barua to the Raja Purandar Singha when he 
was reinstated by the Company as a tributary ruler of Upper Assam in 1833.55 
Sharma states that in 1836 he was appointed Dewan or Land Agent by The 
Assam Company, but the company was not formed until 1839 and only took over 
the EIC's tea gardens the following year56. But Antrobus cites a report in 1841 
from William Prinsep, who was Secretary, which comments favourably on 
"MuneeranT s" work at the company57, so there is no doubt that he did work 
there.
Sharma also states (unreferenced) that Maniram left The Assam Company in 
about 1842, having been suspended on charges of diverting its seed and labour to 
his own ends. All the sources claim that having learned the skills of planting he 
started two of his own tea gardens, at Cinnemara, near Jorehaut, and at Singlo 
near Nazira, Sharma implying that this was while he was still employed by the 
Assam Company, while the MRB website and Gupta date this development to 
1845,
55 Sharma attributes most of her facts to Benudhar Sarma, Maniram Dewan, Calcutta, 1950 
(in Assamese). In a footnote on p. 19 she says he described himself as a "peripatetic 
historian', and that his book drew upon an earlier account published under a 
pseudonym by Nilkumud [Indibar] Barua, a publicist who was related to Maniram by 
marriage, and included him in a narrative of heroic figures from the past. Nilkumud 
[Indibar] Barua, Jivandarsha, Calcutta, 1891. In the 1950s, Benudhar and other publicists 
began organising an annual commemoration of Maniram Dewan, on the anniversary of 
the latter's death, at his native village of Charing in Sibsagar.
56 Griffiths, Indian Tea Industry, pp. 61-3.
57 Antrobus, Assam Company, p. 343.
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All the sources claim that Mardram applied, for waste land grants but was 
unsuccessful, had to purchase land and had to pay land revenue charges of Rs. 
500 for 2,000 bighas [approximately 700 acres]. Dutta58claims that his application 
for grants was "vehemently opposed by Charles Alexander Bruce and other 
planters", which is unlikely, since Bruce had been dismissed as The Assam 
Company's Superintendent of the Northern Division in 184259 (although he may 
have set up as a planter independently -  he lived until 1871). Dutta also claims 
that "concessional fee simple grants of waste land were available to European 
planters at ludicrously low rates, but not for their native counterparts", but the 
fee simple rules were not made until 1862. The MRB website and Gupta also 
refer to "vehement opposition" and "the open hostility of the Europeans", but 
without reference to source. Sharma writes of Maniram's "ineligibility as a 
'native' to enjoy the same government concessions as other planters" but does 
not show a source for this: there is no tiling in the Waste Land Grant rules to 
support the contention. She goes on to contend that Maniram's suspension by 
the Assam Company was discriminatory: "No white entrepreneur faced this kind 
of retribution."
Finally, the MRB website and Gupta suggest that "his tea gardens having been 
opened in the face of the undisguised hostility of the European planter 
community, the latter bided their time to teach the upstart native a lesson", and 
were behind the decision to arrest and execute him. Dutta is even more explicit 
in his accusation:
At the instigation of the planters Maniram was arrested...Not content with 
having physically eliminated their adversary, the European planters forced the 
authorities to distribute the Dewan's properties amongst them and these were 
later auctioned. The crushing of the spirited Dewan was a warning to all local 
people that independent entrepreneurship by the natives would not be tolerated 
by the British masters.60
The Williamsons applied for a lease of 720 acres at Cinnemara in 1853, and began 
cultivation at once, which casts some doubt on the claim that Maniram owned 
the garden there, and that it was auctioned off after his execution in 1858 "at a
58 Dutta, The Khongiya Barooahs. p. 47.
59 Griffiths, Indian Tea Industry, p. 66.
60 Dutta, The Khongiya Barooahs, p. 47.
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throwaway price"61 to George Williamson. Another, perhaps ironical, 
inconsistency is that Dutta, later in his book, wrote:
Bisturam must have learnt about tea directly from the legendary Williamsons... 
The relationship with the Williamsons transcended mere commercial association 
and became personal and intimate. It was Captain Williamson and Williamson 
Magor & Co who acted as the guide and guardian of Bisturam Barooah in his 
first foray into tea planting. The close association with Williamson Magor & Co 
lasted for over three quarters of a century till Bisturam's grandson, Emend 
Prasad, broke away in 1952... The deterrents before native planters, the major 
one being acquisition of land, were many. Had it not been for his intimate 
rapport with the Europeans, perhaps becoming a planter would have remained a 
pipe dream for him. But European acquaintances, when sounded out, agreed to 
help him because of his special relationship with them. With their assistance 
Bisturam Barooah secured a land grant to open up Thengalbarie Tea Estate,. ,62
The determination of some Indian and Assamese historians to demonstrate that 
British hegemony not only dispossessed Assamese peasantry but actively and 
brutally sought to prevent indigenous participation in the development of the tea 
industry seems to have led them into making exaggerated claims which have not 
been substantiated. It would be unfortunate if repetition should be allowed to 
apply a patina of plausibility.
None of the evidence shows any attempt to exclude indigenous participation 
until the somewhat exceptional conditions in the Dooars in the 1920s, either at 
official or non-official levels.
The foundation of Williamson Magor
Captain James Hay Williamson applied for the job of Calcutta Agent for the 
Jorehaut Company and was offered it at a salary of Rs. 200 a month (£10,000 a 
year at current values). He turned this down, in a letter d ted  by Antrobus, dated 
11 August 1859,63 suggesting a salary twice as large and calling the offered salary 
"a pittance" and claiming that "an injudicious parsimony is prejudicial alike to
61 Sharma, European tea 'garden', p. 21, citing A ijan Kumar Baruah, Assamese Businessmen 
from Maniram Dewan to Robin Dutta, Guwahati, 1992, p. 10.
62 Dutta, The Khongiya Barooahs, p. 51.
63 Antrobus, Jorehaut, p. 22.
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the credit, dignity and efficiency of the Company's officers". Antrobus says that 
a note in the margin of the Minute Book states that Williamson had been obliged 
to leave India on account of his health, and "was not now in a position to take the 
Agency". The Board then appointed T. E. Carter, who was also the Secretary of 
the Assam Company. Williamson's absence cannot have been very long, 
because he was certainly back in Calcutta in 1862, when Carter left in the wake of 
the revelation of his dual loyalties. He took over as Agent temporarily, while 
George Williamson lent the Company Rs. 10,000 to tide them over until a new 
bank authority could be arranged. Begg, Dunlop were then appointed as 
Managing Agents, as we have seen.
Antrobus suggests that Williamson may have been acting as Agent for the new 
East India Company, of which his brother George was a promoter, as well as for 
his family's other interests. The chronology appears to be that Williamson first 
worked for the Ganges Company, commanding the steamer Ghazipur, which 
sank in 1852, when he joined the India General Steam Navigation Company, 
commanding the General McLeod and the Madras. In 1862 he left the IGSN 
Company to form a rival concern, the New Rivers Company, with David Begg as 
a major shareholder, and when he left in 1865 to found Williamson, Magor, Begg, 
Dunlop were appointed as Managing Agents.64 There is another cross-connection 
here with William Mackinnon's activities, since when the company went into 
liquidation after Begg's death in 1868, the Mackinnon group bought it from its 
original owners, putting up more than 50% of its initial capital.
At all events, Captain Williamson will have been a man of means, given his 
shareholdings in Jorehaut and New Rivers, and an experienced entrepreneur. He 
was also a director of The Great Eastern Hotel, where he met Richard Blarney 
Magor, who was an assistant there, possibly in 1866. Magor came from 
Cornwall and had been an apprentice with Vivians, whose main interests were in 
copper, before joining the accounts department of the Great Eastern, when the 
copper market hit hard times. In April 1869 they entered into a formal 
partnership.65
64 Sir Perdval Griffiths, A  History of the Joint Steamer Companies, London, 1979, p. 27.
65 Pugh, Williamson Magor, p. 32.
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By this time there were several managing agencies operating in Calcutta, 
including, as we have seen, Bird's, Mackinnon Mackenzie and Gillanders 
Arbuthnot, but also Andrew Yule, Balmer Lawrie, Schoene Kilburn, Shaw 
Wallace, Turner Morrison and Playfair Duncan, but few of them yet active in the 
tea industry. However, the new partnership flourished, doubtless aided by the 
resonance of the Williamson name as well as by the energy of Richard Magor. 
Within a few years they were acting for some thirteen tea companies and had 
established a leading position as tea experts which was never to be challenged, 
even as the number of managing agencies more than doubled in the next twenty 
years.
Griffiths records the nine founding members of the Indian Tea Association in
It is surprising that Balmer Lawrie & Company is missing from this list, given 
that Alex Lawrie had been one of the founding members of the Indian Tea 
Districts Association when it was founded in 1879 -  along with George 
Williamson, Richard Magor and William Roberts (of the Jorehaut company). The 
absence of Duncan Brothers & Company, who were later to manage one of the 
largest tea portfolios in Calcutta, is explained by the steep decline in their 
fortunes following the defection of some senior staff in 1877 to join P. Playfair at 
Shaw, Finlayson, taking all but one of their tea company agencies with them.
It is significant that tea interests were represented exclusively by the managing 
agencies, and not by the proprietor/planter companies themselves, who had not 
succeeded in uniting to take action in their common interest. Three years later 
the Indian Jute Manufacturers' Association followed suit, with the producing 
companies exclusively represented by the managing agencies. Although the
1881 as:
A.W, Wilson nominated by Messrs Jardine, Skinner & Company
J.H. Edwards 
R. Williamson 
D.F. Mackenzie 
R.B. Magor 
A. Simson 
D. Cruickshank 
Leslie Worke 
P. Playfair
Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Company 
Finlay, Muir & Company 
Macneill & Company 
Williamson, Magor & Company 
Schoene, Kilburn & Company 
Begg, Dunlop & Company 
Octavius Steel & Company 
Shaw, Finlayson & Company66
66 Griffiths, Indian Tea Industry, p. 525.
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managing agencies typically held shares in the companies they promoted and 
managed, they were very seldom majority holdings: but they exercised effective 
control partly through their formal authority as Company Secretaries and partly 
through informal influence. This could often be heavy-handed, as the Balmer 
Lawrie archive shows. In 1884 Alex Lawrie wrote to a proprietor:
Were it not that I understand Mr Lister is anxious on sentimental grounds to 
retain the services of Mr Werry I would recommend that a change be made at the 
end of this season in the local garden management -  Mr Werry may be the most 
industrious manager in Assam but the quality of his tea is so inferior and his 
capacity for making excuses is so rich that I (personally) have lost confidence in 
him -  the tea sent home last year realized the lowest average price of any crop 
consigned to us from Assam being only 9d.90 nett. The manager at first blamed 
the fact to Mr Lepp's instructions, then to the insufficiency of labour and on 
getting extra labour to the absence of machinery then to the agents for sacrificing 
the tea in the market and on getting the machinery he blamed the construction of 
the machine. The first invoice of the 1884 season has arrived and having been so 
badly manufactured has only realized the absurdly low price of 7d.88 for the 
nett.67
But this citation from the Williamson, Magor archive of a typically harsh letter 
from Richard Magor in London to R. B. Williamson (J.H. Williamson's son), in 
Calcutta in May 1908 upbraids him for going too far:
Your partners view with considerable misgiving and alarm the possible effect of 
the tone and matter of your correspondence with the various managers...I 
pointed out to you.. .that our position as agents did not warrant our adopting a 
superior tone in our correspondence with managers, and that it was extremely 
undesirable to show any want of courtesy to them.68
Nevertheless, in spite of the self-criticism, the firm was demonstrably successful. 
Pugh records that by 1895 the Calcutta and London partnerships were managing 
44 tea estates, with a total acreage under production of 35,000 acres, producing 
about 14 million lbs of tea.69
67 Uncatalogued papers held privately by Camellia pic.
68 Pugh, WUHamson Magor, p. 45.
69 Ibid., p. 42.
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Chapter 5
JAMES FINLAY & CO.
The impact on Indian commerce of a mature and well-funded Scottish 
business, which developed major interests in tea and jute, and suffered from 
the fatal decline of indigo.
Introduction
The early history of James Finlay & Co differed substantially from that of the 
Managing Agencies which were set up in the 1860s, even though it came to be 
similar in many respects to the developed businesses which flourished in North 
East India in the twentieth century. Finlays7 was the oldest-established of the 
firms, having its business roots in Scotland in the 1760s; and by the last decade of 
that century it was already relatively wealthy, with assets of £12,000 (£675,000 at 
today's values). By the 1870s, when the firm opened its Calcutta office and 
began the rapid expansion of its Indian interests, it was a mature business with 
assets of £1,500,000 (£6 million at today's values), making it far wealthier even 
than the well-established Mackinnon, Mackenzie firm, and allowing bolder 
acquisition and development policies than the less well-heeled agencies could 
afford. Only Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co had a comparably firm financial 
footing in the mid-nineteenth century, founded on the Gladstone family's 
successful West Indies trading in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.
Finlays' also resembled the Gladstone firms in the strong dynastic character of 
their partnerships. It was rare for other than family members to achieve 
positions of great seniority, and the Finlays' succession extended to three 
generations and three dynasties: the Finlays and their cousins the Buchanans;
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the Kays; and the Muirs. Like the Gladstones, the Finlay partners were well- 
trained and experienced in business management, often with a distinguished 
public career.
Unlike the Gladstones, however, the Finlay dynasties remained resolutely 
Scottish, and seemed to favour the employment of Scots well into the twentieth 
century. It is clear that the two firms did business with each other in the early 
days. Writing in 1837 to his son Alexander Struthers Finlay in Bombay, Kirkman 
Finlay said: "I sent you some extracts of letters I have had from Mr Gladstone, 
who I am sorry to say has left a great part of the Tea sent by Turner & Co for 
their account as inferior to Invoice/'1
Three months later Kirkman Finlay wrote again: "Mr Gladstone was with me 
lately, and I am sorry to hear from him so very poor an account of Sir John's 
affairs. He is selling off everything -  all his ships for what they will bring."2
The "advice and aid" of [Thomas] Steuart Gladstone (Sir John's nephew) was 
acknowledged in the recruitment of a new partner for Bombay, and it is 
interesting to see that Kirkman Finlay was a signatory to the Memorandum of 
Partnership -  "Kirkman Finlay agrees on behalf of Ritchie Steuart & Co"3 -  
although Brogan says that James Finlay & Co were no longer in that partnership 
after 1828.
When the "Kirkman Finlay" sailed for Canton in 1834 (after the EIC monopoly in 
China came to an end) a John Macadam Gladstone was supercargo, but he is not 
identified in the Gladstone family archive.
Viewed from the perspective of previous Finlay and Kay generations, John Muir 
seems a youthful heir, but in fact by the standards of Calcutta in the 1870s he was 
one of the older generation -  like the Gladstones, a mature manager of a mature 
business. Bom in 1828, he was forty-four when Finlays' Calcutta Branch was
1 Kirkman Finlay to Alexander Struthers Finlay, Glasgow, 26 May 1837, Glasgow 
University Archive, UGD91/1 /3 /3 /1 . The tea will, of course, have come from China.
2 Ibid., Glasgow, 30 August 1837. No such crisis seems to have been noted in Checkland, 
The Gladstones.
3 Ibid., Glasgow, 23 September 1837.
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founded in 1872, at a time when the tea industry was being re-constructed after 
the "tea mania" of the 1860s. He was fifteen years older than Alex Lawrie, of 
Balmer, Lawrie, and more than twenty five years older than Lawrie's partner 
James Nicholson Stuart, Henry Neville Gladstone of Gillanders, Arbuthnot and 
Ernest Cable of Bird & Company. He was only five years younger than the 
pioneering Sam Bird, and than William Mackinnon, the latter having effectively 
lost interest in India by 1870, in favour of his East African preoccupations.
Finlays' differed sharply from the other firms in that from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century and until the 1870s it was predominantly a cotton 
manufacturing business: its trading interests were principally concerned only 
with selling its own production and buying in its raw materials. It was this latter 
function which led it to develop a strong presence in Bombay, seeking new 
sources of raw  cotton to replace the supplies lost during the American Civil War. 
The cotton manufacturing business in Scotland survived into the mid-twentieth 
century, and was parallelled by cotton mills in Bombay, although their managing 
agency business, and particularly their extensive interests in tea and jute, 
accounted for the considerably larger proportion of their activities by the end of 
the nineteenth century.
To understand the firm's inherited values (and indeed the origin of its wealth) 
requires a preliminary study of its eighteenth century beginnings and the context 
in which they were made.
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The early history of the firm4
The eponymous James Finlay was bom  in 1727, the youngest of ten boys, in 
Killearn, some fifteen miles north-west of Glasgow. He went to Glasgow, set up 
in business as a cotton merchant, and by 1769 had been "admitted as a Burgess". 
The merchanting business will have been concerned with supplying raw cotton, 
buying in piece goods woven on domestic hand looms from home-spun yam  and 
selling on to local and probably foreign markets. Brogan speculates that, in the 
early days at least, James Finlay would have toured the district on horseback 
with pack animals. By the time he died in 1790 the firm had assets of nearly 
£12,000 (£675,000 at today's values).
His younger son Kirkman Finlay was bom  in 1772, and took over his father's 
firm at the age of eighteen. The firm bought the Ballindalloch Mill in 1793, the 
Catrine Mill in 1801 and the Deans ton Mill in 1806. They thus became major 
cotton manufacturers, at the heart of the Industrial Revolution -  Arkwright 
himself trained Archibald Buchanan, a Finlay cousin, and was entertained by 
James Finlay when he visited Glasgow in 1783; Robert Owen's humanitarian 
policies, pioneered at the New Lanark Mill, were evidently followed by Finlays. 
Their business now included exports to Continental Europe, and they actively 
"ran" the Napoleonic blockade after the Berlin and Milan decrees of 1806.
Kirkman Finlay was an energetic participant in public life -  he was elected the 
MP for the Glasgow district of the Burghs in 1812, a few days after his election as 
Lord Provost of the City; he was four times President of the Chamber of 
Commerce; and was Rector of Glasgow University. He was a champion of free 
trade, and lobbied hard and successfully against the East India Company's 
monopoly in 1813 and again in 1830. When he moved towards retirement he 
built himself a grand Strawberry Hill Gothic castle, Castle Toward, overlooking 
Rothesay Bay in Argyllshire . Five years after his death in 1842 a statue of him 
was erected in the Merchants' House, It was still to be seen in the vestibule in 
1950, presumably removed to the new 1874 building.
4 The principal source for this section is [James Finlay & Co.] (Colm Brogan), James 
Finlay & Company Limited: Manufacturers and East India Merchants 1750-1950, Glasgow,
144
After the curtailment of the EIC's monopoly Finlays7 sent the Duke of 
Buckinghamshire out to Bombay in 1816, the first ship to clear for India from the 
Clyde. On board were James Ritchie and Robert Steuart, who set up a firm there 
in partnership with James Finlay & Co and a Manchester firm. Finlays pulled out 
of the partnership in 1828, but continued to do business with the firm, where 
Kirkman7s fifth son Alexander Struthers Finlay was a partner. Press copies of 
Kirkman7 s letters to his son, written in 1835 and 1836, are in the Glasgow 
University archive.5
A new dynasty succeeded the Finlays -  the Kays. The Kay dynasty first appears 
in 1849, by which time Kirkman Finlay and three of his five sons -  James,
Thomas Kirkman and Robert -  had died. A fourth, Alexander Struthers Finlay, 
had retired. Only John Finlay was left, and Brogan finds nothing to say about 
him except that he died in 1873. James Buchanan, Archibald senior's nephew, 
and Archibald Buchanan junior were junior partners. On Kirkman Finlay's death 
the partnership was evidently looking for an exit from the business: they dosed 
their connection with the London partnership of Finlay, Hodgson, and put the 
three cotton mills up for sale. Only the spinning mill at Ballindalloch found a 
buyer.
Exceptionally, a non-family member, and an employee, James Clark, was brought 
into the Finlay partnership in 1849, and very shortly thereafter he negotiated an 
"assodation77 by entering in addition the partnership of Wilson, James & Kay, 
This firm had begun as cotton yam  and goods agents and had added the agency 
of Gladstone, Wyllie & Co. (who had been established in 1840) in Calcutta as well 
as a firm in Bombay. They took over Finlays' operations in Glasgow, induding 
sales. In 1858 the two firms amalgamated under Finlays' name, and Alexander 
Kay became a partner in the new firm, along with John Wilson. James Buchanan, 
Archibald Buchanan's nephew, had left the partnership in 1856, but Archibald 
junior stayed on, to retire to the country in 1883 with the proceeds of selling his
privately published, 1951.
Glasgow University Library, UGD91/1/3 /3 /1 .
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interest for £170,000. He died in 1890, the last of the Buchanans in the Finlay 
business.
Alexander Kay's son James6 started as an assistant in the Bombay branch before 
being transferred to Calcutta in 1870. In 1871 he contracted dysentery and had to 
return home. After a further short period of service in Bombay he was in charge 
of the piece goods department at Head Office, and became a director when the 
private company was set up in 1909. He died in 1911. His son James Reid Kay 
was buna sahib in Calcutta in the 1930s, was President of the Bengal Chamber 
and was knighted.
The Muir dynasty
Meanwhile a third dynasty had made its appearance with John Muir, who 
married Alexander Kay's eldest daughter in 1860, and was introduced into the 
partnership the following year, along with his brother Hugh Brown Muir. 
Brogan does not suggest any other connection, but he reports that John Wilson 
made a private arrangement to transfer his interest in the firm to the Muir 
brothers when he retired in 1862, and also agreed to lend them £30,000 -  a 
substantial amount. It seems likely, therefore, that it was the Wilson, James & 
Kay connection, possibly deriving from a family relationship with John Wilson, 
which first brought the Muirs into the business, and which encouraged John 
Muir's focus on business opportunities in India.7
6 James Kay was the author of the typescript history in UGD91/11/6/1.
7 It is also possible that there was a connection with John Muir's father, James, who was a 
partner in Webster, Steel & Co., which later developed interests in South America and 
South Africa. John Muir himself became a partner when his mother died in 1874 (his 
father having died in 1864) and the firm became closely associated with Finlays in South 
Africa. It was eventually acquired by Finlays in the twentieth century. See Brogan, James 
Finlay, pp. 77-79.
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Hugh Brown Muir subsequently opened an office for the firm in London in 1871. 
He retired in 1873, as did Alexander Kay: John Finlay, the last Finlay in the firm, 
died in the same year. Archibald Buchanan and John Muir were then left as the 
only proprietary partners of a firm with assets at 31 December 1874 of £1,500,000 
(over £6 million at today's values). John Muir had built up the larger amount of 
partnership capital, £173,434, and Archibald Buchanan had £123,889. In 1881 
Archibald Buchanan retired, and agreed that John Muir should continue the 
business rather than close it down, so that Muir became the sole proprietary 
partner.
John Muir was bom  in 1828 and educated at the Glasgow High School and the 
University of Glasgow. He followed the example of his predecessor Kirkman 
Finlay by pursuing an energetic public life, not least by himself becoming Lord 
Provost from 1890 to 1892, after being on the Town Council from 1886 to 1889.
He was Vice-President of the 1888 Glasgow Exhibition, being responsible for the 
India and Ceylon section, greeting Queen Victoria there, but unlike Kirkman 
Finlay he did not stand for Parliament. At the end of his term as Lord Provost 
John Muir was created a Baronet. He was, like William Mackirtnon, a "strong 
Free Churchman. He was a schoolboy at the time of the Disruption, and he grew 
into manhood with the growth of the new church. All his life he was a loyal 
supporter of the church and of the congregations of St George's, Glasgow, and of 
Kilmadock, Perthshire, in particular/'8 To an extent, however, this stem, non­
conformist profile is belied by the photograph in Brogan's History (facing p. 46), 
showing a bearded and floridly coiffed Muir in his Baronet's robe, displaying his 
ProvosFs chain of office.
He had four sons, each of whom came into the business. Alexander Kay Muir, 
the eldest, and James Finlay Muir were put in to manage the Calcutta Branch, as 
we shall see, and came to rim the whole business in Glasgow after Sir John Muir
8 Brogan, James Finlay, p. 53. Brogan seems to have derived his account of John Muir's 
life largely from the promotional pamphlet James Finlay & Company Limited (Formerly 
Finlay, Muir & Co.), Calcutta, 1922, Glasgow University Archive, UGD91 /1 /1 1 /6 /2 . The 
pamphlet adds that Muir was an Elder of the church, and Deputy Lieutenant of the 
counties of Ayr and Lanark and of the county of the City of Glasgow, as well as 
Honorary Colonel of the 4th Volunteer Battalion of the Cameronian Scottish Rifles, a J.P., 
and Chairman of the Clyde Navigation Trust.
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died in 1903. Alexander Kay Muir inherited his father's title and retired in 1926; 
his brother James Finlay Muir succeeded him as Chairman, retiring in 1936, John 
Buchanan Muir was a director and shareholder at the time of the public flotation 
in 1924, but the youngest, Matthew William Muir, was killed in an accident on 
the hunting field in 1922,9 having been buna sahib in Calcutta from 1909 to 191110.
A third Muir generation also went into the business, James Finlay Muir's son 
John Harling Muir was made a director of James Finlay & Co. in 194611, and 
inherited the baronetcy in 1951, on the death of his uncle Sir Alexander Kay 
Muir, whose own son John Buchanan Muir died earlier.12 A. M. McGrigor, who 
was Chairman of James Finlay at the time when Brogan's book was written in 
1950, and who had also been buna sahib in Calcutta, was another grandson: his 
mother, Margaret Muir, was the third of John Muir's six daughters, married to a 
Glasgow solicitor.13
Sir John Harling Muir became head of the company, and presided over Finlays' 
ultimate withdrawal from India in 1983, when they sold their remaining interest 
in Tata-Finlay, the rupee holding company formed in response to the punitive 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Acts of 1974-76, which restricted foreign 
shareholdings in tea companies to 74% - itself a concession which recognised 
tea's value in earning foreign exchange: other foreign-owned companies were 
subject to a lower limit. Stephanie Jones cites the narrative of these events by Sir 
Colin Campbell, then Calcutta chairman.14 Also cited is Monica Clough, whose 
husband became buna sahib of Finlays' in Calcutta, who wrote that: "There was a 
good relationship between Sir John Muir and J.R.D. Tata. It started as a personal 
friendship between these two magnates."15
9 Brogan, James Finlay p. vi.
10 Ibid., p. 96.
11 Ibid., p. ix.
12 Ibid., p. xix.
13 Ibid., p. 53.
14 Stephanie Jones, Merchants of the Raj, Basingstoke, 1992, pp. 327-8.
15 Ibid., p. 267. J.R.D. Tata, a Parsee from Gujarat, was head of a very big, largely family 
owned, conglomerate in Bombay. They owned Air India before it was nationalised.
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The Bombay firm
In 1862, prompted by the drying up of raw cotton supplies from America as a 
consequence of the Civil War, the first Finlay-owned firm outside Britain -  
Finlay, Clark & Co.16 -  was established in Bombay, then experiencing boom 
conditions as the price of cotton soared.
The mills at Catrine and Doune were entirely closed for lack of cotton, but the 
workers were not dismissed to look after themselves. Through all the period 
they were paid half wages, and the educational facilities were extended, so that 
youths formerly employed should have five hours teaching a day...the payment 
of wages cost.. .£13,000 a year.17
Sourcing raw cotton for the Scottish mills was a priority for the new firm, and 
one which could presumably not be left to the long-standing arm's length 
relationship with Ritchie, Steuart. Hugh Brown Muir evidently went to Bombay 
to oversee the firm's formation, and continued to take a dose interest in it 
thereafter.
The firm were not exclusively cotton buyers, although by 1868 they could claim 
to be the largest exporters of raw cotton to Europe.18 They were also importers of 
cotton piece-goods and yam  from Scotland, and had a small miscellaneous 
trading business. The ending of the American Civil War reduced the importance 
of Indian raw cotton exports, but imported cotton piece goods continued to 
flourish.
It was investment by Finlays Head Office in Glasgow "at the instance of John 
M uir"19 rather than any local initiative which generated the major extension of 
the business into shipping, with the appointment of the branch as agents for the 
"County" sailing ships and the Clan Line steamships. The survival of the sailing 
ships was only brief, but the connection with the Clan Line was still extant in 
1950. Brogan dates this to 1878, when the first sailing to India (by the "Clan 
Alpine") was on 26 October, but Marr's history (to which Brogan evidently had
16 The name was changed to Finlay, Muir & Co. in 1870, when the Calcutta office was 
opened under that name.
Brogan, James Finlay, p. 45.
18 Ibid., p. 86.
19 Ibid., p. 87.
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access) reports an agreement dated 1881 to handle sixteen Clan Line steamers20, 
and a memo to Finlay, Muir in Calcutta, dated 20 December 1883, listing twenty- 
five steamers. He details the ownership shares as one third James Finlay &Co., 
one third Finlay, Muir Bombay and one third Finlay Muir Calcutta,21 with Clan 
Line merely operators, which was not an abnormal situation in the shipping 
industry.22 In 1885 an agreement was made for "our Calcutta friends, as the 
largest shippers of tea" to buy 1000 chests of tea for shipping in each steamer, 
presumably as an exemplary contribution towards the economics of early 
voyages.
Clan Line was managed by Cayzer, Irvine & Co. in Glasgow, and the connection 
led in an unexpected direction when Sir Charles Cayzer visited Bombay in 1902 
and "agreed to acquire the Swan Mill"24, an evidently run down cotton spinning 
concern. Finlay, Muir, presumably as Managing Agents, modernised the plant 
and installed a weaving shed with six hundred looms, as well as a small dye 
shed, so that at last Finlays were cotton manufacturers in India. Swan Mill was 
floated as a public company in 1908.
Soon afterwards Finlays decided to build their own mill, with thirty thousand 
ring spindles and six hundred looms, which was also floated as a public 
company, and with their appointment as Managing Agents of Gold Mohur Mills 
in 1924 Finlays were significant players in the Indian cotton industry into the 
1950s.
20 W.H. Marr, unpublished draft typescript history of Finlay & Co. dated Calcutta, 1928, 
Glasgow University Archive, UGD91/11/6/1., T he Business during 1881-1885", p. 1. 
Marr became a director of James Finlay & Co., Ltd. in Glasgow in 1933 and Deputy 
Chairman in 1949, having been President of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce 
(Brogan, James Finlay, pp. ix-x.)
21 Shares in vessels were (and still are) more conventionally expressed as fractions of a 
total of 64 . Thus one third represents 21/64ths.
22 Brogan, James Finlay, pp. 2-3.
23 Ibid., p. 5.
24 Ibid., p. 88.
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The Calcutta firm
Gladstone, Wyllie had been Finlays7 correspondents in Calcutta since the 
amalgamation with Wilson, James & Kay. However, according to James Kay: "In 
1870 when the connection with Gladstone, Wyllie was severed by their deciding 
to open in Bombay.. .it was decided that a counter movement should be made in 
Calcutta and J. A. Anderson and James Kay were transferred there to open the 
firm of Finlay, Muir & Co in September 1870. "25
The firm seems to have got off to a slow start: its name appeared for the first time 
in the Bengal Directory in 1872, with only one listed agency -  for the Scottish 
Imperial Fire and Life Insurance Co., and their correspondents named as James 
Finlay & Co. in Glasgow and W. Strang, Steel & Co., Finlays7 associate in 
Rangoon.26
The first few years of the Calcutta branch were marked by stormy relationships 
with Glasgow. Marr cites a number of angry letters from Leslie Worke, who 
became bnrm sahib in 1875, complaining about the "objectionable" tone of letters 
from Glasgow. On 31 December 1875 he wrote "I now beg further to return for 
Mr. Muir's perusal [two letters].. .1 shall be glad to know whether Mr. Muir 
approves of them and whether, disapproving them, he cannot check them...no 
man of ability or independence would submit tamely to insults of this kind."27 
He left after a year to join Octavius Steel & Co., and was succeeded by Robert 
Ewing, but what Brogan discreetly refers to as "disagreements" arose with 
Glasgow, and he too left in 1879, to form his own firm. Eventually stable 
management came with the promotion of Robert Williamson to succeed Ewing. 
James Kay states that Williamson joined the Bombay office from Glasgow as an 
assistant in October 1870,28 one of the first assistants, but Marr adds that
he seems to have left the service early in March 1876, as when leaving for home 
he sold up. He came back in the autumn, however, as Glasgow wrote in August 
of that year that they had entered into a new agreement with him. He was on
25 Glasgow University Archive, UGD91/11/ 6/1, typescript dated Glasgow, 2 March 
1908.
26 Marr, typescript history, The Founding of the Business 1870-1875, p. 1.
27 Ibid., p. 15.
28 James Kay, typescript, 1908, n.p.
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leave in 1879, and became head of the [Calcutta] firm on his return when Mr. 
Robert Ewing left. He was burra sahib until 1890, when he left India and went to 
London. He was largely interested in the Chabwa Tea Co., and was a Director of 
the National Bank of India until about 1924. He died in 1926.29
He wrote detailed "handover" notes for his successor as head of the Calcutta 
firm, Allan Arthur, dated March 1890, and added in a letter dated 20 March 
189030 that when he got home he was going to stay with his brother George 
W illiam son in Scotland. It is tempting to speculate that this was one of the 
George Williamsons of Williamson, Magor, but there is absolutely no evidence 
for this. George Williamson Senior had started their London office in 1875, and 
according to Pugh "survived -  in retirement in Scotland -  until he died in 1903 at 
the age of 99."31
The first major undertaking through the Calcutta firm was to enter the jute 
industry. The decision to do so sprang from a Glasgow initiative, probably by 
John Muir, who was to become sole proprietary partner in 1873. Following their 
investigation of investment opportunities in Bengal a jute baling factory -  The 
East Bengal Company -  was floated in 1872 (it was later re-named the 
Goolabarry Jute Co.). The following year the Champdany Mill was floated, and 
Glasgow instructed Finlay, Muir to detail an assistant with Dundee experience to 
live on site and supervise the business. In 1881 Wellington Jute Mill was 
acquired by the Champdany company -  it had first been established in 1855, 
according to Wallace's table of jute mills and their capacities in 190932, which 
shows that Finlays' were only middle-sized operators in jute manufacture, with a 
total of 780 looms, as against the big players such as Thos. Duff, with over 3,700 
looms.
Indigo and jute matters dominated the proceedings of Finlay, Muir's Calcutta 
management meetings, but they touch on a wide variety of other commercial 
activities, covered by separate reports not in the archive. These included:
29 Marr, typescript, n.p.
30 Glasgow University Archive, UCD91/11/2/ 3/2.
31 Peter Pugh, Williamson Magor Stuck to Tea, Cambridge, 1991.
32 D. R. Wallace, The Romance of Jute: a Short History of the Calcutta Jute Mill Industry, 1855 
-1 9 0 9 , Calcutta, 1909, pp. 56-57. For a fuller account of the jute industry, see pp. 49-56 
of this thesis.
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piece goods
insurance
coal
shipping (the firm had the Clan Line agency) 
trade with South Africa (Webster Steel & Co.) 
hessian sales to Marshall Field in Chicago 
produce
"Produce" covered a long list of commodities:
cotton indigo shellac
hemp saltpetre india-rubber
jute castor oil ginger
silk hides tea
tobacco skins sugar
rapeseed bristles f T 5nee
linseed poppy seed
The peculiarity of these minutes is that they virtually ignore the firm's tea 
interests, presumably because they were dealt with quite separately. Finlays 
grew to be probably the largest tea company in the world before they sold out 
their Indian interests after Independence, but the archives -  and even the 
secondary sources -  provide frustratingly little detail of the way in which this 
massive business was built. The Glasgow University Archive contains the 
Reports and Accounts of 167 tea gardens34, and Brogan shows a table of acreages 
under tea in 1949 totalling 88,740 acres.35 These figures dwarf those of 
Williamson, Magor, otherwise the Managing Agency with the largest tea 
interests, who were managing 44 tea gardens in 1895, with a total acreage under 
tea of 35,000 acres.36
Finlays' started relatively late in tea, after John Muir had become sole proprietary 
partner -  doubtless not coincidentally. "The year 1874 seems to mark the 
commencement of the tea garden agency business, as there are ledger 
accounts.. .for Nonoi and Sootea tea gardens."37 Brogan states that more 
agencies came to the firm in 1877, and that by 1881 there were sixteen agencies on 
the books. Brogan attributes this expansion in part to Finlays' liberality with
33 Marr, typescript history, "The Business in 1876-1880", p. 14.
34 Glasgow University Archive, UGD91, Appendix III.
35 Brogan, History, p. 106.
36 Peter Pugh, Williamson Magor Stuck to Tea, Cambridge, p.45.
37 Marr, typescript history, "The Founding of the Business 1870-1975", p. 11.
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advances on hypothecation of crop sales, and suggests, perhaps wrongly, that as 
a result Finlays became principals rather than agents.38 However, the 
competitive exercise of financial muscle was undoubtedly a factor in their 
success. In 1883 it was causing pain at Balmer Lawrie:
James Nicholson Stuart in Calcutta wrote on 1 September 1883 to Alex Lawrie in 
London:
.. .Your remarks about not getting new agencies are noted, but scarcely apply, I 
think. Had we a lot of money we should have no difficulty in getting agencies 
for tea gardens but in the face of large advances made by Finlay Muir & Co it is 
impossible for us to compete.... We have not enough funds for outlay advances, 
much less for block debts. Take Lunaikhall, Rupui, Silloner Barree and 
Koleapani; there is a cash outlay of Rs 39,000/-. I daresay you might do like Begg 
Dunlop & Co and get open credits on London, but if tea got into low water 
where should we be?39
Muir seems to have relied on two outside experts for pushing the tea interests 
forward -  P. R. Buchanan and Thomas McMeekin. Brogan states unhelpfully 
that: "it is not known how P. R. Buchanan came to be associated with Sir John 
Muir, but he was of the utmost assistance to the latter in establishing James 
Finlay & Co, in some of the finest tea properties in Sylhet and South India.
About 1880 Finlay Muir & Co. became agents for the P.R. Buchanan group of tea 
estates."40 Presumably Brogan's enthusiasm for the family's history would have 
uncovered any connection with James Finlays' Buchanan cousins, so we can 
assume there was none.
Patrick Buchanan had been in tea since he was a young man, himself owned a 
number of tea estates, and his firm were Managing Agents for nineteen estates in 
1877, although Brogan states that in 1880 Finlay, Muir became agents for the 
Buchanan estates. There is no information on the nature of the relationship 
between the Finlay and Buchanan firms until 1894, when "James Finlay & Co. 
became partners in P. R. Buchanan & Co. .. .[following] financial assistance 
rendered by James Finlay in the grimly difficult years between 1890 and 1893" 41
38 "Hypothecation" was (and still is) a legal term for mortgage. It was not specific to the 
tea industry.
39 Camellia archive, uncatalogued.
40 Brogan, James Finlay, p. 104.
41 I b i d p. 82.
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In 1901 Patrick Buchanan returned to India as General Manager of the Finlay 
Group Tea estates in South India. Brogan identifies Buchanan's as an 
"Associated Firm".
Thomas McMeekin, a "practical agriculturalist" was introduced to Finlays by 
Buchanan, whom he had been advising. He had an interest in a number of tea 
estates, and in 1880, when he fell out with Octavius Steel, his Managing Agents, 
he took the business to Finlays', "apparently at the price of financial support".42 
He was employed by Finlay Muir as head of the newly-formed Tea Department 
(in which, according to Marr, he had an interest) until 1884, when he fell out with 
the South Sylhet Company (in which he also had an interest) over the extension 
of his private tea interests without their permission. His agreement was due to 
expire at the end of 1885, but "in a letter to Mr. Williamson dated 1 March 1885 
he confirms wires asking that the partnership should be dissolved, though the 
connection still lasted for some years."43 This connection was through his firm 
MacMeekin & Co., to which Muir provided additional finance so that Finlay,
Muir could continue to ship teas to London on McMeekin & Co/s account,
"while the firm provided expert assistance in tasting and valuing teas and in 
buying on the Calcutta market". Nevertheless, he removed the agencies for his 
tea estates from Finlay, Muir.44
John Muir himself was personally responsible for a bold development in Finlays' 
tea interests -  the purchase and development of plantation land in Travancore, 
South India. Griffiths writes that the original Concession from the Pooniate Raja 
was obtained in 1879 by John Daniel Munro, sometime Superintendent and 
Magistrate of the Cardomon Hills Division in Travancore. For 227 square miles 
in the Kanan Devan Hills he paid Rs.5,000 with a promise to pay an annual sum 
of Rs.3,000. The Raja's right to make the grant was disputed by the Travancore 
Government, but they were eventually forced to recognise its validity. Munro 
and others formed the North Travancore Land Planting & Agricultural Society, 
and planted coffee and cinchona, but the cinchona market collapsed, defeating
42 Brogan, James Finlay, p. 104, and Marr, typescript history, "The Business in 1876-1881", 
pp. 3-4.
Marr, Ibid., p. 8.
44 Brogan, James Finlay, pp. 104-105.
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some of the few resident European planters. In 1893 Muir toured the High Range 
with P. R. Buchanan and decided to buy out the concessionaires, using the North 
and South Sylhet companies as the vehicle. Subsequently many more 
individually owned properties were acquired.45
In 1926, when James Finlay Muir took over from Sir Alexander Kay Muir as 
Chairman of James Finlay & Co. Ltd., he spoke at the Annual General Meeting of 
his father's Travancore initiative, and of his own visit there in November 1894 
soon after its acquisition:
At the time the only means of access was a rough bridle path which, starting 
from the plains some fifty miles distant from the railway station, rose from an 
elevation of about 1,800 feet to 5,600 feet, where it entered the Concession, and 
the planted acreage consisted of some Cinchona and a little Coffee and Tea.46
He went on to describe the then current situation, with 19,000 acres under tea, 
and a primitive transportation system:
There are good roads connecting Munnar, the centre and Head Office, with the 
plains on the North and with the Ghauts [sic] on the East, but while the former is 
a useful outlet, the bulk of the Company's traffic is carried on an aerial ropeway 
which runs from Munnar to the last mentioned point, a distance of fifteen miles. 
There, at an elevation of 6,200 feet, connection is made with the plains by another 
ropeway, two-and-a-half miles long, and from thence to what will soon be a 
railway station, owing to an extension of the South Indian Railway, is only ten 
miles.47
Not long after the Travancore acquisition, Finlays reorganised the individual tea 
companies into four limited liability holding companies: Consolidated Tea & 
Lands Co., Ltd., which was floated in 1896 to take in the North and South Sylhet 
companies; in the same year the Amalgamated Tea Estates Co., Ltd. consolidated 
Finlay-managed holdings in Darjeeling, Assam, Sylhet and Ceylon; and in 1897 
the Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co., Ltd. was floated to take in the North 
Travancore interests. The fourth company was the Anglo-American Direct Tea
45 Sir Percival Griffiths, A  History of the Indian Tea Industry, London, 1967, p.158-9. 
Griffiths acknowledges Finlay sources for this information.
46 Cited in Brogan, James Finlay, p. viii.
47 Ibid. Writing in 1951, Brogan notes that "since 1926 transport arrangements in 
Travancore have changed considerably and the principal outlet is to the West to the Port 
of Cochin".
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Trading Co., Ltd., floated in 1898.48 The advantages of these moves lay in 
simplifying the financial and operating management of a large number of small 
concerns, a step which seems ordinary today but which was an innovation at the 
time. For the shareholders it also meant that the risks of variable economic 
performance were spread across a large number of gardens.
The Travancore (and indeed the Ceylon) concerns lie outside the scope of this 
thesis, but Muir's decision to invest in the development was a bold and 
pioneering venture, which did not have the benefit Finlays enjoyed in the north­
east of being able to follow the successful example of much earlier enterprises in 
tea. Its eventual importance to Finlays is illustrated by Brogan's figures for 1949, 
which show that Kanan Devan had 29,333 acres under tea, a third of Finlays' 
total for all of India.
Command management
Finlays' were identified, at least in the twentieth century, by the peculiar status of 
their local businesses. They were clearly no more than branches of the Home 
company in Glasgow, and even if there was a nominal board of local directors it 
was no secret that all important decisions were taken in Glasgow. Indeed, Brogan 
describes these major concerns as "branches" without qualification, even in 
chapter headings. Nearly all the other British Managing Agencies had relatively 
strong, and often dissident, local partnerships or, later, companies, even if 
eventually ultimate over-riding control could be (and very occasionally was) 
exercised from Home. Many of them started as autonomous Calcutta 
partnerships which subsequently formed a "correspondent" partnership in the 
UK -  typically in Liverpool or London. These Arms would refer to each other as 
"our friends", and it was not until Calcutta partners began to retire to the Home 
partnership that the balance of power shifted.
48 Brogan, James Finlay, pp. 105-106.
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At Finlays7 this authoritarian command from the centre certainly dates from John 
Muir's becoming sole proprietary partner in 1881 and may well have been in 
evidence earlier. Brogan writes: "It would seem that from January 1876 the 
practice of admitting partners to the (Bombay) branch ceased, and the seniors 
who signed the firm were granted commission on results."49 Nevertheless the 
Calcutta "branch" seems, initially at least, to have been operating as a normal 
independent partnership when Robert Ewing was appointed partner in charge in 
the same year.50
The way in which control came to be exercised is vividly illustrated in the 
minutes of weekly meetings of managers in Calcutta initiated and chaired by 
John Muir when he descended on the office in the Spring of 1895, evidently on a 
punitive mission,51 He was now 67 years old and had been sole proprietary 
partner for some fourteen years, already Sir John, sometime Lord Provost of 
Glasgow, and a powerful and apparently cantankerous and opinionated old 
man. The minutes are expressed in unusually direct terms, and may well have 
been dictated by Muir himself, in order to ensure that his views (and commands) 
were accurately recorded.
At the first meeting on 21 February 1895 he reported that James Finlay & Co. (i.e. 
Glasgow) "were grieved and vexed with the careless and unsatisfactory 
management of this business during the last three years of the extremely heavy 
losses resulting therefrom which he estimated would more than sweep away the 
entire profits of 1894." He also censured the managers for arranging for the firm 
to pay the income tax on their own and their assistants' salaries, without 
informing Glasgow.
The following week Muir took the Senior Partner (Allan Arthur) to task for 
accepting the Presidency of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, while 
acknowledging that he had give his "very reluctant" consent, and that Arthur
49 Brogan, James Finlay, p. 87.
50 Ibid., p. 91.
51 Glasgow University Archive, UGD91 /1 1 /2 /1 /1 .
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had undertaken to resign if the demands were too onerous. He then turned to 
the "terrible blunder" made in connection with foreign exchange: the Calcutta 
firm had failed to make adequate provision for forward rupee/sterling exchange 
requirements. The previous "Senior", William Walker, who had handed over to 
Allan Arthur in 1893, had thought that approximately Rs. 70,000 was not covered 
for exchange when he left, but the actual figure had turned out to be six or seven 
lakhs, almost ten times as much. He went on to complain about the 
unsatisfactory working of the Champdanay and Wellington jute mills, "which 
had caused great dissatisfaction among the shareholders".
Rubbing salt into the wounds, he compared the Calcutta management 
unfavourably with Strang, Steel in Rangoon, with their "close personal attention 
and searching supervision of every detail". When the Seniors were home in 
London they received a weekly diary from each management assistant. "It was 
this close attention to detail and thoroughness in every respect coupled with 
perseverance and self-denial that had made Mr. Steel such a successful 
businessman."
At the meeting on 5 March Muir stated that when on 3 March 1894 he had 
requested Calcutta to set up a weekly exchange committee, Arthur had said it 
was not really necessary, but
this was no reason for not carrying out the instructions... Every one in the 
Calcutta office must recognise that he was the Senior Managing Partner of Finlay, 
Muir & Co., and this was the reason for having his name inserted in the Calcutta 
Directory as the Senior Partner...He then requested Mr Scott [the Secretary! to 
insert his name first on the board which hangs at the entrance of the office to 
show whether the different managers and assistants are in or out, to insert Mr. 
William Brown's name also...
Muir followed this putting down of Allan Arthur by stating
that his two sons Mr. A. K. Muir and Mr. J. F. Muir [were paid £200 p.a. by 
Glasgow in addition to their Calcutta salaries] on the understanding that they 
would specially watch over and protect the business by every means in their 
power...[and] make certain that everything was conducted in the manner they 
believe he would wish if personally present, and that everything of importance, 
whether good or bad, requiring prompt attention should be instantly telegraphed 
to the Glasgow firm.
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At this time A. K. Muir was only twenty-seven years old, and J. F. Muir twenty- 
five, which must have sharpened the implied insult to Allan Arthur and his 
colleagues in installing dynastic representatives over his head. He had been 
transferred to Calcutta from the Bombay office to succeed William Walker in 
1893 as head of the firm, and was by now a well-known and respected senior 
figure in the Calcutta business community, as witnessed by his new Chamber 
position, which earned him a knighthood. It is not surprising that he resigned 
from Finlays', to join "Ewing & Co. in Calcutta for many years."52 Robert Ewing 
was Robert Williamson's predecessor in Calcutta, having been transferred from 
Bombay in 1876, but "disagreements arose between Robert Ewing and Head 
Office ending in his retirement at the end of 1879."53
Meanwhile Muir continued his onslaught on the Calcutta management: on 19 
March he complained that the books were unsatisfactory and should quickly be 
brought up to date to 31 December 1893 and 1894, and that thereafter six month 
balances should be struck, and the cash management should be reformed; on 15 
April he criticised business practice at the Champdany jute mill -  "far too much 
trust was reposed in natives of a worthless sort" resulting in poor quality raw 
jute purchases.
The bulk of the supplies came from the natives, Bazaar dealers and churkli-wallahs 
[from the sandbanks] of the lowest class -  who swarmed into the office 
daily.. .The Chairman then referred to the specially bad results of the 
Champdany and Wellington Mills during the past two years, and said that in Mr. 
Williamson's time these mills, though they never made such good profits as the 
best of the Calcutta mills, were always a little better than average, but that now 
they were about the worst of all...the shareholders had complained very strongly 
of the absence of dividends.
He underlined the importance of the jute business (and by implication his lack of 
faith in the incumbent management) by continuing: "This was the department of 
the business which beyond all others required the immediate and best attention 
of the managers. He requested his sons Mr. A. K. Muir and Mr. J. F. Muir to 
devote their special attention to the Champdany and Wellington Mills and to the 
Twist Mill." Accommodation at the mills would be arranged, so that they could
52 Marr, typescript history, "The Business in 1876-1881", pp. 3-4.
53 Brogan, James Finlay, p. 92.
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go there "from Friday till Monday or Saturday till Tuesday" at one or the other. 
He would himself do the same on his return to Calcutta at the end of the year.
On 20 April, before leaving Calcutta to return to Glasgow, he delivered some 
final homilies:
The Chairman repeated what he had already frequently stated to the managers 
individually and collectively that whether he was in India or elsewhere, he was 
always to be regarded as the Senior managing partner of James Finlay & Co. and 
of Finlay, Muir & Co., and that everything in connection with the business of the 
Calcutta and Colombo firms was to be conducted exactly as the managers believe 
he would wish to have it done, if personally present with all the facts clearly 
before him. He reminded the managers that they were Trustees for James Finlay 
& Co, and must be careful that the funds entrusted to them were only applied to 
such purposes as their Principals would approve of — in no case must these funds 
in future be used for any such purpose as to pay the Income Tax of the 
Managers.. .or the dentists bills of anyone.. .whenever funds are wanted for any 
new or special object not in the ordinary regular course of business, the approval 
of James Finlay & Co. must first be obtained either by letter or telegram...
Muir also stated that if he died or was incapacitated, A. M. Brown, a non­
proprietary partner in Glasgow would take over, or failing him Robert 
Williamson, now head of the London firm. And as a parting shot:
The Chairman requested that each manager should be as careful in regard to 
spending the funds of James Finlay & Co. as if each rupee came out of his own 
pocket, and even more careful, because he was intromitting with the funds of 
absent principals for whom he was acting as trustee.
It seems that his words were heeded, for the firm's legendary reputation for 
Scottish tight-fistedness survived into the 1960s, as well as the subaltern status of 
its local management.
Subsequent meetings were chaired by A. K. Muir, even during his father's return 
visit to Calcutta in December/January 1896, They were much less frequent, and 
dealt largely with routine matters. Details are scanty, since the separate reports 
from the main business fields considered at the meetings are not in the archive. 
Problems in the indigo business are, however, dealt with more fully.
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The indigo disaster
John Muir's enthusiasm for investment in indigo concerns in 1892 and 1893 
ignored the industry's history of turbulence stretching back for more than a 
century. There is no archival record of any case he may have made for his policy, 
but he may well have been influenced by the example of Gillanders, Arbuthnot, 
who had been financing indigo concerns since 1844 and some 43 indigo factories 
had been in their agency at some point. Nevertheless, by 1892 they were 
expressing very negative views about the business.54
Indigo had been, and still was, a very attractive commercial opportunity. 
Although the market price might fluctuate, it had very high value, the processed 
product was compact, durable and easily shipped, and the international demand 
for it was reliable if not wholly elastic. In the peak year of 1842 indigo accounted 
for 46 per cent of the value of goods exported from Calcutta.55 It was, in spite of 
some disastrous years, on average extremely profitable. Pouchepadass cites 
indicative average profit levels in the decade to 1871 ranging from 20% to 35%, 
and an extraordinary 120% in die 1890s regularly achieved by the "immense 
Gondwara plantation.. .when it was in the hands of the Calcutta firm Thomas & 
Co." 56 He goes on to state that: "At the close of the century, when synthetic 
indigo was first commercialised, net profits of 25% to 50% were still common on 
the plantations of North Bihar/'57
But indigo had twice brought down the Calcutta agency houses, in 1834 and 
1847, and in 1859 had shaken the political stability of Bengal Province with the 
"blue mutiny" of ryots against the forced contract cultivation of the crop -  
disturbances and protests which continued sporadically into the twentieth 
century. Sukla records
the assemblage of 20,000 ryots in Motihari to register their grievances before the 
Commissioner of Patna in 1868, the angry protest march of 6,000 ryots (in some
54 see p. 42 of this diesis.
55 Blair B. Kling, The Blue M utiny: The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal, 1859-1862, 
Philadelphia, 1966, p. 21.
56 Jacques Pouchepadass, tr. James Walker, Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and 
Gandhian Politics. New Delhi, 1999, p 102.
57 Ibid.
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records it is 4,000) as a consequence of Sital Rai's arrest in 1908 and a virtual 
demonstration of the ryots before King George V at Narkatiaganj railway station 
in 1911.,.58
There was also trouble in Pubna in East Bengal in 1873. Chaudhary writes that 
following a favourable court judgement in the Yusufshahi Pargannah (against 
Bengali successors to the Raja of Nessore, not European zamindars), the ryots in 
Pubna combined to refuse to execute contracts, to pay enhanced rents and illegal 
cesses or to accept a new and disadvantageous unit of area measurement.59 
Chaudhary refers to this as "the Pubna rising" but makes it clear that cases of 
actual violence were rare, in spite of exaggerated and alarmist reports in Calcutta 
newspapers sympathetic to the zamindars, which he cites. He also cites George 
Campbell, the Lieutenant Governor, who wrote to the Viceroy that considerable 
riots and violence were very few.
Chaudhary does not state that these protests and disturbances were directly 
related to the cultivation of indigo, and indeed by that time, following the events 
in the early 1860s, indigo production had been abandoned by Europeans in 
Bengal. Kling refers categorically to the "final destruction" of the indigo industry 
in Lower Bengal in 186260 but also suggests that even without the disturbances 
and their after-effects, the industry there might in any case have died out because 
of the topographical changes caused by slow shifts in the courses of Delta 
waterways which were already restricting cultivation.61 Pouchepadass merely 
refers to "the collapse of European production [in deltaic Bengal] after the 
disturbances of I860."62
The first major disturbances, in Lower Bengal, began in 1859 and went on until 
1862. They were a considerable anxiety for the Government and the European 
community, coming so shortly after the Indian Mutiny. Many of the indigo 
concerns were located within reach of Calcutta, and the issues tended to polarise 
political opinion there, with the embattled planters facing the hostility of
58 Prabhat Kumar Sukla, Indigo and the Raj: Peasant Protests in Bihar 1780-1917, Delhi,
1993, p. 152.
59 R. B. Chaudhary, The British Agranan Policy in Eastern India: Bengal and Bihar (1859-80), 
Patna, 1980, pp. 144-46.
60 Kling, Blue Mutiny, p. 219.
61 Ibid., p. 30.
62 Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi, p. 70.
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European missionaries (including Alexander Duff, William Mackinnon's friend) 
as well as the nascent Bengali political class, who were forming the beginnings of 
Indian nationalism. The planters also had few friends in official circles, although 
from the beginning of the century the value of indigo to the EICs fiscal strength 
(exceeded only by opium) had guaranteed a policy of laissez faire, and the mid- 
century rise of the evangelical school, combined with the trauma of the Mutiny, 
favoured European settlement, with the indigo planters identified as the 
vanguard.
The Government was prompted to set up a Commission of Enquiry in 1860. Its 
report was balanced and extremely thorough (764 pages) and reflected the 
prevailing liberal tendencies in official (as opposed to unofficial) circles. The 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, John Peter Grant, wrote in his Minute 
commenting on the report that the root of the problem was "the struggle to make 
raiyats grow indigo plant, without paying them the price for it.. .These raiyats are 
not Carolina slaves but the free yeomanry of the country and the virtual owners 
of the greater part of the land".63 He was warmly supported by Sir Charles 
Wood, the Secretary of State (previously President of the EIC Board of Control): 
"It is a most able document, and completely establishes the case as between 
Planter and Ryot. I am very sorry for the individual planters who will suffer by 
the change of system; but that such a system should go on is quite impossible."64 
Lord Canning, who had been Governor-General in 1856 before becoming 
Viceroy, was more sympathetic to the vilified planters, as was Bartle Frere, a 
member of the Legislative Council, who, as we have seen, tended to lean towards 
support for British commercial interests.
The Pubna disturbances show that the problems for indigo were part of a wider 
rural disaffection, rooted in the uncertainties and injustices surrounding land 
ownership and tenancy rights, particularly in Bengal Province (including Bihar), 
which the eighteenth century Permanent Settlement had to some extent created. 
Subsequent amending legislation had failed to resolve the problems entirely, 
although the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 gave ryots occupancy rights at
63 cited in Kling, Blue M utiny, p. 145.
64 Ibid.
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controlled rents after twelve years7 tenancy, as well as the right to sub-let. Robb 
provides a useful overview:
In north-eastern India.. .there was little competition in rents, but also, until the 
early twentieth century or later, little certainty about them either. The assessed 
area was usually uncertain too, for want of measurement. Such conditions 
provided opportunities for oppression and privilege (as well as for peasant 
resistance)...Rent, records, measurement, courts, markets and loans were all used 
as methods of control and to extract produce. The landlords also had frequent 
recourse to direct force -  many of them employed bodies of armed retainers, 
more numerous than their rent-collectors and record-keepers, and so extracted 
rent by violence or intimidation.65
Although European indigo concerns died away in Lower Bengal, they, and with 
them unhappy relationships between planters and ryots, continued in Bihar, and 
Sukla cites a report in the Hindi Bangavasi of 13 April 1876 reporting that the ryots 
of Ramnagar had been "driven by the high-handedness of the planters" to 
migrate to Nepal.66 Sukla also reproduces a table showing that in 1868 54.48% of 
the ryots in 18 villages in Motihari had "fled" to Nepal, but he does not give a 
reference for its source.67
Some forty years later indigo planters seemed still to be a target for vilification. 
Robert Williamson, now Finlays7 burra sahib in London, wrote: "You will 
recognise that we are not able to press upon such a shifty vacillating brigade as is 
the whole body of indigo planters the views which no doubt in other 
circumstances you would be able to enforce."68
The indigo planters have found few independent apologists, although the report 
of the 1860 Commission fell well short of wholesale condemnation and was 
careful to investigate and dismiss some of the wilder accusations of 
maltreatment. The report even noted with approval instances of enlightened and 
humanitarian management, but the legacy of hostile press stories, seized on for 
political advantage, combined with the obvious antipathy of officials, has left an 
overwhelmingly blackened historical record. Most published historical studies 
are centred on ryot resistance to their landlords, and even Kling7 s admirably
65 Peter Robb, A  Histoiy of India, Basingstoke, 2002, p. 269.
66 Sukla, Indigo and the Raj, p. 118., cited from (weekly) Report on the Native Newspapers of 
Bengal, Government of India, para. 52.
67 Ibid., p. 98.
68 Marr, draft history, "The business during 1891-1895", p. 5.
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balanced work emphasises undeniable brutal malpractice with little examination 
of any alternative mitigating view. Pouchepadass, however, has examined in 
greater detail the economic and social structure of indigo cultivation in Bihar, 
and has been less ready to condemn.
The Europeans operated, albeit willingly, within a long-established, semi-feudal 
system not of their own instigating. While this offered much opportunity for 
abuse, it could equally provide support and protection to the ryot. Pouchepadass 
suggests that: " the ryot... could not even imagine that it would be possible to 
resist the will of the planter who had become his landlord.69 Nevertheless, the 
history of continuing revolt disproves this claim: led on, no doubt, by the village 
oligarchy, who were disaffected for additional reasons, the ryots repeatedly 
resisted the planters.
The principal cause for dispute was the price for indigo paid to the cultivators -  a 
contract price based on cultivated area rather than crop quantity. Foodgrain 
crops were more remunerative, as well as being less labour-intensive, and in the 
second half of the nineteenth century steeply rising foodgrain prices (90 per cent 
between 1870 and 1910) exacerbated resentment against being required to 
cultivate indigo instead, often on the most productive portions of land. Although 
Government publicly supported the argument that ryots were underpaid, liberal 
principles made direct intervention anathema, and the planters went to 
considerable lengths over several decades to argue that the ancillary benefits of 
financial and social support which they provided to their tenants, and the soil 
improvement made by indigo's deep roots, made up for a low price level and 
made indigo a profitable crop. In 1877 the Bihar Planters' Association was 
formed, acknowledging continued pressure (stopping well short of direction) 
from Government, and it published periodically a recommended minimum rate 
for indigo cultivation, but this was inevitably treated as a maximum.
With the benefit of hindsight it is surprising that the planters, or more 
particularly their proprietors, given the exceptionally high profit levels which 
they often enjoyed, did not accept a marginal reduction in gross return rather
69 Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi, p. 74.
166
than suffer the high economic and political cost of disruption (as indeed the 
Government pointed out to them at the time).
The discontent of the ryots was heightened by the often despotic and corrupt 
behaviour of the Indian agents (amlas) whom the planters employed to 
administer and coerce their sub-tenants. Pouchepadass states that "it was about 
this supervision that they continually complained, rather than about the loss of 
income imposed by cultivating indigo."70
The grievances of the smallholding ryots were shared by the maliks, the wealthier 
and more influential villagers with larger holdings, the volume of whose 
perceived losses in cultivating indigo was correspondingly greater. Resentment 
of the amlas was often strengthened by caste differences, particularly where the 
tenants were brahmins (whose caste forbade manual labour). The local bania were 
an equally powerful group, even if lower in the caste hierarchy. Moneylenders 
by trade, they were particularly aggrieved by the damage done to their credit 
business by the European planters and the cash advances they made to 
cultivators.
Pouchepadass accepts the conventional picture of a long Indian tradition of 
oppressive lending practice, culminating in effective debt bondage and 
expropriation. However, B. R. Tomlinson casts doubt on this discourse:
.. .the direct influence of mahajans and other urban capitalists on agriculture was 
easy to exaggerate...The picture of a commercially innocent, self-sufficient 
peasantry falling victim to the capitalist wiles of usurious moneylenders and 
urban bankers, painted by the colonial government and its nationalist critics alike 
at the end of the nineteenth century, is a largely inaccurate description of the 
political economy of exchange and production in Indian agriculture in the last 
century of British ru le .71
Nevertheless, "the advances received from the planters not infrequently allowed 
the peasant to meet the instalments of his debts to the moneylender.. .[and] many 
a debtor could even pay off the entire debt."72 It was not only bania who lent 
money to the smallholders: the maliks also used any cash surplus to make high-
70 Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi, p. 74.
71 B.R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 64-66.
72 Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi, p.120.
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interest loans to smallholders. The European thikedar thus exerted a double 
economic penalty on the village oligarchy, which fuelled resentment and, 
eventually, revolt.
Although the ryot received the advances from planters with avid enthusiasm, 
since they released him from the grasp of the moneylenders, they carried with 
them the still onerous contractual obligation to set aside for indigo three- 
twentieths of his land, to be chosen by the planters or their amlas, and to be 
rotated at three-year intervals with alternative land. This obligation did not 
threaten a lifelong debt servitude, but it was rigorously, occasionally violently, 
enforced, and the balance of benefit became less obvious as the price gap 
between what the planters paid for indigo and the market price for foodgrains 
widened. Since the ryots were inescapably reliant on the advances for financial 
survival they found themselves in what seemed to be another trap.
As a concomitant of their authoritarian power, planters frequently accepted and 
exercised social responsibilities for the well-being of their tenants:
.. .there is no dearth of evidence concerning the paternal relations existing 
between the planters and his ryots, and the humanitarian assistance which he 
dispensed to them in times of trial. The planters maintained dispensaries, or 
even attended personally on their tenants and coolies, cleansed and disinfected 
the wells in their villages, built schools on their estates.73
This paternalistic support also embraced acting as arbiter and judge in disputes, 
providing additional famine and drought relief when village support was 
inadequate, and, notably, sympathetic treatment of tenants who were behind 
with their rent, and making loans to them for humanitarian purposes at little or 
no interest.
Pouchepadass points out, however, that there were substantial advantages to the 
planter in thus assuming the role of traditional lord of the manor, since it 
conferred the authority to coerce the ryot to plant indigo. But Pouchepadass also 
points out that "there were genuinely benevolent planters, whom their tenants 
begged not to leave when their thikadri leases expired."74
73 Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi, p. 16.
74Ibid., p. 18.
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Paternalism is deplored by twenty-first century political opinion, but it was not 
imposed on the ryot. It was an intrinsic cultural element of Indian village society, 
where the explicit parental status of superiors was eagerly sought, whether 
landowners, commercial managers or District Officers. Very similar paternalistic 
relationships characterised tea garden management, although there the 
requirement was more simply a matter of efficient labour deployment, and to a 
considerable extent the Europeans shared the physical hardships and health risks 
of wild and unfamiliar country with their immigrant labour force, living, until 
relatively recently, in primitive accommodation: their indigo counterparts, 
meanwhile, lived the life of country gentlemen, including hunting game, in 
palatial houses. Jute managers also lived well, but had no direct involvement 
with agricultural ryots, only with an industrialised factory workforce.
But like tea planters, indigo planters were physically and socially isolated, 
particularly those who managed so-called "out-factories". The freshly harvested 
crop was perishable and could not survive a long journey to a central processing 
factory: smaller processing units were therefore located out in the more distant 
cultivating areas. Young Europeans set down alone in an unfamiliar and hostile 
physical environment, surrounded by overwhelming numbers of "natives" 
whom he had to attempt to control, might well react aggressively to any 
perceived threat, particularly if encouraged by his senior Indian staff.
It is possible to speculate that a conventional Managing Agency structure, as 
operated in the tea and jute industries, might have served to create and maintain 
a healthy and positive link with the outside world, as represented by Calcutta 
management. Relations between Calcutta and the tea garden managers were 
frequently abrasive, but curbed (or at least discouraged) the development of 
paranoid reactions. Records of the exchanges between tea garden managers and 
Calcutta provide historians with useful insights: but the demonised indigo 
managers have no surviving voice, having usually been no more than the 
employees of a variety of distant British proprietors, and the recipients of credit 
and sales services but no management input from the few agency houses which 
were involved with indigo.
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The intervention by Government in 1860 between European private enterprise 
and underprivileged Indians was not an isolated initiative: labour conditions in 
the tea industry came under equally rigorous and more frequent Government 
scrutiny, with a Committee of Enquiry in 1861, a Commission of Enquiry in 1868, 
and another in 1881. There were seven pieces of legislation regulating labour 
practices in tea between 1861 and 1901.
Indigenous participation in indigo manufacture
The departure of European enterprise from Bengal encouraged the development 
there of indigenously-owned plantations. In Bihar, where indigo had been 
cultivated before the arrival of the British, Indian planters were also in evidence, 
if now in comparatively modest numbers: "In 1873, of the 89 plantations in the 
Tirhut region, 22 (25 per cent) were owned indigenously. In 1880, the number 
had fallen to 15 out of 78 (19 per cent), and in 1911, to 14 out of 119 (12 per cent) 
for Bihar as a whole,"75 Pouchepadass goes on to state that in 1877, two-thirds of 
the capital invested in indigo in the Patna division was European, and the 
remaining third indigenous. Interestingly, he also states that:
almost all the zamindars and bankers who invested therein employed European 
managers. Those that did not produced indigo on a very small scale.. .The 
indigenous indigo factories directed by indigenous managers subsisted, as a rule, 
no more than a few seasons, because the management was not adequately 
efficient, and the cultivators were treated in an overly oppressive manner.76
Although this might be taken as a compliment to the Protestant work ethic, it is 
more likely that these Europeans were experienced plantation managers who 
had been trained in European-owned plantations and may have been displaced 
on the termination of the head lease or of their own contract of employment.
75 Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi p.69.
76 Ibid.
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The extent of indigenous enterprise was partially restricted by the effective 
monopoly of leased dihats which the Europeans had established by informal 
understandings between them. But Pouchepadass points out that "Indian 
undertakings were often flimsy. In Bengal and Bihar, the flourishing of . 
indigenous enterprise in periods of booms gave way to chains of failures in 
critical phases."77 They were, in comparison to the European-owned 
undertakings, unfavourably placed when adverse market fluctuations called for 
financial support, since their only recourse was to borrow from Indian 
moneylenders at the prevailing interest rate of 24%, which would cripple the 
business.
It is understandable that the majority of zamindars preferred, given the 
unsteadiness of the profitability of indigo, and being aware of all the risks 
involved for all 'interloping' entrepreneurs who infringed on the de facto 
monopoly established by the Europeans, to refrain from engaging in indigo and 
content themselves with the less spectacular, if steady and assured, revenues 
from rent.78
It is clear that British investment in indigo production by no means displaced 
indigenous enterprise, but rather offered mutual benefits, at least to the
zamindars.
Financing indigo
Indigo planters, in common with other agricultural and horticultural concerns, 
needed significant working capital to finance seed, cultivation and processing 
before annual crop sales generated cash, as they had done for more than a 
century. Determined to re-develop the Indian indigo trade, the East India 
Company had themselves, in 1788, staked "eight or ten pioneer European 
planters in Bengal who were attempting to manufacture indigo by West Indian 
m ethods.. .In 1795, because of its need for remittances, the Company quintupled
77Pouchepadass, Champaranand Gandhi, p.70.
78 Ibid., p.71.
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its advances to the indigo industry"79. In 1802, after a price collapse in the British 
market caused by massive over-supply, the Company stopped making advances, 
but by that time, according to Kling, "the private export of indigo, capitalised by 
the agency houses, was already more than three times as great as that financed 
by Company advances"80.
Following another collapse of the British market in 1834, which brought down 
nearly all the agency houses in Calcutta, a new generation of mercantile agencies, 
backed by British capital, took up the capital financing of the indigo industry, 
and during the following years of prosperity allowed themselves to become 
dangerously over-exposed to the associated risks. Retribution came in 1847, with 
the collapse of the Union Bank, brought down by prodigal advances to indigo 
concerns, and with the bankruptcy of nearly all the agency houses.81
The effect of this catastrophe on the indigo industry was to initiate a fundamental 
restructuring of its capital base and of its operational management.
Before 1847 almost every factory had been purchased with borrowed capital; 
after 1847 a large number of the concerns that failed, especially in Nadia and 
Jessore, were bought cheaply and paid off rapidly, leaving the planters relatively 
independent. The number of European planters managing small marginal 
concerns decreased, while the remaining concerns established 'local indigo 
seignories' and expanded their operations.82
Thus indigo concerns, although largely tenants, were to all intents and purposes 
landowners, with direct control over cultivation of their demesne land by hired 
labour (nijabad), but to a much larger extent they contracted for indigo cultivation 
(raiyati) w ith ryots who had tenancy rights on the leased land. It was this raiyati 
land which was the principal arena for disputes.
Nevertheless, although capital borrowing for land purchase and development 
declined steeply, the need for working capital in the form of "hypothecation"
79 Kling, Blue Mutiny, pp. 18-19.
80 Ibid., p. 20.
81 For a fuller account of this crisis see Chapter 1 of this thesis.
82 Kling, Blue Mutiny, p.23. 'Local indigo seignories' is cited from J. P. Grant's "Minute 
by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal on the report of the Indigo Commission" 
reproduced in full in C. E. Buckland, Bengal Under the Lieutenant Governors (2 vols., 2nd. 
ed., Calcutta, 1901), 1,238 ff.
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advances on the crop did not diminish, in particular to finance advances in turn 
to ryot sub-tenants.
This requirement was the basis for Finlays7 operations in indigo. According to 
Brogan83, Muir used the strategy he had already used to win agency 
appointments for tea gardens in Sylhet and Assam: deploying the depth of the 
firm's financial resources to make generous advances to planters, as Gillanders, 
Arbuthnot had been doing. This financing was not part of a conventional 
Managing Agency relationship, since there was no evident participation in 
management (by Finlays or Gillanders) until Finlays appointed Collingridge as 
Visiting Agent in 1899. The agencies will presumably have handled sales at 
Calcutta auctions, as well as shipping and forwarding, but indigo was a mature 
agricultural development demanding little technical or material support, and 
doubtless was not seen as requiring a full Managing Agency structure.
The death of indigo
Muir's aggressive investment strategy was successful -  Brogan states that by 
1896 there were 69 indigo accounts in the firm's books. However, the decision to 
invest in indigo turned out to be unfortunately timed, since in 1897 the German 
invention of a synthetic blue aniline dyestuff was launched commercially. The 
production cost of the new dyestuff was much lower than natural indigo could 
ever hope to match, and, if its colouring strength was somewhat inferior, its 
quality was reliable and constant, and its availability in paste form was more 
convenient for the textile producer than dried cakes. It was, of course, easily 
possible for the manufacturers to vary production volume with demand to 
ensure a steady price.
83 Brogan, James Finlay, p. 95.
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Although production of the synthetic dye took some years to build up, its initial 
introduction in limited quantities triggered the decline and virtual extinction of 
international demand for the natural product, leaving Finlays' with large 
outstanding advances which were likely to be irrecoverable, so that, like 
Gillanders, Arbuthnot, they were forced to foreclose on property mortgages and 
become reluctant agricultural landowners and tenants.
Although the death throes of the indigo business were protracted (the last 
European plantations eked out their survival until the 1930s), serious damage 
began quite quickly:
The average price of the maund in the Patna division was Rs. 235 in 1895-96; it 
fell to Rs. 166 in 1899-1900. The average price in Calcutta followed...the same 
course. Cultivated area and production rapidly diminished. There were in Bihar 
in 1896 some 112 plantations which produced an average of 70,000 maunds of 
indigo on approximately 400,000 acres during the decade preceding the 
appearance of the synthetic commodity. There were in 1914 no more than 59 
plantations which produced below 8,000 maunds on less than 40,000 acres.84
Pouchepadass states that the average auction price per maund in Calcutta in the 
eighteen years between 1897 and 1915 was Rs. 156, while the average production 
cost rose to Rs. 175. "In the immediate pre-war years it was difficult for a 
plantation to make a net profit of more than 3 to 3.5 per cent."85
Finlay's Calcutta management were left to pick up the pieces as best they could 
as the viability of the industry slowly disintegrated. At a management meeting 
on 18 April 1899 the minutes report that: "the books at certain indigo factories in 
our agency, and which factories were deeply in our debt, were in a chaotic state 
and in some cases had not been written up for years."86 A week later the meeting 
noted: "a letter from Mr. C.N. Macpherson objecting to Mr. Collingridge visiting 
[his factories]...Mr. Macpherson seemed to think he had a chance of getting his
84 Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi, p. 27.
85 Ibid., p. 105.
86 Glasgow University Archive, UGD91 /1 1 /2 /1 /1 . Collingridge had been appointed 
Visiting Agent on 24 January 1899.
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account taken up by another Firm and it was decided to request him at once to 
arrange this."87
On 31 May 1899 the meeting discussed the problem of the time taken to gain 
possession -  as long as eighteen months to foreclose a mortgage, and noted: "the 
importance of being able to deal summarily with indigo concerns which were 
deeply in debt to us and whose managing owners might at any moment show 
themselves to be incompetent or untrustworthy, was daily becoming more and 
more obvious." 88
The indigo problems continued to haunt the business of Finlay, Muir's Calcutta 
management meetings for years.89 "Outlays", that is advances, were still being 
made, but several liquidations were in train. On 18 July 1900 the foreclosure of 
the mortgage on Doomoa was reported. On 19 December 1900 it was reported 
that: "it did not seem likely that a realisation of the assets of this concern 
[Bisteria] would go very far towards liquidating its block debts to us". On 23 
January 1901, referring to the Burgong property, it was noted that:
Mr. Robertson had been unable to raise the loan he had hoped to do, and we 
have told him we would have to foreclose our mortgage on the concern or if he 
would hand it over to us without putting us to trouble, we might pay his passage 
home and give him a small allowance for this season.
This offer was evidently accepted, but not without further problems, because on 
1 May 1901 "Mr. Graham [the new manager] reported that Mr. Robertson had 
completed giving over charge and had signed the books, but that he declined to 
leave the factory".
The tangle of difficulties continued elsewhere. On 22 May 1901 it was reported 
that the owners of Sadananpur were
still negotiating with a Banker with a view to raising a lakh of rupees with which 
to pay off Mussamet Jalat Koeries' first mortgage and to provide 
Rs. 75,000 to give effect to the proposed arrangement with us. The Banker's 
father has unfortunately just died, and although Mr. Collingridge got the 
Mooktar who is acting for [the owners] as well as for the Banker, to go and see
87 Glasgow University Archive, UGD91/11/2 / 1/1.
88 Ibid.
89 Glasgow University Archive, UGD91/11 /2 /1 /2 .
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the latter, the Banker refused to hold any interview pending the termination of 
the funeral ceremonies which had still ten days to run.
This anecdotal report illustrates that Indian capital, as well as European, was a 
source for borrowing by indigo concerns, although the term "hanker" probably 
describes a shroff. No doubt the European banks were also making advances to 
planters, since in more prosperous times a profitable indigo concern will have 
been seen as a good risk, notwithstanding the collapses in the mid-nineteenth 
century.
It was more than a decade later that Finlays' finally fought free of the indigo 
business. Brogan recounts the end of the sad narrative:
Finally two [properties] remained in the Finlay agency, Bubnowlie in the United 
Provinces and Belsund in Bihar...With the aid of a Government loan...a sugar 
factory was erected at Bubnowlie in 1913 and the company formed in December 
1912 entered on a long period of prosperity in which James Finlay & Co. 
benefited as shareholders and as agents. Belsund turned to the manufacture of 
sugar at a much later date when competition was more severe. Apart from this, 
Belsund was handicapped at its inception by the destruction of the factory by an 
earthquake, and although rebuilt the years that followed brought little profitable 
trading.90
Ironically, soon after this the 1914-18 World War provided indigo with a 
temporary reprieve, since imports from Germany were stopped, but the patent 
for the synthetic product was expropriated by Britain as part of the reparations 
after the war, and supplies resumed.
90 Brogan, James Finlay, p. 95.
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Afterword
John Muir built a very substantial business on already substantial foundations. 
The record of Finlays' Indian enterprise is centred on him, although many others, 
including the shadowy figure of P.R. Buchanan, must also have played a part. 
Virtually the whole of the growth of the business in India took place in thirty 
years under his management as sole proprietary partner, following his initiative 
in opening the Calcutta office. But a singularity of his achievement is that he did 
not, like the entrepreneurs who were his contemporaries, serve any kind of 
commercial apprenticeship in India -  he had no direct experience of the country 
and its environment when he took the decision to re-orientate the company's 
business priorities. Indeed he does not seem to have developed any sympathy 
for the country, as his characterisation of jute traders as "Bazaar dealers and 
churkli wallahs of the lowest class" tends to demonstrate: his personal experience 
of India was only that of an occasional visitor. It is not clear from the available 
sources where he found the knowledge and advice which must have informed 
his policy, and it is only possible to speculate on the possible influence of John 
Wilson of Wilson, James & Kay. with whom Finlays' amalgamated in 1858, or of 
the Gladstone family, with whom there must have been local social contact, at 
least before the problem of competition with Gladstone, Wyllie occurred.
A pamphlet published in 1922 shows the remarkable range of interests in 
Calcutta alone:
177
Agents for numerous tea companies (88,693 acres of tea)
Jute mills (Champdany Jute Co., Ltd.)
Goolabarry Co., Ltd.(Hydraulic Jute Presses)
M. Sarkies & Son, Narainganj (Jute Balers)
Clan Line of Steamers 
Houston Line of Steamers 
Ellerman's Wilson Line of Steamers 
East Asiatic Co/s Line of Steamers 
Bengal-Dooars Railway Co., Ltd.
Insurance Companies (Fire, Marine, Life and Motor
Vehicles)
Indigo concerns91
United Provinces Sugar Co., Ltd.,
Central Provinces Prospecting Syndicate Ltd
(Manganese ore)
Tea Merchants
Jute merchants
Exporters of Jute Goods to all parts of the world
Exporters of Rice, Oil, Timber etc.,
Importers of all descriptions of Cotton Goods, Silk and Fancy Goods etc.
Importers of sugar92
The scale of Finlays' tea interests was the largest of any other single company. By 
1898, the total capital of the four tea holding companies alone was £4,358,40093 
(more than £260 million at current values). These companies were not wholly- 
owned by Finlays, but their holdings represented entirely new values added 
since Muir became a partner. Although in some respects Finlays' followed the 
beaten track in developing interests in jute, tea and (less wisely) indigo, the 
innovative tea venture in Travancore demonstrated imagination, determination 
and a willingness to take risks which matched any of the earlier pioneers, and 
was undertaken on a very substantial scale.
In Bombay the original imported cotton piece goods business had been joined by 
the major shipping interest of the Clan Line, and the parallel agency for Lloyds of 
London; and the firm's roots in cotton manufacturing were reaffirmed with the 
Managing Agency of the newly-built Swan Mill. After John Muir's death the 
Finlay Mills and Gold Mohur Mills extended this interest substantially. Finlay,
91 This seems to be an anomaly, since they had no interest in indigo after 1916, according 
to Brogan.
92 promotional pamphlet James Finlay & Company Limited (Formerly Finlay, Muir & Co.), 
Calcutta, 1922, Glasgow University Archive, UGD91/1/11/ 6/2, p. 10.
93 Brogan, James Finlay, p. 47.
178
Muir also had branches in Karachi, Chittagong and Colombo, and James Finlay & 
Co. had associated companies in South America and South Africa. In the 
London branch an important insurance business had been built up, while the 
core Scottish cotton manufacturing business continued to thrive.
Finlays' had been, of course, beneficiaries of the restrictions on the export of 
British cotton manufacturing machinery, for all Kirkman Finlay's early 
campaigning for Free Trade when his appetite for doing business in the Far East 
was frustrated by the EIC's monopoly. The blame for the cotton machinery 
restriction is traditionally laid at the door of the Lancashire industry, and there is 
no record of Scottish support or opposition. With their large piece-goods exports 
Finlays' also, of course, contributed directly to the catastrophic decline of the 
Indian handloom industry, but this was to them a familiar, if regrettable, process 
which they had seen take place close to home, and its impact in India is unlikely 
to have concerned them. Their products were of superior quality at a 
competitive price, which was scarcely a reason to examine their conscience.
Available risk capital was, of course, an important weapon in Finlays' armoury, 
and in spite of the "culture of meanness" which seemed to inform the company, 
and for which it was to become known, the evidence points to the bold and 
ruthless use of superior financial resource as a competitive development weapon. 
As we have seen elsewhere, however, there were substantial capital resources in 
Indian hands, and there is no evidence that Finlays' used their financial strength 
in order to exclude Indian participation in any of their areas of activity, apart 
from competing with local moneylenders in the financing of indigo. The 
reluctance of Indian capitalists to accept unsecured lending risks has been noted 
elsewhere.
In spite of this record of large-scale development, the last years of John Muir's 
life (he died in 1903), were by no means satisfactory from a business point-of- 
view. In his Foreword to Brogan's History, the then Chairman, John Muir's 
grandson A. M. McGrigor, wrote:
The early years of the twentieth century were years of depression not only for
James Finlay & Co., but also for the tea industry in which they were so largely
interested. For twelve years the largest tea company in their agency, The
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Consolidated Tea and Lands Company, Limited, paid no Ordinary dividends 
while the dividends on Preference shares ran into arrears. The other Tea 
Companies in the Finlay group were in little better shape. Shareholders came to 
the Annual Meetings in no mood to greet the Directors with grateful applause. 
There were stormy scenes, very trying for the Chairman and other Directors who 
had full sympathy with the feelings of the shareholders, for many of whom they 
knew the loss of dividends was a grievous blow.94
The poor performance of the tea industry at the end of the nineteenth century is 
also recorded by Griffiths:
Although markets were expanding, prices continued to fall from 1894 to the end 
of the century, and the situation was only saved by the success of the planters in 
North-east India in drastically reducing production costs. In spite of this 
reduction, in 1897 and 1898 the average dividends of Barry's listed Indian 
Companies fell respectively to 1.99 per cent and 2.84 per cent.95
Griffiths also points to the difficulties caused by the revaluation of the rupee in 
the early nineties from Is. 2d. to Is. 4d., which "meant that in rupees per pound 
of tea sold in London the industry received about twelve and a half per cent less 
than before the revaluation -  and it was in rupees that the costs of production 
had to be met".96
Allan Arthur's handover notes of April 1895 describe the Sdndia Paper Mill as 
"this wretched concern", with Rs. 25,000 owing from "the Maharajah". He also 
notes that the Bengal Nagpur Coal Company agency had been acquired in 1892 
"with Sir John Muir's sanction", and that an advance had been made of Rs. 1 lakh 
at six per cent.97 The minutes of 14 March 1896 record that Andrew Yule were 
willing to take over the agency, so it was plainly unsatisfactory. The difficulties 
in tea coincided with the progressive collapse of the indigo industry, and so it is 
doubtless true that Muir's final decade at the helm of the Eastern empire he had 
built were far from happy.
Nevertheless, Finlays' recovered from these setbacks, and from the simultaneous 
interruption of the management succession in the three years it took the Trustees 
of his very large estate to complete its reorganisation. Thereafter John Muir's
94 Brogan, James Finlay, p. v.
95 Griffiths, History of the Indian Tea Industry, p. 128.
96 Ibid. p. 139,
97 Glasgow University Archive, U G D 91/11/2/3/2.
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descendants took the company from strength to strength until their confidence in 
India was undermined by Independence. In that sense, Finlays' was a 
beneficiary of Empire, having shared its lifespan from the 1770s to 1947, and its 
afterlife till 1983, a history which set them apart from their contemporaries.
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CONCLUSIONS
Issues
Bagchi's insistence that the success of British firms depended on the privileged 
position of British business rather than die merits of its performance has 
suggested the issues which this thesis has particularly examined:
the degree of commercial skill possessed by British incomers;
the impact of imported British technical innovation, notably steam power 
and mechanised jute textile production;
the possibility that British commercial interests colluded to erect barriers 
to entry for Indian entrepreneurs;
the importance of access (possibly preferential) to British investment 
capital and bank finance;
the extent of preferential support from the imperial government;
the absence of competitive Indian entrepreneurial activity before 1914.
The study of primary and secondary sources has provided a few unequivocal 
answers to the questions raised, but it must be borne in m ind that the case 
histories rely on the selective nature of the preserved archive material and of the 
often commissioned and privately-published historical accounts, and therefore 
present a skewed profile of the totality of British Managing Agencies. In a clear 
example of history being written by the victors and not the vanquished, it was 
the successful firms which, proud of their achievements and no doubt wishing to 
be congratulated, ensured that the recorded evidence was preserved for 
posterity. But the archives of several of the larger firms have not been preserved, 
at least accessibly, and of the hundreds of smaller firms, many of which failed, 
there is no known record at all.
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Commercial skills
A handful of the individuals who led the firms they helped to found were 
marked out by their success, and several were honoured by the state. Their 
abilities were shown by events to have been exceptional, but they were indeed 
exceptions: the average was more modest, the "men of ordinary ability and. 
initiative" suggested by Lokanathan1. Possibly only John Muir of Finlays 
brought to India mature and well-established management skills, developed at 
the large cotton manufacturing business he came to own. Other protagonists, 
however distinguished they became, seem to have been equipped with little 
more than clerical and book-keeping proficiency, and although Henry and 
Steuart Gladstone had a gentlemahs education at Eton and some basic 
experience in the family firm at home before going to India, it seems unlikely that 
they "imported" superior commercial skills. Their eventual success is more 
probably attributable to a combination of opportunity and of personal 
characteristics, including the imagination to recognise the opportunities, the 
determination to grasp them and confidence that risks could be safely managed.
The later development of the Managing Agency businesses in the twentieth 
century typically saw second and third generation heirs of sharply different 
social standing from their forebears in most of the businesses (other than 
Gillanders), and the perspective from which post-Independence economists, 
politicians and historians viewed the firms may have fostered a distorted picture 
of their earlier character and of the roots of their success, while emphasising 
weaknesses which manifested themselves later. Maria Misra's Business, Race and 
Politics in British India c. 1850-19602 is an example of this, basing its generalised 
critique of the firm's long-term policies on the narrowly specialised example of 
the twentieth century correspondence of the Gladstones then running the firm. 
She is critical of their disconnection from developing Indian political and 
commercial society, but the evidence from earlier examples, even in the 
Gladstone papers themselves, shows a much closer inter-dependence in the
1 P. S. Lokanathan, Industrial Organisation in India, London, 1935, dted  in The Managing 
Agency System, Bombay, 1959, pp. 2-3.
2 Maria Misra, Business, Race and Politics in British India c. 1850-1960, Oxford, 1999
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nineteenth century, even after the watershed of the Mutiny. Clive Dewey took 
issue with her diagnosis in his review of her book.3
The early mid-nineteenth century pioneers operated on a comparatively small 
scale in the far from rarefied environment of the bazaar, sometimes in the 
mofussil, and they were at a significant disadvantage in terms of language and of 
commercial practice, particularly in negotiating credit. They could afford none 
of the delusions of grandeur which tended to manifest themselves later in 
European Calcutta's social life. With the exception of the Gladstones, they were 
not "gentlemen" and did not yet aspire to be.
"Technology transfer"
British protectionist legislation for some time attempted to prevent the export of 
cotton textile machinery. In addition, the short staple of Indian cotton was not 
well-suited to the powered spinning process. As a result local production of 
machine-spun cotton yarn and machine woven do th  was delayed for decades. 
Meanwhile exports of British-made cotton yam  and piece-goods found an 
apparently insatiable market in India, being of superior strength to the locally 
hand-made product and much cheaper, even after shipping costs.4 This trade 
was a staple of the business of the early agency houses, and continued to be 
pursued even after they had taken on Managing Agency contracts.
It was only for jute textiles that parallel technology was freely transferred from 
Dundee, accompanied by Scottish technidans, a possibly incautious step which 
eventually destroyed the parent Dundee industry. By that time stationary steam
3Clive Dewey, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, November 2001, pp. 183-87.
4 The extent of the production cost advantage for machine-spun yam  is shown in 
Kenneth Morgan, The Birth of Industrial Britain: Economic Change 1750-1850, Harlow, 1999, 
p. 41: ".. .in the 1780s it took only 2,000 hours to process 100 lbs of raw cotton in a 
factory, as against the 50,000 hours taken by Indian hand spinners." By the 1820s the 
time had been brought down to 135 hours for 100 lbs of raw cotton.
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engines were well-developed and familiar: the principal technical innovations 
were in the machine spinning of jute yam, while the application of power to the 
weaving process was more straightforward and was introduced later, as it had 
been in the British cotton industry. It was access to these British technologies 
which enabled British-owned jute mills to be set up in the heart of the Bengal 
jute-growing district (where the terrain could not have provided water power). 
Here, as in the tea industry, the Managing Agency system was an ideal solution 
to the needs of distant British shareholders, offering reliable on-the-spot 
management of the investment which they had promoted.
The technology of steam power had British roots, and although none of the 
Managing Agencies had direct experience of its application, it was a vital factor 
in four of the industries with which they came to be engaged -  textile 
manufacture, shipping, railways and coal.
Steam power revolutionised the shipping industry, and William Mackinnon, 
perhaps influenced by his early maritime environment, but more certainly 
inspired by the ferment of shipping and shipbuilding activity in Glasgow, which 
was at the heart of marine steam technology, seized enthusiastically the 
opportunities it created for scheduled steamer services in India. Marine engines 
(like the railway locomotive) required specialised solutions beyond the relatively 
simple design of a stationary engine, and were a later development. Mackinnon 
studied the engineering as well as the commercial opportunities, and his 
enterprise in building a large and successful Indian shipping line was squarely 
founded on specialised British technology.
As important as steam power to the development of m odem  shipping was the 
subsequent introduction of metal hulls, first of iron and then of steel. This also 
was a British (largely Scottish) innovation, enthusiastically embraced by 
Mackinnnon, and another important factor in the growing success of his shipping 
business.
As well as ocean-going shipping, inland water-borne transport was 
revolutionised by steam power, but it was an Indian Managing Agency, Carr,
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Tagore, which first participated in the promotion and management of this new 
enterprise, although after its failure a British firm took over. When the newly- 
built railways replaced river transport on the Ganges, operations were 
concentrated on the Brahmaputra, serving Assam, and a rival line was formed, 
which later also appointed a British Managing Agency.
Steam was, of course, also fundamental to the development of railways, which 
offered some important new commercial opportunities to Managing Agencies, 
notably in the recruitment and deployment of contract labour for construction 
and maintenance, but not in technical developments. A very few conventional 
Managing Agency contracts were made with smaller railway companies.
Another industry revolutionised worldwide by the arrival of steam power was 
coal mining, and here again it was Carr, Tagore which was first in the field, 
promoting and managing the Bengal Coal Company, to be followed by several 
others. Experienced European (and Armenian) managers were appointed, and it 
must be assumed that they introduced more advanced techniques to the hitherto 
small and undeveloped indigenous industry.
In the two important agricultural industries of tea and indigo the impact of 
British technology was minimal. Tea cultivation and manufacturing skills were 
at first imported from China, but Chinese techniques were ill-suited to conditions 
in Assam, and the British planters went on to pioneer their own techniques 
locally. As these were refined, and the successful cultivation and manufacture of 
tea flourished, the number of companies speculatively opening up new land 
multiplied, and Managing Agencies were appointed almost universally to protect 
the interests of distant shareholders and to syndicate the methodology of best 
practice, in the process amassing a large corpus of technical information which 
owed virtually nothing to imported technology.
In indigo the impact of imported technology was equally negligible. Relatively 
primitive traditional methods of extracting the indigo dyestuff had been in use in 
Bengal, Bihar and the UP for centuries before the British took an interest. 
Techniques for cultivating the indigo plant were straightforward and well-
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established. Apart from some improved husbandry and more disciplined 
extraction processes, European planters changed little.
In summary, imported technology was of immense importance in the 
introduction and application of steam power in India, and, together with iron 
and steel hulls, was the foundation for Mackinnon's successful shipping 
enterprise. Steam's demand for fuel in turn created the conditions for coal 
mining development, from which the Managing Agencies profited, and it was 
steam power which made the railways and the river steamers possible, and 
provided further profit opportunities. The mechanisation of jute textile 
production was entirely achieved through technology imported from Dundee.. 
To that extent the success of some of the Managing Agencies, notably 
Mackinnons, can be attributed to "technological transfer", but the tea industry 
was a local development, driven by British Managing Agencies. However, the 
Managing Agencies' involvement in new technology-driven enterprises was 
largely opportunistic. None of the protagonists arrived in India with a clearly- 
formed intention to start a jute mill or a shipping line, for example, although 
several later arrivals were certainly attracted by the idea of starting a tea garden 
or even an indigo factory.
Barriers to entry
It is common for big, successful corporations to attract suspicion and hostility 
from the larger community, often generated by writers and politicians, not 
exclusively from the Left. When the corporations are owned by powerful foreign 
interests, suspicion and resentment are intensified, to the level of paranoia. 
Current examples in twenty-first century Britain are numerous, from the 
American-owned Macdonalds and Starbucks catering chains to the British- 
owned Tesco supermarket chain. Accusations of malpractice are commonplace, 
and have been since the invention of the joint-stock company in the nineteenth
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century, as in Trollope's novel, The Way We Live Now. Often restrictive 
legislation comes to reflect this fundamental unease in society. In India, before 
as well as after Independence, Nationalist politicians and historians demonised 
British business as an accomplice in the perceived injustices of British rule, one of 
the accusations being that British businesses colluded to erect barriers to entry for 
Indian firms in a number of commercial fields. The research for this thesis has 
particularly sought evidence for this practice, but no convincing examples have 
been found.
A case which has attained the status of folklore is that of Maniram Dewan, 
executed by the British for treason during the Mutiny. Posthumously honoured 
as a nationalist martyr, he was employed as a diwan by the Assam Company 
before going into the service of the young Assamese Ahom Saring Raja. The 
wholly unsubstantiated but widely reported story is that he set up a tea garden 
of his own, in spite of having been prevented by allegedly discriminatory 
legislation as a "native" from enjoying the same preferential land grant terms as 
Europeans, and that the European planters somehow inspired the official 
decision to arrest and execute him, picking up his tea garden at auction 
afterwards "at a throwaway price"5. The persistence of this apparently mythical 
account (the latest version was in 2002) is remarkable, and no doubt illustrates 
the strength of the desire to demonstrate unjust British business practice, no 
matter how slender the evidence.
A less controversial, much later, example in the tea industry was the 
unsuccessful attempt by Dooars planters in the 1920s to resist the expansion into 
tea cultivation of Indian-owned agricultural land. Since business conditions in 
tea after the First World War were very difficult, it seems that the planters were 
more concerned to limit any additional production, from whatever source, than 
specifically to exclude Indian participants.
5 Sharma, Jayeeta, "An European tea 'garden' and an Indian 'frontier': the discovery of 
Assam." Centre of South Asian Studies (Cambridge), Occasional Paper No. 6,2002, p. 21, 
citing Anjan Kumar Baruah, Assamese Businessmen from Maniram Dewan to Robin Dutta, 
Guwahati, 1992, p. 10.
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At the same period the jute industry was under pressure from over-supply and 
falling prices, and the European interests represented by the Indian Jute 
Manufacturers' Association (the cartel established in 1884) were concerned that 
the opening of new mills by new Indian investors in 1922 would exacerbate the 
problem. Attempts were made to isolate them (although it might have been 
more intelligent to invite them into the cartel), and there was some overt hostility 
from the Europeans. It seems to have been this episode which prompted Bagchi 
to write with particular venom about British domination of the jute industry, 
which he suggests derived from the British domination of inland transport, of the 
port, and of the trading chain of raw jute from the peasant through to the ship, 
linked by a network of ties -  "a common interest, a common language, and above 
all, a common social distance from the Indians among whom they lived". Citing 
the occasional restrictions on non-European entry to jute trade associations, he 
suggests that "perhaps the Indian merchants knew better than to try to break into 
this nexus".6
Omkar Goswami took a different view, citing the membership of the Calcutta 
Baled Jute Association, which had 133 members in 1903-4, of which 70 were 
Indians.7 Thomas Timberg calculated that by 1900 over half the jute balers were 
Marwaris.8 Goswami goes on to say: "The Marwari move from up-country jute 
trade and dadans to speculation and futures markets, to industry, and then to the 
gunny trade and burlap exports, to eventually straddle all the sub-sectors of the 
jute economy, belies the potency of entry barriers."
Nevertheless Indians faced an undoubted entry barrier to the jute export 
business, de facto rather than deliberately erected. Bagchi's contention that "the 
market for jute manufactures had to be sought out, and this search could be 
made only by businessmen who had an intimate contact with the export trade" 
has to be accepted. The British had superior knowledge and information.
6 A. K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 263-66.
7 Omkar Goswami, Industry, Trade and Peasant Society: The Jute Economy of Eastern India 
1900-1947, Delhi, 1991, p. 85.
8 Thomas Timberg, The Marwaris: from Traders to Investors, Delhi, 1978. Cited by Stewart, 
Gordon T., Jute and Empire: The Calcutta Jute-wallahs and the Landscapes of Empire, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998, p. 26.
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The British shipping industry was also a target for strong Nationalist attacks. The 
dominance of Indian waters by British-built ships and British-owned shipping 
lines came to be cited as yet more evidence of the malignant policies of the Raj -  
"The cruel and calculated destruction of Indian shipping and shipbuilding -  as of 
many other industries -  forms a sordid chapter of the 200-year-old British 
connection with India"9. Gandhi himself expressed his outrage in 1928: "t he 
tragic history of the national village industry of cotton manufacture in India is 
also the history of the ruin of Indian shipping. The rise of Lancashire on the ruin 
of the chief industry of India almost required the destruction of Indian 
shipping."10 Although the logic of ascribing to the Lancashire cotton industry an 
intention to destroy Indian shipping is not clear, there is no doubt that British 
policies and commercial practice were, to say the least, extremely unhelpful to 
indigenous Indian maritime interests.
Restrictive British protectionist legislation in the early nineteenth century, 
reserving trading with India for British-built ships, certainly damaged the 
Bombay shipbuilding industry, but did not extend to the coasting trade. More 
damaging barriers were access to cheap timber, enjoyed by North American 
shipbuilders, and then, fatally, the development of iron and steel hulls in 
Scotland and North-east England, where geological advantages ruled Bombay 
out of the running. The new technology barrier affected many shipbuilders 
globally, and was certainly not any kind of deliberate, selective restriction on 
Indian enterprise.
More controversial, however, is the brutal and overt pursuit of monopoly by 
British ship owners, and the crucial part played by the Government mail subsidy 
in ensuring the viability of scheduled shipping lines, as well as collusive rate 
fixing and the deferred rebate system, which was effective as a barrier to would- 
be new ship operators and as an eliminator of existing competitors. The award of 
the mail subsidy had political and strategic implications for the management of 
Empire, and it is clear that William Mackinnoris personal relationship with
9 N.G. Jog, Saga ofScmdia: Struggle for the revival of Indian shipping and shipbuilding (1919- 
1969), Bombay, 1969, p. 9.
10 cited by Jog, ibid., p. 8.
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Bartle Frere was an all-important factor in gaining Government of India 
confidence and support. Without it the opportunities for a shipping line were 
very limited. If Jog's unattributed figures are correct: . .most of the 102 Indian
navigation companies which were registered between 1860 and 1925.. .had to go 
into liquidation one after another/'11
Predatory pricing by P&O torpedoed Tata's attempt to set up a joint venture 
shipping line to Japan, and Government was unsympathetic to an appeal for 
help.The Swadeshi Shipping Company, which had a political agenda as well as a 
commercial one, was relegated to an impossible competitive position by 
discriminatory shipping schedules negotiated by BI and restrictions on passages 
for Government servants. Eventually it was issues of national security that 
brought the company down.
In the coal and indigo industries the issue of barriers to entry did not arise: 
Indian zamindars for the most part owned the land, and willingly leased out to 
Europeans the rights for mining, cultivation and manufacture, preferring the 
assurance of regular rental income to the risks of operation.
Access to British capital
The overt or covert protection of an effective monopoly by one or more 
companies was more common in the nineteenth century, until successive 
legislation, particularly in Britain and America, made it illegal. Barriers to entry 
in commerce are today more usually defined by lack of fixed capital resources 
with which to match and challenge large, well-funded competitors: the "entry 
price".
11Jog, Saga of Scindia, p. 13.
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For working capital, Bagchi, and even Government, proposed that Indian firms 
were at a disadvantage in gaining access to British bank credit facilities. Bagchi 
writes of "the most important feature of the relationship between European and 
Indian capital during the period under consideration, viz., their basic 
antagonism.. .the persistent advantages enjoyed by the Europeans .. .because of 
the racial alignment of ... the financial and other services supporting and 
reinforcing European control over trade and industry.. "n
The Indian Industrial Commission of 1916-1918, which drew on self-consciously 
radical non-official businessmen, noted the difficulties in getting credit facilities 
for smaller businesses which could not offer the security of approved names or of 
readily disposable stock. Indians suffered particular difficulties in "satisfying a 
bank, whose directorate and staff are entirely European, as to their financial 
position... Applicants for assistance are often unable to exhibit their financial 
position in a form intelligible to a banker." 13
As we have seen, this was illustrated by Morris D. Morris, noting the mis-match 
between the British and the Indian credit systems, where "technical differences in 
the structure of property relations made risks different for [the British] than for 
the native entrepreneur." 14
Certainly we have also seen one instance where a British bank treated a British 
applicant with a sympathetic generosity unlikely to have been offered to an 
Indian: a personal loan to Ernest Cable of Birds' in 1889 of Rs. 1 lakh (around 
£500,000 at current values) with only 10 per cent security. But the network of 
extended Indian family relationships was equally capable of providing generous 
help for a deserving commercial cause, and there were also many instances of 
British firms using short-term Indian finance. This was not a temporary
12 Bagchi, Private Investment in India, p. 186.
13 Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-1918, New Delhi, 1918, p. 213.
14 Morris D. Morris, "Private Industrial Development on the Indian Subcontinent 1900- 
1939: Some Methodological Considerations", Modern Asian Studies, 8,4 (1974), footnote 
34, pp. 552-3.
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expedient: Tomlinson showed that almost a century later it was still an important 
source of liquidity.15
British business made good use of the limited liability company framework for 
raising investment capital, particularly after the introduction of the limited 
liability concept. Indian business was slower to embrace this new method, 
although the Marwaris were enthusiastic speculators on the Indian stock 
exchanges. For the British, access to private capital in Britain was not necessarily 
easy, but it was often possible to recruit large numbers of small shareholders.
The flotation of new companies by established British promoters could 
occasionally make use of the resources of the London stock exchange, but the 
experience of Tata's steel company flotation showed that Indian promoters were 
not favoured.16 Nevertheless, Indians soon caught up with the techniques, 
notably in the jute and cotton industries.
It can be seen, therefore, that Bagchi and the Industrial Commission may have 
been justified in pointing out that Indian business did not have easy access to 
British finance, but that the reason was partly technical, rather than deliberately 
discriminatory. Indigenous finance from traditional sources was not difficult to 
access, but the interest burden was substantially more onerous -  sometimes twice 
as high. Advances by European firms on indigo crop hypothecation were 
eagerly sought by the cultivators for this reason, and the banians and zamindars 
greatly resented this undercutting of loan rates and the loss of opportunities for 
land acquisition by foreclosing on defaulting borrowers. This disparity in rates 
of return on capital was also a significant disincentive to Indian capitalists from 
investing in new, and possibly risky, industrial developments.
15 B. R. Tomlinson, 'Colonial Firms and the Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 1914- 
1947', Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3 (1981), p. 485, citing "especially" 'Note of conversation 
with F. P. Pudamjee 31.7.35', Benthall Papers X, Centre of South Asian Studies, 
Cambridge.
16 B. R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India 1860-1970, Cambridge, 1993, p. 129.
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Preferential treatment of British firms by Government
There is no doubt that Mackinnons' shipping business received preferential 
Government treatment, for reasons other than the personal friendship which 
developed between William Mackinnon and Sir Bartle Frere, a member of the 
Supreme Council and then Governor of Bombay.
Frere was arguing for the Bombay Marine to be wound up as well as the already 
discontinued Bengal Marine, and for the private sector to provide all the Indian 
government's maritime transport needs, thus being encouraged to develop a 
mercantile marine in Indian waters. He wrote in an official Minute, "we have in 
the coasting trade of India itself the means of creating a local steam marine, 
which in time of need might render most valuable service to the State. " He 
suggested that "local coasting steamers" might be promoted by making use of 
them for the transport of troops and stores and for post-office purposes.17
Munro shows that Mackinnon's plans for a series of inter-connecting steamship 
services around India from Singapore at the end of the Straits of Malacca to Basra 
at the head of the Persian Gulf suited Frere's strategies perfectly, and he "threw 
the full weight of his influence behind William's proposals.. .As Governor of 
Bombay with responsibility for the conduct of India's foreign policy in the 
Persian Gulf, he was now ideally placed to use William Mackinnon's steamships 
as agents of British power in the Gulf.'18 However, Munro suggests that 
Mackinnon had not previously realised that steamship transport had strategic 
and political implications as well as the more obvious commercial ones.
Every state (not only the British Empire -  the Mongol Empire is one of several 
other examples) has an interest in the strength and security of its 
communications, and will sometimes impose a state monopoly if it considers its 
interests, whether strategic or mercantile, too important to put at risk 
unprotected in a competitive market. -  with the British General Post Office as a 
good recent example. In the transport industry the state will look
17 Munro, Maritime Enterprise, p. 46, citing Minute by Sir H.B.E. Frere, 6 January 1869, 
Confidential Print No. 72, Abstracts, IOLR L /P& S/19.
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sympathetically at requests for help and protection from carriers undertaking 
scheduled, regulated services which are seen as contributing to the national good 
and which can contribute to state security.
Since the railway, as well as the steamship line, was developed at the same time 
as Britain's hold on India had been challenged from within, it may have been 
inevitable that presumed loyalty to the Crown was a particularly necessary 
qualification for receiving state patronage. Nevertheless, if William Mackinnon's 
possibly paranoid suspicion was correct, there was a school of thought in the 
Bombay Presidency which favoured the "native" company for the subsidy.
A parallel case some forty years later is explored by Geoffrey Jones in his article 
on the oil industry in Burma.19 He challenges the nationalist claim that the 
Government acted in support of British interests and at the expense of Indian 
national interests. In particular he shows that "Burma Oil.. .never received the 
unequivocal support of the governments in Simla and Rangoon", but that the 
strategic requirement for fuel oil by the navy led the British Admiralty to insist 
on the exclusion of foreign companies from the Indian and Burmese oil industries 
to protect the security of supplies.
At the time of the First World War William Mackinnon's successor, James 
Mackay, later Lord Inchcape, had masterminded the merger of BI and P & O, of 
which he was chairman, and held positions of state authority. The firm was 
established as an important partner of Government.
At a less exalted level, the way in which the Jumna pontoon labour contract was 
awarded to Birds in 1864 by the East Indian Railway Company (which was under 
eventual government supervision) was extremely questionable. An Indian 
contractor won the contract at As.4 per wagon on 1 December but lost it again 
two weeks later, when Birds were appointed at As.8 per wagon. The E.I.R. traffic 
manager responsible for the recommendation turned out to be a "very good 
friend to Capt. Sam Bird, and for the following ten to fifteen years joined with the
18 Munro, Maritime Enterprise, p. 49.
19 G. G. Jones, "The State and Economic Development in India 1890-1947: The Case of 
Oil", Modern Asian Studies, 13, 3, (1979), pp. 353-375.
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Birds.. .in many of their projects, both speculative and otherwise"20, which adds 
to the doubtfulness of the transaction.
Nevertheless, whatever the truth may have been, it seems it was a minor, local 
transaction, scarcely an illustration of deliberate Government favouritism. More 
than twenty years later the Director-General of Railways reported officially: "The 
'handling' contracts [for the Eastern Bengal Railway] let to Messrs. Bird & Co. 
were satisfactorily carried out, but the rates were in excess of those given to the 
petty contractors who worked previously... the certainty of getting the 'handling' 
done at all times, without delay to vessels or rolling stock, more than 
compensated for the enhanced rates..."
It seems that the preferential treatment given to a European firm was, in this case 
at least, based on a pragmatic value judgement.
Imperial power was, of course, a prerequisite for the orderly development of the 
tea industry. Apart from the military threat of continued incursions from Burma, 
the limited power of the Assamese state to administer land use would have 
discouraged large-scale investment in an inherently unstable country. As it was, 
the imperial administration became the engine of development, and the Waste 
Lands designations and grants were the enabling mechanism. The tea industry 
was entirely the beneficiary of Empire, even if it later found itself in an 
adversarial relationship to Government. But the state was also a substantial 
beneficiary, both in the medium term, when an undeveloped jungle province 
turned into a revenue-producing asset, and in the longer term, when the tea trade 
became a dominant earner of foreign exchange.
The Waste Land Grant Rules did not exclude Indians from the benefits, although 
the high acreage threshold and the funding qualification did require considerable 
financial resource. Although the vast majority of planters were British, Indian 
participation started with Dwarkanath Tagore and continued, if patchily, 
through several crisis periods.
20 M.S. Jacomb-Hood, A History of Bird & Co. 1864-1929, Calcutta, 1929, p. 143.
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The adversarial relationships between Government and the tea industry were 
also found in the indigo industry, and in both cases the friction arose from 
Government intervention to regulate the oppressive treatment of Indians by 
planters. In the tea gardens the appalling mortality among immigrant labour 
being shipped from Chota Nagpur and the brutal pursuit of indentured 
"absconders" outraged liberal opinion and prompted legislative restraints: 
between 1861 and 1901 there were seven pieces of legislation regulating labour 
practices in tea which were seen by many planters as wanton interference with 
the practical realities of managing a tea garden.
In the indigo industry the oppressive system forcing ryot tenants to cultivate 
indigo was widely resented, and sparked serious disturbances from time to time. 
The liberal outcry enlisted vocal support from missionaries and, even more 
authoritatively, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, who set up the 1860 
Commission of Enquiry and pithily commented that the root of the problem was 
"the struggle to make raiyats grow indigo plant, without paying them the price 
for it".21 Although the industry escaped legislative controls, they were under 
continuous pressure from a generally unsympathetic Government to alter their 
contract terms.
In the tea and indigo industries a claim that they were receiving preferential 
Government treatment would have been met with derision.
21 cited in Blair B. Kling, The Blue M utiny: The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal, 1859-1862, 
Philadelphia, 1966, p. 145.
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The absence of competition from Indian entrepreneurs before 1914
No compelling evidence has been found to support the argument that British 
commercial or political policies prevented or discouraged direct Indian 
participation in the major industrial developments of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, with the exception of shipping and the railways, where 
issues of state security were perceived, particularly after the Indian Mutiny. Nor 
did the European entrepreneurs import commanding personal skills or control 
substantial financial resources (with the exceptions of Finlays and Gillanders) 
with which Indians could not compete. They could, however, access more 
readily the Scottish-based technologies of machine spinning and weaving of jute, 
of marine steam power and of iron- and steel-hulled steamships. This access was 
not necessarily exclusive, and Indian-owned steamships were in service before 
the end of the nineteenth century, whereas jute manufacturing had no Indian 
operators until the 1920s.
Religious and social inhibitions have been suggested as causes for the slow start 
of Indian industry; however, Gujarati and Marwari entrepreneurs were subject to 
the same Hindu ritual restrictions as their Bengali counterparts but succeeded in 
reconciling them with their own commercial behaviour, which by the early 
twentieth century was competing strongly with the Europeans. It was a 
Bengali, Dwarkanath Tagore, who initiated many m odem  industrial 
developments in the 1840s. There may have been some peculiar inhibitions in 
Bengal, perhaps through memories of the backlash from the 1846 financial crisis, 
perhaps from the emergence of a countiy landowning class -  the bhadralok -  with 
a cultural distaste for "trade", possibly from the example of the Indian Civil 
Service elite in Calcutta.
A principal motive may have been more rational, however. There was easier 
money to be made in agricultural finance and trading, as well as in small-scale 
traditional manufacturing, without the risks involved in the new and unfamiliar 
industries, which for the most part offered a much lower return on capital 
employed, without security. Banians, maliks and zamindars dealt only in secured 
loans "with recourse", and did not hesitate to foreclose in the event of default.
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The new industries themselves generated low-risk opportunities for profitable 
trading in ancillary services, such as the procurement of raw  jute, the activity 
where John Muir of Finlays felt exposed to sharp practice by "natives of a 
worthless sort"22.
At a more sophisticated level, Marwaris, who had long dominated the domestic 
grain market, became increasingly active in trading in raw jute futures, 
progressing gradually towards eventual jute mill ownership. They seem to have 
emulated European practice and to have been ready to speculate in risky 
ventures from the late nineteenth century. For instance, in the short-lived but 
disastrous Calcutta "gold rush" of 1894, Birds found themselves in an exposed 
position, prompting Ernest Cable to record in his memoir: "The same Marwaris, 
who brought bags of silver to the office to subscribe to the company, turned on us 
when the "boom" was over..."23
There were many parallel ancillary businesses surrounding the tea industry.
Even in indigo, where cultivation and production by indigenous landowners was 
well-established long before the Europeans moved in, many zamindars 
recognised the attraction of hiving off the management responsibility, and 
particularly the commercial risks, to European tenants, and of living comfortably 
off the rental income.
22 Glasgow University Archive, UGD91 /1 1 /2 /1 /1 . Minute of management meeting on 
15 April 1894.
23 Jacomb-Hood, M. S., A  History of Bird & Co 1864-1929, Calcutta, 1929, p. 19.
Summary
Different attitudes to the acceptance and management of financial risk may well 
have been a determining factor in the apparent reluctance of Indians, particularly 
in Bengal, to engage earlier with the opportunities for new industrial and 
horticultural enterprises. As well as underlying cultural attitudes, the British 
incomers were, almost by definition, risk-takers, having made the long voyage 
hopefully, but with no certainty of success, or even survival, and frequently 
without the security of a "position" to go to. Letters home contain a few 
personal expressions of despair, and while the official records show a high 
mortality among registered European companies, the failure of private 
partnerships, unprotected by limited liability provisions, was not similarly 
recorded. However, the psychology of risk-taking suggests that those who set 
out on a venture were confident of success, discounting the risk of failure, 
perhaps by "calculation'', even if the record showed that in many cases the 
calculation was over-optimistic.
Nevertheless, the successful entrepreneurs showed vision in identifying new 
opportunities and boldness and determination in grasping them. Many of these 
opportunities arose from Imperial rule, but only in land grants, and to some 
extent in shipping, were they in the gift of Government. Only in shipping is 
there evidence of deliberately exclusive preferential treatment for the British, 
motivated by strategic military considerations. By no means all those 
entrepreneurs were British: the subsequently successful record of industries 
owned by Parsi, Marwari and Gujarati interests denies the claim that there were 
deliberate obstacles put in the way of indigenous enterprise.
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